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
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## THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

**1624 H Street, N. W.**

**Washington, D. C.**

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Organized November 9, 1885

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
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# Equestrian Events, Games of the Xth Olympiad

By Major William M. Grimes, Cavalry\*

## General

THE equestrian sports of the Games of the Xth Olympiad are past history. However, I doubt very much if those fortunate enough to have witnessed that glamorous equine panorama will ever forget either the contests, the contestants, the spectators, the superb setting, or the staging.


Five chockablock days for horsemen! No matter where your interests lay you could drink your fill. If schooling was the apple of your eye, what a feast was spread out on Riviera's lawns on August 10th and 11th for the *Dressage* and the Three-Day training test; if you were a 'unting cross-country sort, the steeplechase and the endurance phases of the Three-Day event were enough to fill your cup to the brim. On the other hand, if the airs of the *haute école* and the gruelling endurance phases did not quench your equine thirst, you still might have found a *pièce de résistance* in the *Prix des Nations*—a 1050-meter whirl-a-round of impressive fences, ditches and water laid out on the floor of the Olympic stadium. If none of the foregoing interested you, I don't know what would have—as golf was not a sport on the programme of the Games of the Xth Olympiad.

As stated in the beginning of this account, the Games of the Xth Olympiad are past history. However, after all such contests there always follow a period of explanations and the reasons for "this and that." No attempt will be made in this article to explain why "this" and why "that." The records speak for themselves. I don't suppose any Olympiad was staged under more perfect conditions as to facilities, management and weather. Suffice it to say that the equestrian sports were beautifully staged and managed by the U. S. Cavalry Association, as the American representative of the *Fédération Equestre Internationale*.

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Barry, Cavalry, was the individual largely responsible for the detailed conduct of the equestrian events in Los Angeles, including the selection, preparation and construction of all courses and the detailed management thereof, a difficult task well administered and handled.

The schooling events took place on the beautiful turfed polo field of the Riviera Country Club. The setting was ideal. Approximately 25,000 people witnessed the two schooling tests. Looking back on it now, I doubt if ten per cent of the audience fully appreciated the marvelous exhibitions it was their privilege to witness. Once in a lifetime, perhaps, horsemen

see such exhibitions as that given by Commandant Le Sage and the horse *Taine*. One will journey far before again seeing such a splendid layout as tested the endurance of the Three-Day horses; the fences on the cross-country course were designed to test the courage and skill of both rider and mount. How well our gallant Three-Day team measured up to every requirement of this course! Who will ever forget the beautiful setting of the *Prix des Nations*?—the grassy turf of the Olympic stadium seemed to fairly bristle with fences of every description. Predominating were those of typical American hunting country: an old-fashioned snake fence, Tennessee stake and rider rock fence, oxer, a Maryland post and rail, Aiken brush, water jump ditch, bank and bar, gates of various kinds,



The Jury of Appeal. Left to right: Count Clarence Von Rosen, Sr. (Sweden) Vice President *Fédération Equestre Internationale*, Major General Guy V. Henry (USA), President *Fédération Equestre Internationale*, Commandant G. Hector, Secretary, *Fédération Equestre Internationale*.

yawning ditches; a chicken coop seemingly as high as the Olympic peristyle, with its white sides appearing to protrude abruptly out of the green carpet of the stadium's floor. Lastly, the stadium's population of 105,000, following in breathless silence every performance of each horse and rider. If Chamberlin and *Show Girl* could not win, how happy the audience was over the well-earned victory of the smiling Nipponese Lieutenant Nishi riding the courageous and experienced *Uranus*!

## The Competitors


As in past Olympics all entries were from the armies of the several competing countries. The United States, Sweden and Mexico entered all three events (*Dress-*

\*Technical Assistant to the Chief of Cavalry at the Olympic Games.

age, Equestrian Championship or Three-Day Event, and the *Prix des Nations*). Japan entered the Three-Day Event and the *Prix des Nations*, Holland the Three-Day Event only, and France the *Dressage* only. Mexico made her debut in Olympic competition.

The Japanese team consisted of 11 horses and the following riders:

Colonel Kochei Yusa, Cavalry, Chef de Mission  
Major Shunzo Kido, Cavalry  
Major Yasushi Imamura, Cavalry  
Major Shigetomo Yoshida, Cavalry  
Captain Morishige Yamamoto, Cavalry-Reserve  
Captain Taro Nara, Artillery  
Lieutenant Baron Takeichi Nishi, Cavalry



Jury for Dressage. Left to right: General La Font (France), Lt. Col. Sloan Doak (USA), Count Carl G. Bonde (Sweden).

The Swedish team consisted of ten horses and the following riders:

Count Carl Gustaf Bonde, Equerry to the King of Sweden  
Captain Count G. F. von Rosen, Swedish Royal Horse Guards  
Major Bertil Sandstrom, King's Own Hussars, Swedish Cavalry School  
Major Ernst Hallberg, 2nd Hussars  
Lieutenant Gustaf-Adolf Boltenstern, Cavalry Royal Horse Guards  
Lieutenant Count Clarence Von Rosen, Jr., Horse Guards  
Lieutenant Arne Francke, 2nd Hussars  
Lieutenant Thomas Bystrom, 2nd Hussars

The Dutch team consisted of four horses and the following riders:

Major C. H. Labouchère, Cavalry, Chef de Mission  
Lieutenant Charles F. P. de Mortanges, Cavalry  
Lieutenant Karel J. Schummelketel, Colonial Army Cavalry  
Lieutenant Jonkheer A. Van Lennep, Artillery

The French team consisted of four horses and the following riders:

Commandant Georges Hector, Cavalry, Chef de Mission  
Commandant François Xavier Le Sage, Cavalry, French Cavalry School

Commandant Charles Marion, Cavalry  
Capitaine André Jousseau, Artillery, French Field Artillery School

The Mexican team consisted of nine horses and the following riders:

Colonel S. Urvina, Cavalry, Mexican Military School, Chef de Mission  
Major Carlos H. Mejía, Cavalry  
Captain P. Ortiz, Cavalry, Mexican Staff School  
Captain José P. Allende, Cavalry, Aide to the President of Mexico  
Captain N. Mazkarian, Cavalry, Mexican Military School  
Captain J. I. Lepe, Cavalry, Mexican Military School  
Captain M. Figueroa, Cavalry, Mexican Military School  
Captain Andres Bocanegra, Cavalry, Aide to the Minister of War  
Captain Armando Barriguete, Cavalry, Mexican Military School  
Lieutenant G. Gracida, Cavalry 6th Regiment.

The American team consisted of 15 horses and the following riders:

Lieutenant Colonel C. L. Scott, Cavalry, Chef de Mission  
Major Harry D. Chamberlin, Cavalry  
Captain W. B. Bradford, Cavalry  
Captain I. L. Kitts, F. A.  
Captain E. Y. Argo, F. A.  
Captain H. E. Tuttle, Q.M.C.  
Captain Alvin C. Moore, Cavalry Reserve  
1st Lieutenant J. W. Wofford, Cavalry  
1st Lieutenant E. F. Thomson, Cavalry

Of three European teams, France and Sweden shipped to New York and thence by rail to Los Angeles, returning over the same route; the Dutch team shipped to and from Los Angeles via the Panama Canal. The Mexican team shipped by rail to Los Angeles, and the Japanese team, of course, shipped directly by water.

The Japanese team was the first to arrive, landing at the port of Los Angeles early in July. All teams landed in Los Angeles in sufficient time to acclimate horses and riders.

The horses of the foreign teams were stabled at the spacious Riviera Country Club, Santa Monica.

Captain Gustav B. Guenther, Cavalry, acted as Liaison Officer with the foreign teams.

#### Juries—Judges, Etc.

The following gentlemen served on the several juries, etc.

#### Jury of Appeal

United States—Major General Guy V. Henry,  
President *Fédération Equestre Internationale*  
France—Commandant Georges Hector, Secretary  
*Fédération Equestre Internationale*  
Sweden—Count Clarence Von Rosen, Sr., Vice  
President, *Fédération Equestre Internationale*

#### Dressage

United States—Lieutenant Colonel Sloan Doak, Cavalry

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France—General La Font  
Sweden—Count Carl G. Bonde

# *Concours Complet*

United States—Lieutenant Colonel Sloan Doak,  
Cavalry

Holland—Commandant C. H. Labouchère

Sweden—Count Carl G. Bonde

# *Prix des Nations*

United States—Lieutenant Colonel Sloan Doak,  
Cavalry

Japan—Colonel Kochei Yusa

Sweden—Count Carl G. Bonde

# *International Examining Commission—Three-Day Event*

United States—Carleton Burke

France—General La Font

Japan—Colonel Kochei Yusa

Veterinarian—Captain P. H. Hudgins, U. S. A.,  
Ret.

In addition to the foregoing, numerous regular, national guard, and reserve officers served as ground judges in the stadium jumping events and the steeplechase and cross-country phases of the Three-Day Event. In this latter event approximately 65 ground judges were required; these included timers, starters, checkers, scorers, judges at jumps, etc.

## The Dressage

The *Dressage* competition was held on Wednesday morning, August 10th, on one of the polo fields of the Riviera Club. Team and individual entries were made by France, Mexico, Sweden, and the United States—ten entries in all—with three riders each from all save Mexico, which made an individual entry only. Captain Moore of the U. S. Army, riding *Water Pat*, was the first rider; followed in turn by the first riders representing Sweden, Mexico and France.

Our team consisted of:

Captain Hiram E. Tuttle, Q. M. C. on *Olympic*—  
T. B. B. G., 16.2½, 1225, 8 years (*Radius Rose-Odetle VI.*)

Captain Isaac L. Kitts, F. A., on *American Lady*—  
T. B. B. M., 16, 1025, 11 years. (*Prince Henry-Half a Sovereign*)

Captain Alvin H. Moore, Cav. Res., on *Water Pat*—  
(*Latardo-Water Birdie*) T. B., Br., G., 15.3, 1100, 8 years.

The French team consisted of:

Commandant François X. Le Sage, on *Taine*

Commandant Charles Marion, on *Limon*

Captain André Jousseume, on *Sorella*

The Swedish team consisted of:

Lieutenant Gustaf-Adolf Boltenstern, on *Ingo*



Major Bertil Sandstrom, on *Kreta*

Lieutenant Thomas Bystrom, on *Gulliver*

The Mexican team consisted of:

Lieutenant G. Gracida, on *El Pavo*

After several riders from each country had ridden, it was very apparent that the audience was witnessing two distinct *dressage* schools—one the French, the other the Swedish. The French team were all mounted on light thoroughbreds; their schooling was indicative



Top: Major H. D. Chamberlin on "Pleasant Smiles," Cross country Course, Endurance Phase, Three-Day Event.

Middle: Capt. E. Y. Argo on "Honolulu Tom Boy," Steeplechase Course, Endurance Phase, Three-Day Event.

Bottom: Lieutenant Thomson on "Jenny Camp," Stadium Jumping Course, Endurance Phase, Three-Day Event.

of extreme lightness, balance, evenness, and grace; in passing from one movement to another there seemed to be an almost imperceptible pause. Our team showed unmistakable influence of the French school and doctrines; our horses too were all thoroughbreds. The Swedish team, on the other hand, rode a much heavier and what to us would appear to be a less breezy type



of horse; their horses were well schooled, their movements smooth and uniform; one might say they were almost routine in their evenness. In passing from one movement to another the Swedes appeared to speed, to accelerate and even slur the transitions, whereas the French transitions were more clearly defined by an almost imperceptible pause.


#### Individual Classification

| A     | B                                   | C       | D   |
|-------|-------------------------------------|---------|---|
| Order | Name                                | Country | Standing of riders in rating of each judge; viz., place total |
| 1     | Commandant Francois X. Le Sage      | France  | 6   |
| 2     | Commandant Charles Marion           | France  | 14  |
| 3     | Captain Hiram E. Tuttle, Q. M. C.   | U. S.   | 14  |
| 4     | Lieutenant Thomas Bystrom           | Sweden  | 16  |
| 5     | Captain André Jousseau              | France  | 17  |
| 6     | Captain Isaac L. Kitts, F. A.       | U. S.   | 17  |
| 7     | Captain Alvin H. Moore, Cav. Res.   | U. S.   | 20  |
| 8     | Lieutenant Gustaf-Adolf Boltenstern | Sweden  | 21  |
| 9     | Lieutenant G. Gracida               | Mexico  | 30  |
| *10   | Major Bertil Sandstrom              | Sweden  | 9   |

\*Note—Major Sandstrom was placed tenth by the Jury of Appeals for violation of a rule of the *Federation Equestre Internationale*—clucking to his horse, an unauthorized aid in the Dressage.

Note.—The figure in Column D is obtained as follows: Commandant Le Sage was rated, respectively, by the three Dressage jurors, as: Second Place, First Place, and Third Place, giving a place total of "6" as indicated.

Truly the record of our *Dressage* team was remarkable, when it is considered that not a rider nor a horse had ever before been in an international *dressage* competition, that the team had been in training less than 8 months and that we were greatly limited in the quality and quantity of suitable *dressage* prospects and qualified riders. As a nation, we are not *dressage* or school minded; at the Xth Olympiad, we



U. S. Team, 3rd in Team Dressage contest. Left to right: Tuttle, Kitts, Moore.

were competing with European countries whose equestrian history is full of the *dressage*; their riders and horses had the advantage of experience in international competition; our riders and horses were without this background and experience. Captains Tuttle, Kitts and Moore each put up highly creditable individual

performances, which in turn reflected great credit on the team as a whole. If ever long and favorable effort was rewarded, certainly it was on August 10th in the showing of our *Dressage* team.

#### Three-Day Event

I think we can safely say that, if there was one event the winning of which meant more than any other, it was the *Concours Complet D'Equitation*, or the Three-Day Event.

In the minds of most horsemen the Three-Day Event is the military event *par excellence* on the Olympic programme. The requirements for this event more nearly coincide with our conception of the ideal charger. If, in selecting and training our chargers, we followed more closely the requirements of a Three-Day horse, how much better all of us would be mounted!

The Three-Day Event is essentially a team event. Entries were made by Holland, Sweden, Japan, Mexico, and the United States, as follows:

#### Holland

Lieutenant Charles F. P. de Mortanges, on *Mar-croix*

Lieutenant Jonkheer A. Van Lennep, on *Henk*

Lieutenant Karel J. Schummelketel, on *Duiveltje*

#### Sweden

Captain Ernst Hallberg, on *Marokan*

Lieutenant Clarence Von Rosen, Jr., on *Sunny-side Maid*

Lieutenant Arne Francke, on *Fridolin*

#### Japan

Lieutenant Colonel Shunzo Kido, on *Kyu Gun*

Captain Taro Nara, on *Sonshin*

Captain Morishige Yamamoto, on *Kingo*

#### Mexico

Captain Armando Barriguete, on *Monza*

Captain José P. Allende, on *El Torero*

#### United States

Major Harry D. Chamberlin, on *Pleasant Smiles*, T. B., B., G., 16.1, 1100, 8 years (*Transvaal-Bread Winner*)

Captain Edwin Y. Argo, on *Honolulu Tom Boy*, T. B., Ch., M., 15.2½, 1050, 6 years (*Honolulu Boy-B. M. 534*)

Lieutenant Earl F. Thomson, on *Jenny Camp*, ½T. B., B., M., 16, 1000, 6 years (*Gordon Russell-B. M. 392*)

Our team was mounted on outstanding types of American thoroughbreds with the exception of Thomson on *Jenny Camp*, a half thoroughbred. They were in excellent condition—ready, fit and "raring to go." How well they and their riders were prepared is witnessed in the account that follows. None of the other teams were mounted on clean bred horses exclusively. The Swedes had one clean bred, one three-quarter bred and one unknown; the Dutch horses were all ½T. B.; the Japanese had no clean breeds, neither did the Mexicans. It was the consensus of opinion of practically all competitors that the thoroughbred was the only type of horse that could satisfactorily meet the rigid present-day requirements of the Three-Day Event.



## Training Test, Three-Day Event

The Three-Day Event started on Thursday, August 11th, with the training test, at the Riviera Club.

The *Fédération Equestre Internationale* in order to place more emphasis on the training test (schooling) of this event did two things, viz: First, increased the number of allotted points to 400; and then disqualified any rider who failed to make a score of at least 150 points. Knowing the *Fédération's* attitude regarding schooling, those responsible for the training of our Three-Day Team recognized the necessity of concentrating on the schooling phase of the Three-Day. This was a sound and wise decision; if successful it would enable us to "feather our nest" prior to the endurance phase and give us a margin on which to operate. Just how successful we were is attested by the results listed below. Out of 14 competitors, all three of the U. S. Army riders placed within the first six, viz: First, second and sixth. Our team stood first as a team with a total average score of 973.333; Sweden was second with 904.332, and Holland, third with 856.833.

It was a very pretty sight, indeed, to witness the 11-minute period allowed for the execution of the prescribed movements. Listed below are the individual scores of this phase:

| Order | Name                | Country | Horse                   | Average Score |
|-------|---------------------|---------|-------------------------|---------------|
| 1     | Chamberlin, Major   | U. S.   | <i>Pleasant Smiles</i>  | 340.333       |
| 2     | Argo, Captain       | U. S.   | <i>Honolulu Tom Boy</i> | 333.0         |
| 3     | Mortanges, Lt.      | Holland | <i>Marcroix</i>         | 311.833       |
| 4     | Von Rosen, Lt.      | Sweden  | <i>Sunnyside Maid</i>   | 310.666       |
| 5     | Francke, Lt.        | Sweden  | <i>Fridolin</i>         | 303.333       |
| 6     | Thomson, Lt.        | U. S.   | <i>Jenny Camp</i>       | 300.000       |
| 7     | Hallberg, Captain   | Sweden  | <i>Marokan</i>          | 299.333       |
| 8     | Van Lennep, Lt.     | Holland | <i>Henk</i>             | 277.5         |
| 9     | Schummelketel, Lt.  | Holland | <i>Duiveltje</i>        | 267.9         |
| 10    | Yamamoto, Captain   | Japan   | <i>Kingo</i>            | 257.333       |
| 11    | Nara, Captain       | Japan   | <i>Sonshin</i>          | 242.000       |
| 12    | Kido, Lt.           | Japan   | <i>Kyu Gun</i>          | 212.82        |
| 13    | Allende, Captain    | Mexico  | <i>El Torero</i>        | 171.166       |
| *14   | Barriguete, Captain | Mexico  | <i>Monza</i>            | 119.166       |

\*Note.—Eliminated for failure to make the requisite number of points—150 points, minimum.

## Endurance Phase Three-Day Event

On Friday, August 12th, began the rigorous endurance phase of the Three-Day Event. There were many thrilling episodes connected with the running thereof. First a word as to the 22½-mile course to be made in two hours, 5 minutes and 6 seconds. There were 5 separate and distinct phases, viz:

**Phase A**—4½ miles roads and paths over a winding trail leading up a canyon and over some difficult foothills. Rate, 9 miles per hour.

**Phase B**—2½ miles steeplechase course consisting of 15 fences—brush, open ditches and water jump—jumps as specified by National Steeplechase and Hunt Association rules—Rate 22½ miles per hour.

**Phase C**—9½ miles—more roads and paths. In order to get to Phase D, (Endurance) it was necessary to follow certain streets from the Riviera Club area to the high mesa in the vicinity of Loyola College. Rate 9 miles per hour.

**Phase D**—5 miles—the course included 34 obstacles, brush, post and rail, Aiken fence, ditch in and out across road, stone fence, concrete culvert, logs, water trough, baled hay, chicken coop, etc.

Fences were, in general, solid and imposing in size. Rate 17 miles per hour.

**Phase E**—1½ miles, gallop on the flat, to be made in 6 minutes.

The terrain in and around the Riviera area is, from an equestrian point of view, far different from the lovely galloping country to be found in the hunting areas of our eastern seaboard, with their natural



U. S. Team, winner of Three-Day Event. Left to right: Chamberlin, Argo, Thomson.

fences and stretches of nice galloping turf. In Los Angeles, it was extremely difficult to find suitable terrain on which to stage the endurance phase; it was necessary to construct not only a steeplechase course—since none was in existence—but likewise to construct all the fences for the endurance phase. As I recall it, there was not a single fence that was not "planted" so to speak—post and rail fences, stone walls, etc., such as we know in the east, are not to be found in and around Santa Monica. Unfortunately the going on the Cross-country course was hard—the ground was baked, with numerous cracks and ridges. However, it was the best to be had and it was as fair for one horse and rider as for another.

Let us go through a few phases with several riders. First, Lieutenant Thomson of the U. S. Army riding *Jenny Camp*—winner of the endurance phase. Lieutenant Thomson and the gallant *Jenny Camp* incurred not a single jump penalty in either the steeplechase or cross-country phases—some forty odd jumps clean as a whistle,—truly a remarkable achievement. Lieutenant Thomson gathered a six-point bonus for the steeplechase. Second place went to Lieutenant Mortanges riding *Marcroix*, the winner of the Individual Three-Day Event in 1928; he received a 70-point penalty in the cross-country phase and a 6-point bonus in each of the cross-country and steeplechase phases. Lieutenant Von Rosen of Sweden placed third in the individual classification with a 50-point penalty in the steeplechase and with a 12.5 point time penalty and a 4-point bonus for the cross-country phase. Captain Hallberg of Sweden placed fourth, with Major Chamberlin of the U. S. in fifth place. Lieutenant Schummelketel of Holland was sixth, and Captain Yamamoto

of Japan seventh. Captain Argo of the U. S., who was eighth, on this day, gave one of the highlight performances of the Games. Prior to the team's departure from Fort Rosecrans, Argo slipped and fell on a staircase and dislocated his shoulder; he entered the events with his shoulder strapped to his side. The Training test caused him no difficulty, but the water jump on the steeplechase was a disastrous fence for him. Here, Argo's shoulder popped out once more, as a result of a peculiar twist of *Honolulu Tom Boy*; during this period the excruciating pain caused intense suffering, and it was only by the greatest display



Dutch Team, second in Three-Day Event—Left to right: Lieutenants Van Lennep, de Mortanges, Schummelketel.

of grit and determination that Argo carried on, riding a distance of approximately twenty miles and negotiating some forty odd fences with a score high enough to warrant an individual classification of eighth for the endurance phase. After the water jump on the steeplechase course, it became necessary for Argo to radically change his seat, in order to ease the strain on his injured shoulder.

Colonel Kido of Japan was unfortunate enough to be eliminated at the last fence of the endurance phase (jump No. 34, a chicken coop across a road). This was the irony of fate after a twenty-mile gallop and negotiating over two score fences. Captain Nara of Japan was eliminated on the twelfth jump of the steeplechase, and Captain Allende of Mexico was eliminated for failure to keep to the course between the twelfth and thirteenth obstacles. Lieutenant Francke of Sweden was eliminated three jumps from the finish—at Jump 31 of the cross-country phase. Major Chamberlin had a perfect performance on the steeplechase course; but on the cross-country course *Pleasant Smiles* plowed through the thirty-second jump with a resultant terrific fall for Chamberlin and his mount. However, undeterred, *Pleasant Smiles* gallantly carried his rider on to the finish.

Of the thirteen riders who started the endurance phase, two were eliminated in the steeplechase course, and two were eliminated in the cross-country phase. Three riders got through the steeplechase and cross-country courses without any faults at fences (Schummelketel of Holland, Thomson of the U. S. and Yama-

moto of Japan). Lieutenant Mortanges of Holland was the only rider to receive a bonus on both the steeplechase and cross-country phases; six each, or a total of twelve.

The finish of the endurance phase was a scene of intense activity, as each horse and rider drew up after the long twenty-two mile ride. Only two teams finished with three riders up—Holland and the United States. Each of these teams finished with all three horses in reasonably good shape. By far the most alert, the most unconcerned and the least fatigued horse was the bold and courageous filly, *Jenny Camp*. She was a picture of perfect health and condition as she nibbled some hay a few minutes after completing the course. Only a courageous hearted thoroughbred like *Pleasant Smiles* could have carried on and finished after his terrific fall towards the end of the cross-country phase. The same applies to his rider.

At noon on Saturday, August 13th, all horses which had satisfactorily completed the endurance phase were examined by an international commission, for the purpose of eliminating all horses suffering from the effects of the first two days' tests. All satisfactorily passed the commission.

Insofar as the *Endurance Phase* itself is concerned the individual classification of the first three riders follows:

1st—Lieut. E. F. Thomson, U. S., *Jenny Camp* 1271

2nd—Lieut. C. F. P. de Mortanges, Holland,

*Marcroix* ..... 1242

3rd—Count Clarence von Rosen, Jr., Sweden,

*Sunnyside Maid* ..... 1241.5

Team standing for endurance based on total of individual scores:

1st—United States ..... 3286

2nd—Holland ..... 3144.5

At the close of the *endurance phase* (including the schooling) the *team standing* was:

1st—United States ..... 4259.33

2nd—Holland ..... 4001.33

Individual standings:

1st—Lieut. Thomson, U. S., *Jenny Camp* .... 1571

2nd—Lieut. Mortanges, Holland, *Marcroix* .... 1553

3rd—Lieut. Von Rosen, Sweden, *Sunnyside Maid* 1552.1

Here again we see an American officer winning the Individual *Endurance* phase and our team first as a team.

#### Stadium Jumping Phase

The final phase of the test was the stadium jumping held on the afternoon of August 13th. A beautiful course of twelve jumps faced each horse and rider; the fences were between three feet seven and three feet nine in height. Each horse was required to take the course at a fourteen mile gallop.

The standing of the several riders was:

| Order | Name          | Country | Horse                   | Total Penalty |
|-------|---------------|---------|-------------------------|---------------|
| 1     | Argo, Captain | U. S.   | <i>Honolulu Tom Boy</i> | 0.75          |
| 2     | Mortanges     | Holland | <i>Marcroix</i>         | 40.0          |
| 2     | Hallberg      | Sweden  | <i>Marokan</i>          | 40.0          |
| 3     | Yamamoto      | Japan   | <i>Kingo</i>            | 40.25         |
| 4     | Von Rosen     | Sweden  | <i>Sunnyside Maid</i>   | 42.75         |
| 5     | Schummelketel | Holland | <i>Duiveltje</i>        | 58.0          |
| 6     | Thomson       | U. S.   | <i>Jenny Camp</i>       | 60.0          |
| 6     | Chamberlin    | U. S.   | <i>Pleasant Smiles</i>  | 60.0          |
| 7     | Van Lennep    | Holland | <i>Henk</i>             | 114.25        |

Captain Argo, riding *Honolulu Tom Boy*, made a remarkable performance; not a fault at a jump—only a time penalty of 0.75. Lieutenant Thomson on *Jenny Camp* went into the final phase of the Three-Day Event with a 17.2 point lead over his nearest competitor, Lieutenant Mortanges of Holland on *Marcroix*. However, in the stadium jumping phase *Marcroix* negotiated the course more cleanly than did *Jenny Camp*. *Marcroix* had one knockdown and touched the water once, whereas *Jenny Camp* had one knockdown and was in the water at the fourth and eighth obstacles, which lost Lieutenant Thomson the Individual Three-Day Championship.

The final scores of the Three-Day Event are listed below—and what records of achievement they are:

## Team Standing

| Rider                | Country | Horse                   | Score    |
|----------------------|---------|-------------------------|----------|
| Lieutenant Thomson   | U. S.   | <i>Jenny Camp</i>       | 1811.0   |
| Captain Argo         | U. S.   | <i>Honolulu Tom Boy</i> | 1539.25  |
| Major Chamberlin     | U. S.   | <i>Pleasant Smiles</i>  | 1687.833 |
| Team total           | U. S.   |                         | 5038.083 |
| Lieut. Schummelketel | Holland | <i>Duiveltje</i>        | 1614.5   |
| Lieut. Van Lennep    | Holland | <i>Henk</i>             | 1260.75  |
| Lieut. Mortanges     | Holland | <i>Marcroix</i>         | 1813.833 |
| Team total           | Holland |                         | 4689.083 |

Our team led from the start; the victory was a glorious achievement for our riders and horses. Each rider of our team won an individual phase, viz: training, endurance and stadium jumping. The team, as a team, likewise won every phase! This is the first time that the Three-Day Event has been won by any nation but Sweden and Holland. The foundation for this victory was begun in 1912 and was added to by the experiences gained in 1920, 1924, and 1928. The result speaks volumes for the resourcefulness, determination, courage, and skill of our riders and mounts. The cornerstone of the Three-Day victory was laid on "condition"—for which two individuals are largely responsible—namely, Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Scott, Team Manager, and Major James E. Noonan, Veterinary Corps, Team Veterinarian.

Condition, while a great contributing factor, alone could not assure victory; there were long tedious hours spent in the saddle preparing for these events. Here is where the experienced eye of Major Chamberlin was so useful for the schooling and jumping.

It goes without saying that victory would not have been possible without the loyal and wholehearted cooperation of every officer and enlisted man serving with the team. For loyalty, faithfulness and devotion to the work of the enlisted attendants of the team, under conditions which at times were most trying, stands out as one of the high spots of the Games of the Xth Olympiad. The part played by these men cannot be measured. Suffice it to say that theirs was a contribution that assured success to our team.

Individual standings of competitors follow:

| Order | Rider              | Country | Horse                   | Score    |
|-------|--------------------|---------|-------------------------|----------|
| 1     | Mortanges, Lt.     | Holland | <i>Marcroix</i>         | 1813.833 |
| 2     | Thomson, Lt.       | U. S.   | <i>Jenny Camp</i>       | 1811.0   |
| 3     | Von Rosen, Lt.     | Sweden  | <i>Shinnyside Maid</i>  | 1809.416 |
| 4     | Chamberlin, Maj.   | U. S.   | <i>Pleasant Smiles</i>  | 1687.833 |
| 5     | Hilberg, Captain   | Sweden  | <i>Marokan</i>          | 1679.33  |
| 6     | Schummelketel, Lt. | Holland | <i>Duiveltje</i>        | 1614.5   |
| 7     | Yamamoto, Captain  | Japan   | <i>Kingo</i>            | 1609.583 |
| 8     | Argo, Captain      | U. S.   | <i>Honolulu Tom Boy</i> | 1539.25  |
| 9     | Van Lennep, Lt.    | Holland | <i>Henk</i>             | 1260.75  |



Top: Commandant LeSage, French Army, on "Taine"—winner of the Individual Dressage. Middle: Lieutenant Charles F. P. de Mortanges, Dutch Army, with "Marcroix." Highest individual score—Three-Day Event. Bottom: Lieutenant Baron Nishi of Japan. Highest Individual Score, Prix des Nations.

To win the individual Three-Day Event is a glorious victory; to win it twice in two successive Olympics with the same horse is an honor that has never before been achieved. Lieutenant Mortanges of Holland and the gallant 12-year old half-bred bay gelding *Marcroix* richly and truly deserve the title of "Olympic Champions."



## Prix Des Nations (Jumping Event)

The *Prix des Nations* was the closing event of the equestrian sports; indeed, it was the *grand finale* of all the sports of the Games of the Xth Olympiad. On Sunday afternoon, August 14th, over 105,000 people were in the Olympic stadium to witness the closing ceremonies and the *Prix des Nations*. This audience saw the greatest jumping exhibition ever staged in this country.

There were four team entries—Mexico, United States, Japan, and Sweden, making a total of twelve individual competitors.

The United States team consisted of:

Major Harry D. Chamberlin, Cavalry, on *Show Girl*, T.B., Gr. M., 15.3, 1150, 8 years, (*Stress-Chanata*).

Captain William B. Bradford, Cav., on *Joe Aleshire*, ½T.B., B., G., 16.1, 1200, 12 years, (*Red—S.B.-McDonald—T.B.*)

Lieut. John W. Wofford, Cavalry, on *Babe Wartham*, ½T.B., B., G., 16.2½, 1175, 13 years, (*Henry of Navarre—½ Coach*).

Our riders need no introduction; all were veterans seasoned and experienced in past international competition. As to horses, they likewise were experienced. Our *Prix des Nations* nominations were originally *Babe Wartham*, *Joe Aleshire*, and *Tan Bark*, with *Show Girl* as substitute. Forty-eight hours prior to the actual event the final team was selected with *Joe Aleshire*, *Babe Wartham*, and *Show Girl*. *Tan Bark* had not been in the best of condition, and it was decided not to enter him. Evidence of the soundness of *Show Girl's* selection, both as the general reserve mount for the entire team and as a competitor in the *Prix des Nations*, is borne out by her wonderful showing in this event. Many were disappointed in not seeing *Ugly* nominated; however, he was not in satisfactory condition.

The course as set up had twenty obstacles; it was approximately 1050 meters long and required a gallop of 400 meters per minute. The fences were stiff, mostly patterned after natural hunting country. They were also higher than in past Olympics, due to new requirements as to dimensions. Without doubt it was the most difficult course ever set up in the United States; however, this was but to be expected—this was Olympic competition,—a fact often overlooked by carping critics.

The Olympic stadium course demanded a galloping "lepper"—one bold, courageous, dependable, and experienced. Mere jumping ability was not sufficient—time and space factors demanded a horse that could move along. To these two qualities one had to add boldness and courage so as to face the yawning ditches, stretches of water, the breadth, height and variety of the fences; lastly, but not least, there was required dependability and experience—to steady, place and lift the bold gallant horse over the tight spots and trappy places at his fences.

Let us follow the four teams and the twelve riders. The first to attempt to negotiate the course was Captain Bocanegra of the Mexican Army—horse and rider reached the fifth obstacle (ditch and bank), where they were eliminated for three disobediences (refusals). Then came our first rider, Lieutenant Wofford on *Babe Wartham*. Wofford should have been eliminated at the eleventh fence, where he had his third disobedience, the other two being at the eighth and tenth fences. However, the jury permitted him to complete the course. The third entrant was Major Imamura of Japan; he was eliminated at the tenth fence, having suffered one disobedience at the eighth fence and two more at the tenth. All eyes now turned to Lieutenant Von Rosen of Sweden. Due to individual penalties up to this moment, the teams of Mexico, United States and Japan were already eliminated as teams. Lieutenant Von Rosen was the first rider to safely negotiate the course, with the excellent score of sixteen penalties. Major Mejía of the Mexican Army was eliminated at the second fence for three refusals. Then came Captain Bradford on old *Joe Aleshire*; they completed the course with a score of twenty-four

Sweden was eliminated as a team at the tenth fence—an Aiken brush—where Lieutenant Francke had three refusals. Up to this time Lieutenant Francke's mount was jumping very nicely. All teams were now eliminated. So, attention was now focused on the individual. So far Lieutenant Von Rosen was standing first, with sixteen faults; and Captain Bradford was second with twenty-four faults. The last Mexican rider, Captain Ortiz, was eliminated at the eighth fence where he had his third disobedience. Next came the final United States representative, Major Chamberlin on *Show Girl*. Many the time Chamberlin had ridden forth in team competition faced with the insurmountable task of turning in a perfect score—and how well he has succeeded is well known to all followers of our Army equestrian teams! Chamberlin and *Show Girl* were the cynosure of all eyes and the hopes of every American in the Olympic stadium. Chamberlin and the graceful, grey, rakish mare got away to a lovely start—four fences in perfect form—then a knockdown at the fifth fence (a four-point penalty)—feet in the water at the sixth fence and in water again at the thirteenth fence, making eight faults over water, or a grand total of twelve faults. What a roar of applause greeted this gallant rider and horse,—and well the audience might cheer, for the U. S. Army was now first with a rider having a score of twelve—no mean score for the *Prix des Nations*! Then came Lieutenant Baron Nishi riding the Japanese Army entry *Uranus*—a big upstanding 14-year old French half-bred. *Uranus* under the skillful riding of Lieutenant Nishi incurred no penalty until the water was touched at the sixth obstacle (3 faults)—a quick recovery, then three clean leaps and the first refusal at the tenth fence,—an Aiken brush (3 faults)—then on again with not a single remaining fault, a total of seven faults at fences and a time



penalty of one fault, or a grand total of eight faults, and the crowd hailed the winner of the *Prix des Nations!* A great victory for Japan, and well might they be proud of Nishi and *Uranus*.

Following is the scores of the individuals:

| Order | Rider             | Country | Horse               | Score |
|-------|-------------------|---------|---------------------|-------|
| 1     | Lieut. Nishi      | Japan   | <i>Uranus</i>       | 8     |
| 2     | Major Chamberlain | U. S.   | <i>Show Girl</i>    | 12    |
| 3     | Lieut. Von Rosen  | Sweden  | <i>Empire</i>       | 16    |
| 4     | Captain Bradford  | U. S.   | <i>Joe Aleshire</i> | 24    |
| 5     | Captain Hallberg  | Sweden  | <i>Kornett</i>      | 50.5  |

Some interesting sidelights:

- No team had three riders to complete the course; therefore, there were no team awards.
- United States and Sweden the only two countries having two riders up at finish.
- Out of twelve riders—five completed the course.
- Of those who finished the course Lieutenant Nishi was one of the two competitors who had a time penalty. Lieutenant Nishi had no knockdowns; his penalties were "feet in water", a "refusal" and "time."
- Not a single rider and horse escaped a 4-fault penalty for feet in water at the sixth obstacle (leaning bar and water). The only rider whose horse did not touch the water at the thirteenth fence was the winner, Lieutenant Nishi.



#### Recapitulation

To summarize, the showings made by the 1932 Olympic Games Equestrian Teams are as follows:

| Nation        | Dressage |            | Three-Day |            | Prix des Nations |            |
|---------------|----------|------------|-----------|------------|------------------|------------|
|               | Team     | Individual | Team      | Individual | Team             | Individual |
| United States | III      | III        | I         | II         | .....            | II         |
| France        | I        | I & II     | .....     | .....      | .....            | .....      |
| Sweden        | II       | .....      | III       | .....      | .....            | III        |
| Holland       | .....    | .....      | II        | I          | .....            | .....      |
| Japan         | .....    | .....      | .....     | .....      | .....            | I          |
| Mexico        | .....    | .....      | .....     | .....      | .....            | .....      |

The 1932 Olympic Games Equestrian Team will go down as one of the most successful teams that has ever represented our Army in Olympic competition. It has set a high record of achievement. The team was fortunate in its personnel, as well as in its horseflesh. Extremely fortunate, too, the team has been in having as Chief of Cavalry\* one who rode on and captained the first Olympic equestrian team of the American Army (1912). This in itself assured the team a broad and sympathetic understanding. This factor, coupled with the War Department's policy of helpfulness and cooperation, materially assisted the efforts of all concerned in winning an Olympic equestrian victory on American soil.

\*Major General Guy V. Henry



U. S. PRIX DES NATIONS TEAM

Top: Major Chamberlain; Middle: Captain Bradford; Bottom: Lieutenant Wofford.



# A Suggested Procedure

## To be Followed When a Line Troop of Cavalry is Ordered to Prepare For Immediate Field Service of an Indefinite Duration

By First Lieutenant Frederick W. Drury, Cavalry

### Assume:

1. No "warning" order.
2. Date of return to home station—unknown.
3. Individual field equipment (clothing, belts, etc.) in possession of men.
4. In squad rooms, a wall locker and a trunk locker for each man.
5. Rifles in arm racks in squad rooms.
6. The following are at stables:
  - a. war set and extra tie ropes,
  - b. class "A" harness,
  - c. all packs.
  - d. extra horse shoes,
  - e. class "A" wagons and jockey box equipment.
7. The following are in store room in barracks:
  - a. extra laundry or barrack bag for each man, properly tagged with man's name and grade,
  - b. one additional name tag for each man,
  - c. ammunition,
  - d. class "A" mess and organizational equipment except that at stables,
  - e. all arms except rifles.

A. As soon as the order for the turn-out is received, the 1st sergeant, mess sergeant, supply sergeant, stable sergeant, and all platoon sergeants will assemble in the orderly room for a conference with the troop commander. This conference will take precedence over all other duties.

B. After this conference the following procedure will be strictly followed in the order given:

1. All members of the troop, including officers' orderlies, will report immediately to their squad leaders at barracks. The stable sergeant *only* will remain at the stables. Teamsters, saddlers, and other troop specialists will proceed as indicated in "Special Instructions" given below.

2. All men will then dress in their most serviceable field uniforms, with war set belts, canteen covers, and suspenders.

3. All men will then make their canteen rolls and lay them at the foot of their bunks. Squad leaders will personally supervise this work.

4. Under the supervision of their squad leaders all men will then draw the following articles from the supply sergeant at the store room:

- a. pistols,
- b. machine guns,
- c. ammunition.
- d. one (1) extra laundry bag per man,
- e. two (2) name tags per man.

(Squad leaders, as they report to supply room, will furnish a detail to help the supply sergeant with this work.)

5. All men will then place their personal equipment and clothing *not* to be taken into the field in trunk lockers or barrack bags plainly tagged with the name, grade, and troop number of the man to whom it belongs. Wall lockers will be emptied and left open. Trunk lockers and barrack bags will then be piled neatly by squads in a location previously determined upon. Men on duty at the stables will see that their trunk lockers and barrack bags are taken to quarters and left in the proper locations. (*Property not placed in trunk lockers or tagged bags will probably be lost.*)

6. All men armed with rifles will then draw rifles from the arm racks in the squad rooms.

7. Platoon sergeants will then cause their platoons to fall in in front of barracks with the following equipment:

- a. canteen rolls,
- b. arms,
- c. raincoats (unless overcoats are prescribed,

in which case the raincoats will *not* be carried.)

Squad leaders, under the close supervision of platoon sergeants, will then inspect their squads. The following points, particularly, will be noted:

- a. Completeness of equipment,
- b. Serviceability of clothing,
- c. Serviceability of shoes.
- d. Serviceability of gloves, hat cords, etc.
- e. Proper arms.

NOTE: This is a very important inspection, and squad and platoon leaders will be held strictly responsible that all members of their units are properly equipped and clothed. Necessary changes and corrections *must* be made at *this* inspection. There will be no opportunity later. Platoon and squad leaders will not report their units as formed until they have assured themselves that these units are absolutely ready for the field. There will be no excuses accepted for shortages or unserviceability of equipment, sloppy or dirty clothing or equipment.

8. After this inspection, no man will leave the troop, his platoon, or his squad without first securing authority to do so from an officer.

9. Platoon sergeants will then march their platoons to the stables (*filling canteens en route*). Saddles will be packed and assembled by squads in a convenient location. All *pack saddles and relative pack equipment* will be placed in the aisles of stables directly behind each pack horse concerned, in such a manner that they can be placed upon the horses' backs systematically and at a moment's notice.

NOTES: a. While saddles are being packed, squad leaders will report to the stable sergeant and draw enough class "A" halters and tie ropes for the

men in their squads. Squad leaders of the M. G. Platoon and Troop Headquarters will draw sufficient additional tie ropes and halters for all pack horses.

b. Before packing his pommel roll, each man, under the supervision of his squad leader, will report to the stable sergeant with grain bag and get one (1) feed of grain per animal. Members of the M. G. Platoon and Troop Headquarters will carry two (2) feeds of grain in order to provide for the pack horses. Members of Troop Headquarters will also draw sufficient nose bags from the stable sergeant for all pack horses.

10. a. The 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, will then report, dismounted, to the supply sergeant at the store-room to act as a loading detail for the wagons. This squad will remain on this duty until it has been relieved by another squad or dismissed by the officer in charge of loading wagons.

b. The 1st Squad, 2nd Platoon, will report, dismounted, to the mess sergeant at the kitchen. This squad will remain on this duty until it has been relieved by another squad or dismissed by the officer in charge of loading wagons.

11. The 1st and 2nd Platoons (less 1st Squad of each), assisted by Troop Headquarters and the M. G. Platoon, will then water, clean out the feet, and brush off all horses in the troop.

a. Horses will be tied outside the stable as for drill, unless the weather is inclement, in which case the horses will be left in the stables.

12. All platoons, under the supervision of the platoon sergeants, will then saddle, forming, when saddled, as for drill.

13. Squad leaders will then draw from the stable sergeant extra fitted shoes for all horses in their squads.

14. a. The 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, will then report, mounted, to the supply sergeant at the store-room, relieving the 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, which, upon relief, will proceed to the stables, saddle, and form with the remainder of the platoon. The 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon will remain on duty at the store-room until it is dismissed by the officer in charge of loading wagons.

b. The 2nd Squad, 2nd Platoon, will report, mounted, to the mess sergeant at the kitchen, relieving the 1st Squad, 2nd Platoon, which, upon relief, will proceed to the stables, saddle, and form with the remainder of the Platoon. The 2nd Squad, 2nd Platoon, will remain on duty at the kitchen until it has been dismissed by the officer in charge of loading wagons.

15. All equipment will then be properly adjusted, upon the completion of which process platoon leaders will report their units as formed.

16. Upon the receipt of these reports, the troop commander, accompanied by platoon sergeants, will make a thorough inspection of all platoons. This inspection will cover the following points:

a. Adjustment of equipment including biting,

- b. Cleanliness of leather equipment,
- c. Cleanliness of horses,
- d. Correctness of arms,
- e. Cleanliness of personal equipment of men,
- f. Completeness of personal equipment of men,
- g. Extra fitted shoes for each horse,
- h. Extra grain, halter shanks, etc.
- i. Condition of horses; lameness, etc.

NOTE: Deficiencies listed under headings b, c, e and f above will *not* be corrected; all other deficiencies will be corrected.

17. Platoons will remain dismounted until directed to mount.

C. The following *special instructions* will be obeyed by the individuals concerned:

1. *Teamsters.*

a. As soon as they have been notified of the turn-out, teamsters will at once proceed to the stables in fatigue clothes, water, groom, and harness wheel mules and buckboard team using class "A" equipment throughout. They will then get class "A" wagons and spot them as follows: Baggage—Store-room; Ration—Kitchen; Buckboard—After getting officers' bedding rolls—at kitchen.

NOTE: Between the wagon shed and barracks, teamsters will stop at the stables, draw jockey box equipment, whips, wagon covers, etc., forage (if prescribed), and feed, from the stable sergeant. These supplies will be placed in the wagons.

b. After the wagons have been spotted, teamsters will get lead teams, water, brush off, and harness them, and hitch them to the wagons.

c. Teamsters will then inspect all harness for adjustment and then prepare their personal equipment, turning their teams over to a member of the squad on duty at the place the wagon is spotted.

d. Teamsters will then assist in the loading of their wagons and will then report to the officer in charge of loading wagons for instructions.

2. *Officers' orderlies.* Officers' orderlies will roll their rolls, etc., as rapidly as possible and will then report to their squad leaders for inspection. They will go to stables ahead of the troop and prepare the officer's horse and saddle equipment for the field. They will then pack and saddle their own horses, reporting mounted, upon completion of this duty, to the officers for whom they are acting as orderlies.

3. *Saddler.* The saddler will go to barracks with the stable crew, draw his own equipment and arms, and report to the 1st sergeant for inspection. He will also draw a rifle, pistol, and ammunition for the stable sergeant. He will then go to the stables, pack his saddle, and will then assist the stable sergeant. The saddler will carry a kit on his saddle bag.

4. *Horseshoers.* Horseshoers will go to barracks with the stable crew, draw their equipment and arms, and report to the 1st sergeant for inspection. They will then go to stables, pack their saddles, saddle, and will then assist the stable sergeant. Each horseshoer will carry an emergency kit on his saddle bags.

5. *Supply sergeant and mess sergeant.* The supply sergeant and mess sergeant will remain on duty at barracks until their wagons have been loaded. They will then report to the 1st sergeant for instructions. Keys to all storerooms will be turned over to the N. C. O. in charge of quarters.

6. *N. C. O. in charge of quarters.* The N. C. O. in charge of quarters will, as soon as the call is sounded, proceed to the guard house, get garrison prisoners belonging to the troop, bring them back to the troop and report them to the supply sergeant to be equipped. After these prisoners have been equipped they will be turned over to their squad leaders. The N. C. O. in charge of quarters will then remain on duty at the telephone until he has been relieved by the 1st sergeant, after which he will secure his own equipment, proceed to stables, saddle, etc., and join his platoon.

7. *First sergeant.* The 1st sergeant will supervise all activities of the troop. As soon as he receives word that the troop is to be turned out, he will notify the troop commander and the other troop officers. He will then send a reliable man to notify the soldiers living out of barracks. At all times he will keep the troop commander informed of his whereabouts.

8. *Stable sergeant.*

a. The stable sergeant will see that sufficient grain is kept in the grain cart each night to supply one feed of grain per animal in the event the troop should be turned out in an emergency. This cart will be securely locked in the feed room each night in order that no loose animals can reach it.

b. He will remain constantly on duty at the stables, packing his saddle and saddling at a time which does not interfere with his other duties.

c. He will supervise the issue of grain, halters, tie ropes, and fitted horse shoes.

d. As soon as he is notified of the turn-out, he will segregate all sick animals until they have been inspected by the troop commander.

e. He will remain in a location such that he can hear the telephone.

f. He will see that all extra halters, tie ropes, fitted horse shoes, not claimed by the time the troop is ready to leave, are placed on the wagons.

g. He will turn over all keys to stable storerooms to the 1st sergeant, who will, in turn, turn over the keys to the man in charge of quarters or stables.

*General.*

1. *Man left at quarters.* The 1st sergeant will detail a non-commissioned officer to remain at barracks. This N. C. O. will relieve the regularly detailed N. C. O. in charge of quarters as soon as word of the turn-out is received. After the troop and wagons have left barracks this N. C. O. will make a thorough inspection of quarters. He will place all arms in the storeroom, police the entire barracks, and lock or nail up all doors and windows in barracks. He will then report to the Post Adjutant for instructions.

2. *Man left at stables.* The 1st sergeant will detail a private to remain at stables. This man will re-

lieve the stable sergeant at the telephone as soon as word of the turn-out is received. After the troop has left stables he will police the stables and all rooms connected therewith. He will lock or nail up all doors, take sick horses to the veterinary hospital, and will then report to the Post Adjutant for instructions.

3. *Men for whom there are no horses.* These men will pack their saddles, place them in front of stables, and will then report to the 1st sergeant for instructions.

4. *Leaving stables.* Squad and platoon leaders will keep their units together at all times. No man will leave stables for any purpose without first securing permission to do so from an officer.

5. *Surplus feed bags and horseshoes.* The 1st sergeant will see that five additional feed bags are placed on the wagon. All surplus fitted shoes, halters, and tie ropes not claimed by the time the troop is ready to leave the stables, will be put on the wagons.

6. *Cooks.*

a. The first cook will ride on the buckboard.

b. The second cook, mounted, will accompany the cooking and ration pack horses.

7. *Echelons.*

a. The supply sergeant and the first horse-shoer will accompany the wagons.

b. The mess sergeant and the second horse-shoer will accompany the troop.

8. *Officers.*

a. The Commanding Officer, 1st Platoon, will supervise loading the wagons and will report with them to the troop commander at the stables.

b. The Commanding Officer, Machine Gun Platoon, and the Commanding Officer, 2nd Platoon, will assist the troop commander at the stables.

c. At all times, all troop officers will know the whereabouts of the troop commander.

9. *Miscellaneous reminders for the troop commander.*

a. Inspect sick animals.

b. Take any surplus animals, not sick, with troop as led horses.

c. Send note to commander of the guard re prisoners.

d. Be sure to take Council Book, blank checks, vouchers, maps, Army Regulations, M. C. M., etc., in troop field desk.

NOTE: It might be well to have the N. C. O. in charge of quarters get the field desk from Regimental Headquarters at the same time he secures the garrison prisoners for the troop.

e. Put valuable property in safe or turn it over to Post Adjutant.

f. Turn in Post Exchange checks and U. S. A. M. P. books.

g. Before leaving, inspect barracks and stables.

h. Inspect wagons for lashing of loads, etc.

i. Report to Squadron Commander when troop is ready to leave.



# My Friend, Buffalo Bill

As Told by General Charles King to Don Russell, First Lieutenant, 342d Infantry

*General Charles King, at 88 years of age, one of the oldest of living graduates of West Point, veteran of the Civil War, Apache and Sioux Indian wars, Spanish-American war, Philippine Insurrection, and World War, favorite novelist of a generation or so ago, once more tells the story of Buffalo Bill's greatest exploit, of which he was an eye-witness, in the following interview. It includes much new material gathered since his writing of the story nearly fifty years ago in "Campaigning With Crook," now out of print.*

WAS there such a person as Buffalo Bill? You might doubt it, if you believed all that you read nowadays. Thousands of persons now living have seen the magnificent figure of William Frederick Cody directing the presentation of his Wild West show. But there are those who maintain that Cody was never anything but a showman, that he was only the hero of a series of dime novels and of exploits on the stage and in the arena.

It may be that Cody brought some of this on himself. He was always regarded as strictly honest while he served my regiment, the Fifth Cavalry, as chief of scouts. I think there is no doubt that later, under pressure of his publicity men, perhaps when his show was in difficulties, Cody somewhat dramatized and expanded his celebrated exploits. I do not believe he ever told anything that injured anyone else or tended to detract from another's accomplishments, but there is no question but that he made the best story he could about himself.

Now, even his most celebrated exploit, the killing of Yellow Hand, the Cheyenne chief, at the fight on the War Bonnet in 1876, is doubted. That is going too far. To take a grain of salt doesn't mean that you must put it in your eye.

I saw that fight from start to finish. Probably fifteen other persons were in a position to see all or any part of it. Of these it would seem at least a hundred survive, most of whom either killed Yellow Hand themselves or saw someone other than Buffalo Bill do it.

So long as General Wesley Merritt, General Eugene A. Carr, Colonels Mason, Sanford C. Kellogg and Leib, and Captains Montgomery, Hayes, and W. P. Hall were alive these modern claimants for the honor of having killed Yellow Hand were silent. At the time I never heard of the "Sergeant Jacob Blaut" whose story has been quoted. The members of the advance guard, under my command, were all—Sergeant Schreiber, a fine old veteran of whom the entire regiment was proud, Corporal Wilkinson, and eight private troopers—from my own company, K, commanded by the senior captain of the regiment, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Julius W. Mason.

You will remember that in 1876 three expeditions were sent out against the Sioux under the respective commands of Generals Alfred H. Terry, George Crook and John Gibbon. After roughly handling General Crook's column the Indians fell on the Seventh Cav-

alry commanded by General George A. Custer and detached from Terry's column, and destroyed Custer and five of his twelve troops, the remaining seven under Major Reno and Captain Benteen suffering heavy casualties before they were rescued by Terry and Gibbon.

News of this disaster caused reinforcements to be sent to the troops in the field, and my regiment, the



Buffalo Bill.

Fifth Cavalry, was assembled from various stations in Kansas and ordered to join Crook. Shortly after we started our march William F. Cody, "Buffalo Bill," joined the regiment as chief of scouts, a position he had held previous to its five years service in Arizona from which it recently had returned.

We were marching toward Fort Laramie with seven troops and, at noon, Saturday, July 15, seven troops were resting at Rawhide Creek, eighteen miles from

the fort, when a courier appeared with dispatches stating that some eight hundred Cheyennes were preparing to leave their reservation with the intention of joining Sitting Bull and the Sioux. Merritt decided at once to attempt to head them off. To do this he had to march eighty to eighty-five miles around three sides of a long rectangle before the Indians could march thirty miles. Of course the Indians did not know there was a race—the roundabout course was taken to deceive them. A direct march toward them would have driven them toward the Sioux.

Eighty and more miles in a day and a half is no easy march, but Merritt's troops made it on time and by Sunday evening were across the trail the Indians were expected to take, at War Bonnet or Hat Creek, the Indian name being variously translated. The troops went in bivouac, hidden under the bluffs.

That night I was detailed to command the outposts toward the southeast, from which direction the enemy was expected.

At daybreak next morning I am on a hilltop with Corporal Wilkinson of K company—my troop—searching the horizon for Indians. Wilkinson is first to see a small group of the Cheyennes. Word is sent to General Merritt. Soon we see other small bands of the enemy. General Merritt, General Carr and several other officers come to the ridge. Among them is one troop captain, Sumner.

We see more and more Indians, but they are not approaching. Why? They do not seem to be trying to hide from us, so it does not seem probable that they suspect the trap. Our men have built very few fires, and those are well concealed.

Soon it is explained. To our right front, about four miles away, I should say, we see the white covers of our wagon train. We had supposed them left far, far behind in our rapid march, but Lieutenant William P. Hall has done much more than was expected of him, and as it happens almost too much.

We are not worried about him. He knows the Indians are about and he is ready with a trap for them. He has two companies of infantry as train guard, and we see no sign of them. We know why. They are hidden in the wagons.

The Cheyennes are due for a surprise when they attack that train. Before they recover from it, we shall be among them. Our scheme is not affected.

"Have the men had coffee?" General Merritt asks. "Yes, sir," reports Adjutant William C. Forbush. "Then, let them saddle up and close in mass under the bluffs," Merritt orders. General Carr leaves to see to the execution of this command. Sumner rejoins his troop.

Now comes a complication that spoils this plan and gives Buffalo Bill his chance. He and others of the scouts are with us on the hill.

Cody is the first to notice an unusual scurrying around among the Cheyennes. A dozen or so whip up their ponies and start down the ravine toward us. We look along the road by which the wagons are approaching and see why. Two couriers are advancing

rapidly from the train towards us. They are Troopers Anderson and Keith of C company and they had ridden nearly twenty-five miles farther than we had, for C troop had been sent from Rawhide clear up to the Niobrara crossing of the road to Fort Robinson. They have now been sent to find Merritt and they know about where he is to be found. Of course, they have no suspicion that the Indians have arrived also.

Now this road is to our right front, and the ravine down which the Indians are approaching is to our left, ravine and trail meeting slightly to the right and in front of our position. In other words, because of the intervening high ground, the Indians must pass close in front of us in order to run down the two couriers, and all in the world they are after is those poor fellows' scalps.

Cody is the first to see the opportunity.

"By Jove! General, now's our chance," I quoted him in "Campaigning With Crook" and those were about his words. "Let our party mount here and we'll cut those fellows off."

"Up with you, then," is Merritt's answer. "Stay where you are, King. Watch them till they are close under you; then give the word. Come down, every other man of you."

I am the only man left on top of the hill. My hat is off. Only the top of my head and my binoculars are visible above the crest, and I am not seen. Merritt and two staff officers, Forbush and J. Haydon Pardee of the 23d Infantry, are crouching just out of sight down the slope. Nearby are Sergeant Schreiber and Corporal Wilkinson.

Cody, who was quick to see the chance and first to suggest it, is given the honor of leading the dash. He is mounted and ready below. With him are two scouts and five or six private troopers. The scouts are Tall and White, the latter Buffalo Bill's shadow and great admirer, known, for these reasons, as "Buffalo Chips." He was killed a few weeks later at Slim Buttes, where the chief, American Horse, was slain.

I watch the Indians through my binoculars. If I give the word too soon they may take alarm and escape. If I wait too long they may get the scalps of those two men. It is a magnificent sight as I see them drawing near, their beautiful long war bonnets trailing, the sun flashing from their armlets and polished lances, in their war paint, with their gaily decorated rawhide shields.

I look back.

"All ready, general?"

"All ready, King. Give the word when you like."

I wait until I hear the panting of their ponies, until they are much less than a hundred yards away.

"Now, lads, in with you."

Those were my exact words. They are so quoted in "Campaigning With Crook," and in an article which appeared in the *New York Herald* of July 23, 1876, of which more later.

Cody gives a cheer and leads his little band against the Indians' flank. The next few moments are busy ones. Merritt, Corporal Wilkinson and the rest spring

up beside me to see the attack. For a moment we see nothing, as both parties have been carried beyond our view. We hear a shot, then another, and look eagerly to see what is going on.

Suddenly, Wilkinson pulls at the general's sleeve excitedly; he points to the front; we are looking to the left. There, just in front of us, we see a fine figure of an Indian on horseback. He has just darted into view and hearing the shots and shouts behind him, has reined in quickly. He tries to see what is going on.

"Shall I fire?" Wilkinson asks.

"Yes, if you like," Merritt snaps.

The corporal fires. The Indian swings down in his saddle, and almost immediately an answering shot whistles by the general's ear, whether fired from under the horse's neck or otherwise I am not certain, but probably in the manner you may have seen in Wild West shows or in the movies, the Indian swinging down behind his pony's body.

The newspaper account says this Indian was shot by Wilkinson, but I do not think so. I think he was so excited that he missed. The only importance of it is that later Wilkinson got the idea into his head that he had killed Yellow Hand. Yellow Hand was shot only a few yards away, but it is somewhat doubtful if Wilkinson shot anybody, and I am sure that this was not the Indian called Yellow Hand. I think this was the only shot Wilkinson fired that day.

Years later Buffalo Bill's show played in the town where Wilkinson was then living, and as was his invariable custom when he heard of an old comrade being nearby, Cody paid high tribute to him in his press notices and invited him to come out to the show. They got together and presumably divided the honors; at all events Wilkinson said no more about shooting Yellow Hand, and Cody, of course, said nothing to discredit Wilkinson's story of having killed an Indian chief in the battle. The story still crops up, but that is all the basis for it.

But as these shots were fired, that of Wilkinson and that of the Cheyenne, I see the main body of the Indians rushing down the ravine and coming up by the dozens from all along the ridge. I shout a warning to Merritt.

"Send up the first company," he orders and springs to his saddle, followed by his adjutant.

The first company is my company, K troop (they were known officially as "companies" although "troop" is now the proper designation in cavalry). Its commander is Captain and Brevet Lieut. Colonel Mason.

Of course, I look around for my horse, but the orderly, who has been holding several, has lost him, and I see him dashing across the plain. It is perhaps 45 seconds before I run him down and then I am in a bad position for mounting. The McClellan saddle is high, the blanket roll and other field equipment of that day pile it up higher, and I have a crippled right arm. We circle around two or three times before I am able to make it, but I am mounted in time to join the first platoon of my company.

Now, this is long in the telling, but it is perhaps not much more than sixty seconds from the time we

hear the first shot until we are dashing past Cody who is standing over the body of the Indian chief he has killed, waving the handsome war bonnet and shouting something—perhaps it is, "The first scalp for Custer." That is the way he always told the story and it is probable—the event was fresh and everyone was thinking of it.

But it was a war bonnet, not a scalp he was waving. He could not have scalped the Indian in that short time.

Nearly we see the Indian's pony, dead, in a heap.



General Charles King

The Indian was identified as Hay-o-wei, a young Cheyenne leader. The name was translated for us by a half-breed guide known as Little Bat as meaning "Yellow Hand," and so we always called him in speaking of the affair. Much later an Indian authority who claims to know the Cheyenne language told me the name really means "Yellow Hair" and probably refers to a scalp he had taken, possibly a white woman's.

Now what had happened?

If any reliance can be placed on the stories of the affair in Cody's autobiographies, Hay-o-wei recognized Cody when he first appeared and called out. "Come



on! Come on! White Long Hair." (Cooa Cooa Pe-ha-ha-has-ka" in Cheyenne, according to Cody. "White Long Hair" was Cody's Indian name).

Later this doubtful story was expanded to a medieval romance involving a challenge and a duel between the lines. There was nothing like that. It was all over very quickly, and it was a general fight, although Cody and Hay-o-wei met without interference. The others were all busy.

As near as I could make out at the time, from what I saw and from what two soldiers who were in the charge with Cody said, both fired at once, Cody's shot piercing Hay-o-wei's leg and his pony's heart. The Indian's shot missed Cody, but Cody's horse stepped into a gopher hole and threw him. The soldiers say Cody got up, recovered his rifle, and fired again, the shot killing the Indian, who, of course, was also on the ground.

That was the story as I first wrote it. When we reached Fort Laramie after the long dusty march, and I was just setting out for a swim in the North Platte, Cody brought me a telegram from the *New York Herald*, then edited by James Gordon Bennett, asking for an account of his services in the campaign. Because he knew well I was his warm friend, and because he believed I had seen the entire affair between him and Hay-o-wei, he asked me to write an account of the fight. Because the matter was urgent and because I knew it meant much to him, I went at once with him and two civilians to the little frame building in which were the adjutant's office, the telegraph office, and one or two other rooms.

I wrote a brief story and, when I read it aloud to Cody, his companions, and the listening telegraph operator, I noticed the expression of pleasure on Cody's face at the rather vivid description.

"How'll that do?" I asked him as I finished.

"Oh, it's bully," he said. "It's fine, only—" but though he hesitated, he let it go, possibly thinking that as he had asked me to write, he ought to stand by what I wrote, so that never until long years after, forty-five years perhaps, when we were together at Pine Ridge Agency, did he tell me that he had finished Hay-o-wei with a big hunting knife.

"Why, we have it at home on the mantel-piece," he said.

Well, perhaps he did. Perhaps, in his excitement, Cody plunged in with his knife even as the poor fellow was dying, or perhaps it was a hand-to-hand fight with knives as he sometimes told the story, but if so it couldn't have lasted very long. Whatever happened, Cody was in considerable danger at that time, and one cannot blame him for making certain he wouldn't get a shot in the back. It was not civilized warfare.

The newspaper story, however, was not printed as I wrote it, and I presume one of the men present was a reporter who added other material he had gathered. My own story, four years later, in "Campaigning With Crook," was to the same effect, however.

But, at all events, Cody was waving the war bonnet

as we of Company K dashed by in a charge on the would-be rescuers just emerging from the ravine.

The Indians fire a scattering volley as our long blue line pops over the ridge, but as they see the gray horse Troop B, Captain Robert H. Montgomery, about sixty yards to the right rear, and Troop I, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Kellogg, coming front into line at the gallop about the same distance to our left rear, they wheel and scatter.

We advance cautiously in open order to the ridge, but as it is gained we see the Indians fleeing in all directions. We follow them thirty-five miles to the reservation, but they keep ahead, and by the time we get there it is impossible to tell which have been out on the war party and which have remained as friendly as all of them pretend to be.

But we have kept eight hundred re-inforcements from Sitting Bull, and the Cheyennes are discouraged from going on the warpath.

And no one can take the credit from Buffalo Bill of having led and planned the first attack, and of having killed the leader of the Indian party.

The collaborator would like to add a few words to General King's account.

General Merritt neglected to make an official report of the fight on the War Bonnet, probably because he left the regiment on leave shortly after it took place. This somewhat limits the historical evidence.

But Buffalo Bill's true claim to fame is supported by ample evidence. General Philip H. Sheridan in his "Personal Memoirs" tells of Cody's "exhibition of endurance and courage" in riding three hundred and fifty miles in less than sixty hours and refers to his services as "extremely valuable." General Nelson A. Miles in "Serving the Republic" refers to him as "a prince among hunters and frontiersmen," and remarks on his "superior horsemanship and rifle shooting."

But, even in his real achievements, there was something of the theatrical about Buffalo Bill that makes him hard to believe in a more prosaic age. On the occasion of the War Bonnet fight he is said to have worn one of his stage costumes, a Mexican outfit of black velvet slashed with scarlet and trimmed with silver buttons and lace. One can hardly imagine anyone riding to battle so attired—unless he thinks of Custer's black velvet coat and breeches, scarlet necktie, gold-lace chevrons, and wide brimmed hat that he wore as a brigadier-general of cavalry in the battles of the Army of the Potomac.

Was Cody thinking "first scalp for Custer" when he donned this similar dress, was he thinking of next winter's appearance before the footlights, or was it that he didn't have any other clothes to change to?

At any rate he became the hero of his own drama in "as plucky a single combat on both sides as is ever witnessed," as General King termed it long ago. It had all the elements of a modern western thriller—rescue of two soldiers, dash of cavalry, hand-to-hand combat—and no amount of over-dramatization can spoil it much.



# Cavalry Machine Guns in Defense

By First Lieutenant W. P. Campbell, 14th Cavalry

*NOTE: In January 1932 a number of larger cities in Blueand declared a boycott against all Redland articles of trade. The latter country retaliated by declaring war and ordered an invasion of Blueand territory. Greencountry had decided during the latter part of 1931 to modernize her military forces, so, upon hearing of the outbreak of war, she immediately requested permission for a Commission of officers to visit Redland and Blueand for the purpose of studying the employment of the various arms. Major Taeful und Hanshaker of the Greencountry cavalry, who was Military Attache at the capital of Blueand, was appointed a member of the Commission and was attached to the Blueand Field Forces for the specific purpose of reporting on the use of cavalry machine guns. The following notes, which cover the use of a Cavalry Machine Gun Troop in a defensive operation which Major Hanshaker witnessed personally, are an extract from his field note book:*

I WAS attached to the First Cavalry Division, which was part of the advanced Blueand Forces and was in close proximity to an invading corps. However, the nearest known enemy command of any size was one Redland Infantry Regiment, which was a long day's march to our front. The Division C.O., General A. Dash, an immaculate, well tailored and decisive individual, whom I had met on many social occasions in the capital, informed me in the evening that his command would move out the next day to occupy and defend a sector near the international boundary, which would later be taken over by the 5th Infantry Division. He stated that I could accompany his personal staff and thus study the whole operation from a divisional standpoint. I replied that I should prefer to be attached to one of the regiments and see how a machine gun troop actually functioned in war.

General Dash smiled good naturedly and told one of his aides, Captain H. A. Diplomat, otherwise known as "Dippy" (although a very studious officer), who had commanded a Machine Gun Troop for over two years during recent border troubles, to escort me the next day and later issued instructions that we would accompany the First Cavalry. This regiment was to march at 3:00 A.M. preceding and covering the remainder of the division, with orders to occupy and organize its own sector of the division position upon arrival thereat. We reported to Colonel I. A. M. Crafty, a typical big red-faced hard-boiled regular of the 1st Cavalry, that night and explained the nature of our mission. He introduced me to his staff including Captain M. G. Competent (familiarily called "Shot Gunner") of the Machine Gun Troop and instructed Captain Diplomat to see that I was accorded every possible courtesy.

Next morning promptly at 3:00 A.M. the 1st Cavalry under Colonel Crafty moved out. Soon after starting, as I was riding along near the regimental commander, I noticed Captain Competent, the Machine Gun Troop commander, and asked him if he would mind explaining why he did not conduct his troop on the march. He replied: "In the Blueand Cavalry Service, the commander of the Machine Gun troop acts as a regimental staff officer and advises his colonel on all machine gun matters. Our regulations actually

require him to join his regimental commander and ride with the regimental commander's group whenever combat is imminent. This allows him to become fully conversant with any possible situation quickly and thus places him in a position to make immediate recommendations for the employment of the armament of the Machine Gun Troop. You will notice, too, that a corporal liaison agent and his messenger have been furnished the colonel from the troop to maintain communication at all times between the regimental commanding officer and the Machine Gun Troop."

As soon as it was daylight I saw that the 1st Cavalry's advance guard was composed of the 3d squadron (less one Troop) with 3d Platoon and 3d 37 mm. Gun Squad, Machine Gun Troop, attached. These attached machine gun units marched at the rear of the support. The remainder of the Machine Gun Troop, except the antiaircraft cars, was in column between the 1st and 2d squadrons. Captain Diplomat said that, although a section of two machine guns would normally be attached to an advance guard the size of a troop, a whole platoon of four machine guns and a 37 mm. gun were attached to the advance guard here so that it would be sure to have sufficient fire power to perform its duties in case any Red cavalry attempted to delay the march.

Just after the second halt, I was riding with the Machine Gun Troop Second in Command, Lieutenant I. S. Clever, at the head of the machine gun troop, and brought up the question of the antiaircraft section on the march. He explained: "Car No. 1 is in the 1000-yard interval between the advance Guard and the main body, Car No. 2 is at the rear of the main body, Car No. 3 is with the trains, and Car No. 4 is acting as a control and communications car."

By 8:00 A.M. the regiment had been halted under cover, a march outpost had been formed by the advance guard, and the regimental commander, accompanied by Captain Competent and others of his staff, had made his reconnaissance of the 1st Cavalry sector. From a position on hill "A" Colonel Crafty pointed out the various terrain features which were visible and showed us his map which he had marked in red pencil.

Indicating a red line which lay on the forward slopes of hills "A" and "B," he said, "This is the main

line of resistance. The boundaries of the regiment are as I have shown in pencil so you see we are in the center of the division. My intention is to hold the regimental sector with three squadrons less a troop forward and one troop in reserve. The led horses, except those of the Regimental Reserve Troop which will be in Buck canyon, will be held immobile in Sleepy Hollow under cover of buildings.

More detail followed, then the Colonel asked Captain Competent for his recommendations for the employment of the machine gun troop.

During the entire march, Captain Competent had made a constant study of his map and the terrain. Also, he had just finished the reconnaissance of the regimental sector with the Colonel and thus was thoroughly familiar with the situation. Consequently, he immediately recommended that the regimental Machine Gun Troop support the defense by locating two machine gun platoons on the main line of resistance and one platoon on the squadron reserve line. He considered that the three 37 mm. guns should be placed as shown on the map to cover enemy routes of approach and that the antiaircraft section of four cars should be used to protect the led horses of the troop in regimental reserve. Machine Gun Combat wagons were to be released to the troop.

I heard nothing about coordinating the fire of adjacent units, so asked him, "Will any arrangement be made with the regiments on your right and left to cover by Machine Gun Fire the adjacent centers of resistance?" "Oh, yes," he replied, "you must have missed part of my recommendations, for I stated that the fire of all machine guns would be coordinated by me so as to provide mutually supporting as well as continuous bands of fire in front of our main line of resistance and of adjacent units on our right and left. I consider that the coordination secured by interchanging firing tasks with adjacent flank units in order to insure systematic flanking fire along the whole front is the basis of a good defensive position."

"Captain Competent, you kept out no Machine Guns for the Regimental Reserve. Is that a common practice in the Blueand Cavalry?"

"We believe that idle Machine Guns are a waste of power in defensive situations."

Captain Competent then handed me his map which showed the location of all units of the Machine Gun Troop in blue pencil. He informed me, "I am required to send a like copy to the Colonel as soon as my troop is in position, so that he will know the exact location of each machine gun, each One Pounder and each Antiaircraft Car."

While studying the map and terrain my attention was attracted to four officers who joined Captain Competent in rear of the crest of the hill. I learned they were the three Machine Gun Platoon Commanders and the Commander of the 1 Pounder Section and the Antiaircraft Section. After completing his explanation of the Regimental Defense plan and having his subordinates mark their maps in accordance with his own, the Machine Gun Troop Commanding Officer con-

tinued with his own plan, the main points of which I have jotted down:

"The 1st Platoon will be located in the forward part of the Center of Resistance occupied by the 1st Squadron which is on the right.

"The 2d Platoon will place one section in the forward part of the area occupied by the 2d Squadron which is in the center, and one section in the forward part of the area occupied by the 3d Squadron (less a troop) which is on the left.

"The primary mission of the 1st and 2d platoons is to fire on targets of opportunity within your sectors, while your secondary mission is flanking fire across the front of adjacent units. Your arcs and bands of fire will be as I have shown on the map.

"The 3d Platoon will compose the rear guns and will take position on the squadron reserve line as indicated. You will site your guns so as to cover the intervals between and the flanks of the organized tactical localities to your front. You may find it necessary to employ indirect fire but avoid it if possible. When necessary, you will furnish antiaircraft protection for the regimental battle position.

"All guns will be sited so as to cover likely approaches by long range fire.

"Each squad will keep twelve boxes of ammunition (3000 rounds) at the gun position.

"The spring wagon after being loaded with ammunition and the ammunition section will be 200 yards north of Road Bend in trees at 'M.'

"The remainder of the led horses will be at Sleepy Hollow under cover.

"As soon as you are in your position ready to fire, report to the troop command post by a runner who will be retained.

"My command post will be near the regimental command post in the ravine south of Hill 2."

As the platoon leaders moved out to make their reconnaissances, I decided to remain with the Lieutenant commanding the 1st Platoon, whom my instructor and body guard called "T.B." Altho T.B. was a dried-up scrawny-looking little fellow with a low forehead, a long beaky nose, thick lips, a large Adam's apple, and no chin, he was an agreeable surprise.


"I presume you are going back to get your platoon now," I remarked a bit haughtily.

"No, Sir," said T.B., "before leaving I ordered the platoon to a forward rendezvous about one-half of a mile back, because I knew we would go into action in this vicinity. Also, it saves a long ride back and a good deal of time. My messenger was sent to get them as soon as I learned my mission."

After T.B. had made his reconnaissance, Dippy asked him where he expected to put his Command Post. He said it would be near the right section at the clump of trees 100 yards east of Hill "A".

"What decided you in this?" I asked.

"Control," T.B. said. "You no doubt realize that I have three choices, one near the 1st Squadron Command Post and one with either of the two sections. I would be too far from my guns at the Squadron



tion by sound, smoke clouds and muzzle blasts, the use of small bursts is habitual except when attacked mounted. Then all guns open with the maximum rate of fire."

At this moment the two section sergeants appeared on the scene and were immediately taken to a position from which they could get a full view of the front. The platoon commander gave them the general outline of the plan of defense, pointed out prominent landmarks, mentioned possible avenues of enemy approach, briefly showed them the complete troop installations from his map, and pointed out that the 1st Squadron would defend the center of resistance in which they

"The advance of the enemy is generally the signal for all guns to open fire at maximum practicable rates. However, as large bursts betray the gun posi-



would be located. T.B. was careful that the sergeants located the forward positions to be occupied by the rifle troops to insure that the guns would be placed slightly in rear of the main line of resistance. In addition to the primary mission of firing on targets of opportunity he cautioned both section leaders to be sure to provide mutually supporting fire for adjacent units and be prepared to fire in close support of the main line of resistance.

It must be remembered that the M.L.R. is not one continuous line, but a series of platoon combat posts with varying intervals between them. For this reason, it is extremely important that these Machine Gun Section Sergeants know exactly the location of the rifle platoons whose fronts they protect by fire.

We went to the actual area T.B. selected for the left pair of guns where he gave direct orders to that section.

"The Second Section will occupy this area. Your area of fire is between that tree stump and the Lone Tree.

"Your bands of fire will be to the limits of your area of fire.

"Dig your emplacements in this cover and be sure to conceal your guns.

"Keep your twelve boxes of ammunition (3000 rounds) per gun, which are on the two squad pack horses, at the gun positions. The Troop Ammunition Section with six extra boxes per gun will be near the Light Wagon in those trees at 'M'.

"When your led horses are unpacked send them to the clump of trees near the road bend at 'M'.

"Report when you are ready to fire."

T.B. then went over to the other section position while we remained to see how the 2d Section Sergeant would carry out his duties.

Sergeant Doit, while walking over to his position, had called to the messenger whom he had brought up with him: "Return to the section and bring it forward mounted to that group of trees, then have the corporals join me here followed by their guns."

When the two gun corporals arrived the sergeant briefly explained the situation from the edge of some cover, giving them about the same information as he had received from the platoon commander. Sergeant Doit then gave each corporal a definite mission and field of fire, pointed where the emplacements would be dug, told them how much ammunition to bring forward, and finally stated where he would be.

I asked Sergeant Doit if he always gave each gun a definite mission and he said: "No, sir, if practicable we site all guns in pairs and assign the same mission to both guns, but in this case, the area to be covered by the section is so large that it appeared more desirable to give each squad a separate mission."

Both gun corporals, from a small covered area, in rear of their gun positions, explained the situation briefly to their gun crews and then conducted their guns forward to the positions selected by the Section Sergeant.

We watched the men mount the guns and noted some of the calculations which were made. The guns were aimed at the Lone Tree and the tree stump with the sights set at the range obtained from an average estimate of several men. The traversing dials were set at zero and the guns clamped, then the corporals took the quadrant elevations of the guns by means of clinometers. Improvised aiming stakes were then taken out and placed in front of each gun on the line of sight. The same process was followed for each terrain feature where a target might appear and all the data set down on a Defense Card by each corporal. A copy of each of these Range Cards was sent to Sergeant Doit and one kept with each gun.

"I realize that the gunner can fire with good effect on any of those points where he suspects the enemy without seeing them by using the calculations obtained," I said, "but just why is it necessary to obtain these indirect fire data?"

"In defense all machine guns have definite tasks which they must accomplish, regardless of atmospheric conditions or time of day," Dippy told me. "With reasonable accuracy it is possible to estimate the actual ground covered by the danger space by designating a fixed line of fire on a specific aiming point. You will note for example that the range to the Lone Tree is 700 yards and from the Fire Control Tables we learn that; for a range up to 700 yards, the danger space is continuous; also that the beaten zone at this range is 150 yards long by 1 yard wide. This width, of course, can be increased by tapping or traversing the gun. These two guns can effectively defend an arc of 800 mils (45 degrees) but can cover efficiently at any one time only 50 mils each."

"You mean, then, that these indirect fire precautions are necessary so that all guns can fire thru fog, smoke, or dust and during darkness when the enemy cannot be seen?"

"Certainly," replied Captain Diplomat, condescendingly, "in fact the effect of such fire on the morale and organization of advancing enemy troops is beyond description."

A rifle platoon was digging in about 100 yards to our right front, so we walked over to its commander and asked him if any steps had been taken to coordinate machine gun fire with his rifle fire. The youngster stated that the Machine Gun Officer had been over and told him where the guns were and where they would fire; also that his platoon would be expected to give protection to the machine gun section in rear of his combat post.

To see how far forward these machine guns were, surprised me and I stated that I had thought they should not be in advance of the troop support platoons of a forward position.

"A most erroneous idea," replied Dippy emphatically. "The ground is the all important factor because machine gun tactics are simply fire tactics. In order to get a clear field of fire machine guns have to be well forward in this situation. On the other hand,



for obvious reasons, one platoon of rear guns was placed on the Squadron Reserve Line."

"What about employing these forward guns for indirect fire?" I asked.

"Hell, no," he said in disgust, "forward guns never use indirect fire, particularly cavalry forward guns. They must shoot straight, not blindly. However, as I just said, they take precautions against possible necessity for indirect fire due to fog, smoke, gas, etc."

On our way back to the 37 mm gun positions we ran across that funny-looking but very efficient T.B. again. He had just been to see the 1st Squadron Commanding Officer to coordinate his fire with that of the Squadron. I told him I liked his Machine Gun positions and asked him what he considered in picking them out. T.B. thought a minute and said, "I try to get positions with good fields of fire and command of enemy positions; with defiladed approaches for the guns; with good observation of fire of enemy positions; with cover from view and if possible from fire; with facility of movement and communication to the front, flank, and rear; with appropriate nearby cover for led animals; and locations with good alternate positions, usually to a flank, for occupation if the guns are located by artillery. In selecting Machine Gun positions I always remember a statement by General Ludendorff which appeared in a document on German Principles of Elastic Defense. 'Commanding points should not ordinarily be used by machine guns.'"

"Just where do you locate your alternate positions?" I asked.

"For sections and platoons, they should be located to the flank and rear within 300 yards of the first position and should have concealed routes from the battle emplacement to them. Alternate positions should be so located as to permit at least a partial performance of the original mission. They should be marked and data figured for them so that they can be occupied at night, if necessary, and fire opened."

The enemy had not yet appeared, so we continued on back to the 37 mm Gun positions. From the map you will note that these guns were located in defensive areas and about equally distributed so that they could cover the whole regimental sector. They were under concealment on commanding ground and were from 250 to 350 yards in rear of the Main Line of Resistance. The officer in command of the one-pounders told me it was normal to locate them centrally in each center of resistance with any or all of the following missions:

1. To cover the principal approaches.
2. To cover probable lines of advance for armored cars and hostile tanks.
3. To support an attack.
4. To fire on targets of opportunity.
5. To silence automatic rifles, Machine guns and 37 mm guns.

It was noticeable that the one-pounders were not

placed near other units. Upon inquiry, I learned that this was due to the fact that they draw artillery fire.

Captain Diplomat reminded me that the one-pounder Section of 3 guns and the antiaircraft section of 4 cross-country cars were both under the command of one officer in the Blueland Cavalry Regiments. Dippy turned to the 37 mm gun officer and asked him to point out the location of the antiaircraft cars. The Lieutenant enthusiastically answered, "If you will walk up the hill with me a little way you can see the location of each car. One is on each of those hills (pointing to the south to hills 1, 2, 3, and 4). Each car is on a commanding position with all around observation and is in supporting distance of the other cars. The fourth car is normally used to replace casualties, but, to utilize the section to the fullest extent, an initial location is given it."

"What mission was given your cars?" I inquired.

The young officer answered with seeming importance, "Antiaircraft cars may furnish air protection for the regimental installations, trains, reserves, assembly positions, and led horses. In this particular situation my cars have the mission of furnishing anti-aircraft protection for the led horses in those canyons (pointing to the Buck Canyon Forks), while certain machine guns in the main line of resistance and in the support line have been designated to furnish air protection for those positions."

It was nearing noon, so Captain Diplomat and I started toward the rear, hoping to find a stray chow wagon somewhere. On the way we discussed the appropriate missions that might be given cavalry machine guns in defense. I learned that the following were the main ones considered by the Blueland Cavalry Machine Gunners: to deny ground to the enemy; to protect flanks; to support counter attacks; to economize rifle units; to stop minor attacks and check and disorganize main attacks; to defend the main line of resistance and limit penetration; to fire in close support of the main line of resistance and provide mutually supporting fire for adjacent units; to sweep with long range fire important routes of approach; to interdict enemy concentration points and put over harassing fire day or night; and to cover a withdrawal.

Suddenly we heard a small amount of firing in the direction of the outpost line and wondered what kind of targets the Redland troops would present to our machine gun friends. Dippy remarked: "My idea of a good machine gun target is one that is deep and dense with relation to the direction of fire, such as a column, or lines taken in enfilade while unfavorable ones are broad and shallow, such as frontal fire on a skirmish line. Infantry halted or in close order formation presents a remunerative target, but in attack its waves must be taken in flank. Dismounted cavalry should be engaged the same as infantry, but mounted cavalry should be fired upon whenever and wherever it appears, provided the range and tactical situation permit. Tanks and armored cars are poor machine

gun targets, as are enemy machine guns, but the personnel of the latter is profitable. Planes, passenger cars, trucks, reconnaissance groups, staff parties, signalmen, and observers are fleeting but vulnerable. Bridges, trenches, buildings, obstacles, and woods are themselves unremunerative, but their exits are valuable when the enemy desires to cross or emerge from them."

We saw a nearby anti-aircraft car open up on a rather high Redland plane, and some remark was made about the principle of employing these cars for anti-aircraft protection. So I asked Captain Diplomat what his experience had taught him were the main general principles for the employment of cavalry machine guns in Defense. He thought a few minutes and said. "Machine guns are especially adapted to defense because of their characteristics. They are capable of direct or indirect accurate long range fire and thus can conquer fog, darkness, smoke, or rain; they can produce a large volume of rapid and sustained fire quickly and thus can get surprise easily; the tripod allows fire to be switched from target to target without change of position; they can deny areas to an enemy; their cone of fire is narrow, dense, deep, and easily observed; and they have a cyclic rate of fire of 500 rounds per minute.

"Machine gun fire is most effective when developed suddenly and in great volume from an unexpected direction.

"Machine gun fire is not opened on unimportant targets because they are left to riflemen and other automatic arms.

"The sector of fire or responsibility of a gun ordinarily should not be greater than 800 mils (45 degrees).

"Machine Guns must conceal themselves from ground and aerial observation.

"Before action commences every machine gun officer

and non-commissioned officer should be thoroughly familiar with the situation because, during an attack, machine guns must maintain the closest possible touch with each other and with the troops with whom they are operating.

"Cooperation is the keynote of machine gun tactics. It should exist between machine gunners and riflemen and between machine guns themselves.

"Mutually supporting fires should be arranged by machine gun commanders with adjacent units whether ordered or not.

"Machine Guns must be distributed in depth over the entire defensive position with the general mission of giving continuous resistance to an enemy attack.

"Machine Guns fight by fire alone, so their ammunition supply must be dependable.

"During an attack machine guns in rear of those on the main line of resistance fire on low flying hostile planes when not firing on enemy ground troops.

"On the battle field the role of machine guns is dependent, so their every effort must bear a direct relation to the plan of the commander of the force.

"Machine guns should be sited so as to deliver oblique or flanking fire against a hostile force moving forward in attack.

"When practicable the command post of any machine gun unit is normally located at or near the command post of the rifle unit to which it is attached.

"In a defense of some duration the Machine Gun Units and the Rifle Units should not be relieved the same day. Usually allow one day to intervene, the machine gun organization being relieved last.

"Place defensive machine guns in or near a strong point, so as to have ample rifle protection if needed."

Dippy and I now reached the brigade reserve, where a hot meal was being served and decided to indulge, then start back to the front line, where we hoped to see some real action before night.



*Join the Red Cross*

# The Raid on Korosten

By Captain Hinterhoff, General Staff, Polish Army

NO other action of large cavalry units requires so much moral worth and talent on the part of the commanding officer, and fighting value of his troops, as a raid on the enemy rear. In spite of the great difficulties with which the commanding officer is confronted from the very outset of the raid to its end, in spite of enormous risk and responsibility for the lives of thousands of men subordinate to him, who execute his orders with confidence, one of the great ambitions of an efficient commanding cavalry officer in war time is to command a raid. A successful raid ensures the commanding officer a name and fame—which is only just, as a raid being quite an independent action, often deprived of any contact with the main force, the whole result and success of the raid are connected with and solely dependent on, the person and talent of the officer, on his quick grasp of the situation and indomitable energy.

A raid also sets several tasks before the men; it demands, besides gallantry, a great effort both physical and moral. On the Western front the action of large cavalry units was comparatively rare (the action of a French cavalry corps under General Sordet, and a German cavalry raid under Generals Marwitz and Richthoffen) and dating from 1915 cavalry detachments began gradually to fill the trenches. On the other hand the Eastern and Asiatic fronts, owing to their specific conditions, were the scenes of very interesting actions of cavalry on a large scale, to mention only the raids of General Allenby in Palestine, of General Henrys in Macedonia, and the raid of German cavalry on Molodeczno-Swieciany.

This form of action, however, was adopted by large units of cavalry in the Polish-Soviet War and in the Civil Wars in Soviet Russia, with which the Western cavalryman is not so familiar. Vast territories suitable for maneuver and a comparatively thin frontal line created suitable conditions for the development of cavalry action.


The records of the Polish-Soviet War can boast of several raids in a grand style, connected forever with the names of their commanders. I presume that the Western cavalrymen, who are interested in the history of cavalry battles in the East of Europe, are not unacquainted with the names of the Polish Generals, Rommel, Romer, Dreszer, and of the Russians Budienny and Gaj-Chan. A closer study of the activity of these officers will undoubtedly give to each cavalry officer ample material for reflection and consideration.

## Operation Background.

After the victorious battle won through the genius of the commander-in-chief, Marshal Joseph Pilsudski, the final phase of the Polish-Soviet War, the strategical pursuit of the retreating Soviet army, began. On the

Southern front, south of the Polesian marshes, the 6th Army consisting of two operation groups, pursuing the 12th and the 14th Soviet armies and the seriously damaged mounted army of General Budienny, reached the lines of the rivers Zbrucz and Horyn on the 20th of September, 1920, where the progress was checked. General Jedrzejowski the chief of the operating group issued orders to a Cavalry corps under the then Colonel Rommel (at present Division General and Army Inspector) of the region of Zviahel together with a cavalry brigade of the region of Zaslavie, to occupy the middle ground of the 6th Army, with the object of screening the main force. According to cavalry reconnaissances and intelligence supplied by agents, the position of the enemy facing General Jedrzejowski's group was as follows: the 44th Soviet Infantry Division, which screening a part of the mounted army of Budienny had suffered serious loss from the detachments of the Polish cavalry division, held the left eastern bank of the River Slucz, south of Zviahel, and to the north of the 44th Sov. Infantry Division, the 7th Soviet Infantry Division—and in the region of Olewsk the 58th Soviet Infantry Division.

To the rear of the army—in the region of Berdyczow—the 24th Soviet Infantry Division, which pushed forward one brigade south of the 44th Soviet Infantry Division, took possession of the River Slucz on the line



1. Situation on the South Front on Sept. 20, 1920, and Plans for the Raid

Rohaczow-Baranowka. Between the 12th and 14th Soviet armies were two Soviet cavalry brigades—the Bashkir and Cossack brigades. Moreover the Soviet command had at its disposal several excellently equipped armored trains.

The mounted army of Budienny considerably weakened by the losses sustained in the last encounters with the Polish cavalry and infantry was completing and reorganizing its ranks in the region Zytomierz-Berdyczow.

On account of the relatively good spirit of the Soviet army, an offensive on its part had to be reckoned with.

#### Decision of the Raid.

The commanding officer of the Cavalry Corps, the then Colonel Rommel, wishing on the one hand to take advantage of the continued dash of the offensive of his cavalry, which for several weeks had been pursuing Budienny's army, and on the other to paralyze the possible offensive of the enemy, submitted three proposals of using the Cavalry Corps in a raid.

**Raid on Berdyczow** had three objectives: the destruction of the mounted army, already considerably thinned and undergoing a reorganization in the Berdyczow zone; to approach the 12th Soviet army from the rear and by destroying railway connection, depots and by launching an attack on the rear detachments, paralyze the action of the 12th Soviet Army.

**Raid on Korosten.** a. The overwhelming of the Soviet Divisions in middle ground and in the rear in the Korosten region, thus defeating the right flank of the 12th Soviet Army; b. the demolition of the important railway junction in Korosten, which would render the transference of the Soviet forces to the North impossible and which would cut them off from direct communication between the northern and southern fronts.

**Raid on Kiev.** a. Rapid and violent action against the rear of the Soviet army and the demolition of railway stock and depots in the region of Kiev. b. By the action on the rear to demoralize the spirit of the Soviet army. Moreover this raid would, to a certain extent, bear a political character.

Of the three proposals of the Commander of the Corps, after a careful consideration both on the part of the Commander of the 6th Army and Headquarters, the raid on Korosten was decided upon for the 2nd of October.


#### Preliminary Action (Sketch No. 2)

Foreseeing the raid, the Commander of the Corps issued orders for the regrouping of the forces of the Corps. The 1st Cavalry Division (6th and 7th cavalry brigades) to the northwest of Zviahel; the 2nd Cavalry Division (8th cavalry brigade, Zviahel; 9th brigade—Smoldyrew.)

The Cavalry Corps consisted of:

The Commander of the Corps  
Colonel Rommel

Chief of the Staff  
Captain Gen. Staff Praglowski



2. Scene of the Fighting from Oct. 1 to Oct. 10, 1920

#### 1st Cavalry Division

| 6th Cavalry Brig.             | 7th Cavalry Brig.             |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1st Uhl. Reg. 400 sw. 12 m.g. | 2nd L. H. reg. 150 sw. 8 m.g. |
| 14th Uhl. Reg. 350 sw.        | 8th Uhl. Reg. 400 sw. 12 m.g. |
| 12th Uhl. Reg. 300 sw.        | 9th Uhl. Reg. 300 sw. 12 m.g. |
| 2 horse art. bat.             | 2 horse art. bat.             |
| 1050 swords                   | 850 sw.                       |

#### 2nd Cavalry Division

| 8th Cavalry Brig.               | 9th Cavalry Brig.                |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 2nd Uhl. Reg. 400 sw. 12 m.g.   | 1st L. H. Reg. 400 sw. 12 m.g.   |
| 108th Uhl. Reg. 200 sw. 12 m.g. | 201st L. H. Reg. 300 sw. 12 m.g. |
| 115th Uhl. Reg. 200 sw. 12 m.g. | 203rd Uhl. Reg. 200 sw. 12 m.g.  |
| 1 horse art. bat.               | 1 horse art. bat.                |
| 880 sw.                         | 900 sw.                          |

The Corps consisted of 3500 swords, 142 m. g., 24 field guns.

The day of the 1st being assigned for the clearing of middle ground and for reconnaissance work, the two divisions received orders to make a sally in accordance with which the 2nd Division launched attacks with its two brigades on Kropiwno, the 8th cavalry brigade on the highroad between Zviahel and Zytomierz, and the 9th brigade approaching Mlyn Ostrozkie from the southwest, succeeded in defeating the 44th Infantry Division, capturing 1000 men, 30 heavy machine guns and 2 field guns. On the 2nd of October the commander of the corps received orders to raid Korosten on the 3rd of October. However, on account of considerable loss of ammunition in connection with the sallies of the 1st of October, the attack was postponed until the 8th of October. On the same day the 115th Regiment of the 8th Cavalry Brigade was ordered to make a sally on Zytomierz. This regiment, by forced march over wooded ground and avoiding contact with the enemy, returned only on the 5th, bringing important intelligence as to the position of the enemy in the region of Zytomierz.

The commander of the Corps ordered a sally on the bank of the Slucz for the 5th of October. Detachments



of the Cavalry Division in conjunction with the 25th Infantry Brigade caused considerable loss to the 7th Soviet Infantry Division to the north of the highroad Zviahel-Zytomierz, capturing 500 men. Here it is only fair to emphasize the action of the 25th Infantry Brigade, which facilitated to the cavalry the successful fording of the River Slucz.

After forcing back the enemy to the east, towards the evening of the 5th the Corps were regrouped as follows: 1st Cavalry Division in the region of Niemienka-Fedorowka-Uzaczyn; 2nd Cavalry Division in the region: Hulska-Kropiwna-Romanowka. In the course of the 6th and 7th of October, detachments of the Cavalry Corps finished their preparations in connection with the strenuous effort which awaited them; they were to take with them a five days store of provisions and fodder for the mounted artillery—the beginning of the raid was fixed for the 8th of October.

#### Position of the Enemy.

Intelligence acquired by the cavalry, which had taken part in the skirmishes of the last few days, stated certain changes in the grouping of the enemy. The 24th Soviet Infantry Division unchanged—one brigade holding the eastern bank of the Slucz on the line Rohaczow-Romanowka, whereas the main force in the rear of the army in Berdyczow. The 44th Soviet Infantry Division, on account of serious losses sustained on the 1st of October from the 2nd Cavalry Division in the region of Kropiwna, withdrew with the aim of reorganizing and refilling its ranks, to Zytomierz. The sector of the above mentioned Soviet Divisions was held by the force of two cavalry brigades (Bashkirs and Cossacks). The 7th Soviet Infantry Division after the battle of the 5th with the 1st Cavalry Division retreated to the region Barasze-Andrzejowicze-Sloboda Sobowska, to reorganize, in order to make good their losses. Moreover from the reserves of the Soviet army stationed in Korosten the 17th Soviet Infantry brigade was detrained.

#### Execution of the Raid.

*Plan of Maneuver.* The Commander of the Corps decided to take advantage of the breach to the north of the highroad Zytomierz-Zviahel, between the 7th Soviet Infantry Division and detachments of the Soviet cavalry, caused by the retreat of the defeated 44th Soviet Infantry Division to Zytomierz, that he might with rapid maneuver reach these detachments from the rear. The above direction of the march, to say nothing of its security, thanks to dense woods, and a great distance from railway line patrolled by the four Soviet armoured trains, had also this advantage that even in case of Polish Cavalry maneuver being detected, they would not be able to ascertain the exact direction of the raid. Moreover, choosing a similar middle course with relation to Korosten and Zytomierz, the commander of the Corps left open to himself the two following possibilities: (1) with the whole force to strike on Korosten and alternatively (2) in case of intelligence that weaker forces be in Korosten, to push there only one brigade, which would amply suffice for the accomplishment of the task—with the remaining three brigades

to march to Zytomierz for the complete defeat of the 44th Soviet Infantry Division then in the act of reorganizing.

#### Execution.

In accordance with the plan and order of the commander of the Corps, the Cavalry Corps set out at dawn of the 8th of October, in marching columns in four directions. Shortly after 6 a. m. the 12th Uhlan Regiment, marching in the vanguard of the 6th Cavalry brigade, encountered enemy fire, which proceeded from the Soviet infantry scattered along the railway track and supported by artillery fire.

In spite of the exceedingly unfavorable conditions owing to wooded and broken terrain the regiment launched a vigorous attack, routing the enemy, thus opening the way for the march of the main force.


Detachments of the 2nd Cavalry Division established touch with the Bashkir Cavalry Brigade at Bromiki, which, however, speedily withdrew in southeasterly direction. At nightfall of the 8th of October, detachments of the Corps reached the following positions. 1st Cavalry Division—Usohusy-Buda-Stawki, 2nd Cavalry Division—Zubrynka-Koszelowka.

As intelligence of the arrival at Korosten of considerable detachments (the 17th Brigade) had been confirmed, the alternative plan of an attack on Zytomierz was abandoned, and it was decided by the Commander of the Corps to strike on Korosten. In connection with the above, the commander of the Corps decided that the following units were to reach and occupy the following positions: 1st Cavalry Division—Wyhow-Mogilno; 2nd Cavalry Division—Cholosznia-Bieloszyce; designating these points as the exit base for the attack on Korosten.

On the 9th, the detachments of the Corps, in accordance with the order issued the evening before, set out at dawn for their destination. Technical squadrons had been sent in advance to destroy railway lines, thus cutting all connection with the forces stationed at Korosten. Detachments of the 6th Cavalry Brigade, advancing along the highway Krasnogorka-Uzomir managed, without great effort, to drive back the weaker forces of the enemy. The 7th Cavalry Brigade advanced along the highway Ryczewka-Puchaczowka-Krasnopol.

On account of its quick progress, the 6th Cavalry Brigade reached Uzomir at 4:40 p. m. The commander of the Corps, who was accompanying the Brigade, so as to take advantage of what might appear to him a favorable situation, determined to shift the beginning of the attack, which was to begin at dawn of the 10th, to the night of the 9th. The decision of the commander of the Corps had its cause in the fact, that the commander of the 12th Soviet Army, probably alarmed by the maneuver of the Polish Cavalry, might issue orders directing forces to Korosten, with the view of forestalling and eventually opposing the raid. Subsequent events proved all the conjectures of the commander of the Corps to be right.

In spite of the exhausted condition of the horses, the 6th Cavalry Brigade set out by forced march and



3. Return from the Raid

at 7 p. m. reached Czelowka, 3 kilometers from Korosten, where it established touch with the vanguard of the 17th Soviet Infantry Brigade.

Detachments of the 7th Cavalry Brigade, and especially of the 2nd Cavalry Division, whose horse artillery horses were in a state of acute exhaustion after the forced march over heavy ground, proceeded on their strenuous march in pursuance of the energetic orders of the commander, who did not take into consideration reports about the state of horses.

It was, however, the 2nd Cavalry Division, which had the greatest distance to cover, that found itself in specially difficult circumstances. At 9 p. m. of the 9th, the commander of the Corps received information from the commander of the 2nd Cavalry Division that, owing to the exhaustion of horses and especially those of the horse artillery, which could not keep pace with cavalry over heavy ground, the forces under his command would be able to leave the region of Cholosznia only about 12 p. m. These reports, however, did not influence the decision of the commander of the Corps who was bent on surprising the enemy, except that he agreed to postpone the hour of attack to 3.30 a. m. of the 10th. In the course of the whole night, detachments of the 6th Cavalry Brigade exchanged artillery, rifle, and machine-gun fire with the Soviet infantry.

At 3.30 a. m. explosions on the railway lines Korosten-Kiev, and Korosten-Mozyrz signalled the beginning of the attack.

From the southwest, detachments of the 6th Cavalry Brigade advanced on foot, from the west the 7th Cavalry Brigade, while the 2nd Regiment of Light Horse, forming part of the 7th Cavalry Brigade, was at that time engaged in a struggle with the Soviet armored trains on the line Zwiahel-Korosten. The heavy fighting was transferred from the suburbs to the centre of the town, from where about 6 a. m. the remnants of Soviet detachments began to withdraw in great disorder, leaving in the hands of numerically weaker Polish forces hundreds of prisoners and a large quantity of war material. The enemy, retreating towards

the east, encountered the detachments of the 2nd Cavalry Division, which after a whole night's forced march (on the preceding day it covered 70 kilometers) reached the appointed places before daylight, acting in conjunction with the 8th Cavalry Brigade, from the north, and with the 9th Cavalry brigade, from the west, on their advance on Korosten.

The raid on Korosten was attended with great success: the 17th Soviet Infantry Brigade was completely defeated, losing about 1000 prisoners and considerable war materiel, 3 modern Soviet armored trains were rendered harmless, a number of trains loaded with war materiel fell into our hands. The Korosten station was equally seriously damaged, and railway bridges were blown up, thus leaving the important railway junction of Korosten quite useless for the space of several weeks.

#### Return from the Raid.

On account of the fact that the moment of surprise had been fully taken advantage of, and that one had to reckon with serious reaction on the part of the commandship of the 12th Soviet Army in Kiev, which besides pushing forward the detachments of the 17th Infantry Brigade to Korosten, could direct detachments of mounted infantry, which were being reorganized in the region of Berdyczow, as well as to cut off the return route with the aid of parts of the 7th and 44th Soviet Infantry Division, which were reorganizing at Zytomierz, the commander of the Corps ordered, after a rest, the return of the detachments.

As it was afterwards found out through reports obtained from prisoners, the commander of the 12th army had ordered joint action on Korosten with the detachments of the 7th Soviet Infantry Division, the 44th Infantry Division, and 58th Soviet Infantry Division, together with the Bashkir Brigades.

This time also, that they might establish swifter contact with the main force, the course of the march of both divisions planned, was on either side of the railway line Korosten-Zwiahel.

From intelligence obtained, it was found out that detachments of the 7th Soviet Infantry Division were, in accordance with orders issued by the Commander of the 12th Soviet Army, concentrating on the 10th of October in the region of Jablonica-Raszyn, to cut off the return route of the Polish Cavalry Corps. The commander of the Corps decided to strike the 7th Soviet Infantry Division. At daybreak of October 11th the 2nd Cavalry Division established a contact with its two brigades and the vanguard of the 7th Infantry Division, which was already advancing in two directions towards Korosten.

In the vicinity of the village Krasnogorka, the 9th Cavalry Brigade meeting a strong resistance from the enemy, launched an attack on foot, forcing the enemy to retreat in disorder towards the east and southeast.

At the same time the 8th cavalry brigade fought successfully with the 7th Soviet Infantry Division on the way to Uszomir-Bielka. After the battles of the day, the 2nd Cavalry Division captured 1000 prisoners, 5 guns, 25 heavy machine guns, and a considerable supply of war materiel.

On the night of the 11th and 12th, the remnants of the 7th Soviet Infantry Division, concentrating all their strength, tried to break through in the eastern direction. For this purpose, during the night they attacked the detachments of the 8th Cavalry Brigade in the region of Baranowiez-Rudnia.

As a result of the night's battle fought, on the one side by the despairing Soviet detachments, and on the other by the Polish regiments exhausted, yet full of fighting dash, the remnants of the 7th Soviet Infantry Division were completely vanquished.

In this battle the 7th Soviet Infantry Division ceased to exist, losing many men, about 1000 prisoners, 8 guns, about 30 heavy machine guns and the whole supply of war materiel.

In the early hours of the 12th, the commander of the Corps received a message by air from General Jedrze-jowski, the Commander of the Operation Group, to retreat beyond the River Slucz, pending the truce which was to take place on the 14th of October.

On the day of the defeat of the 7th Soviet Infantry Division, the commander of the Corps planned an action with part of his forces in the north with the object of defeating the 58th Soviet Infantry Division, in the region of Olewsk, which was advancing towards the south, in accordance with orders issued by the Commander of the 12th Soviet Army. The order of the return march beyond the Slucz rendered the whole plan of action against the 58th Soviet Infantry Division null, and on the evening of the 12th, the detachments of the Corps reached the following regions: 1st Cavalry Division—Katerynowka-Niemelanka-Fedorowka. 2nd Cavalry Division—Tupolee-Niesolon. On the 13th both Divisions of the Corps crossed to the right bank of the Slucz.

#### The Value of the Raid.

If one is to take into account the value of the raid, it must be considered from two points of view—operation and execution. It is difficult to estimate the value and importance of the brilliantly executed raid on subsequent operations, as a truce was signed already on the 14th.

As the idea of the raid had been conceived by the Commander of the Army as an independent action without cooperation of other large units, its success could be of little advantage to the whole front. Undoubtedly, in case of a frontal attack of large infantry units cooperating with the action of the raid, the result of the whole action would be infinitely greater.

However, the Cavalry Corps, as such, accomplished the given task, thanks to the penetration into enemy lines a hundred kilometers deep, as well as inflicting serious loss—the 12th Soviet Army suffered so seriously as not to be taken into account as a large fighting unit. Moreover, the serious damaging of the Korosten railway junction rendered the provisioning of the 12th Soviet Army impossible for the space of several weeks, and prevented the transport of troops through Korosten to the northern front.

#### Point of View of Execution.

The detachments executed a raid right into enemy lines; depth 100 kilometers covering a distance of 250 kilometers in 5 days; scouting detachments made much more with minimum losses (a few officers and men killed and wounded); the Cavalry Corps completely defeated the 17th Soviet Infantry Brigade together with serious losses to the 2 Soviet Divisions, capturing 3500 prisoners, 100 heavy machine guns, 21 guns, and a quantity of war materiel, also destroying 3 armored trains.

We should here emphasize the spirit and indomitable will to conquer, when the detachments in spite of two days' heavy march, on the order of the commander of the Corps, who clearly comprehended the situation without any rest entered into the heavy night's struggle to come out victorious, notwithstanding the opposition of the enemy.

This raid being one of the most gallant feats of the young Polish Cavalry concluded the victorious struggle against the superior forces of the enemy.

So finished the 5 days' raid on Korosten, closing one of the most brilliant pages in the records of the Polish-Soviet War.





# The Greatest Sport of All

By First Lieutenant George J. Rawlins, 26th Cavalry

ALL sports and athletics maintained in the Army are "for the good of the service." With very rare exceptions they are highly beneficial. When there are exceptions, generally the fault is in management, and not inherent in the particular sport.

The ideal army sport will have the following attributes. It will be within available finances. Open to the greatest number of participants. Contributes to health, muscular development and coordination. Develops mental alertness. Cultivates stamina and determination. Improves the technique of one or more military qualifications. Builds morale and team work. Engenders clean sportmanship. Is capable of proper supervision. Forms desirable civilian contacts.

Now let us consider a recreational activity which the writer feels is rather neglected. I refer to The Greatest Sport of All,—the ancient and honorable sport of Hunting.

In the magnificence of its antiquity, all other sports dwindle to the merest passing fads. It is older than Horsemanship, older than War itself. It even antedates the human race by a few geologic ages. In fact, it is probable that the first primordial globule of protoplasm to develop self-propulsion also became the first hunter.

At the dawn of written history, hunting excellence and martial excellence were almost synonymous. The great warrior and the great hunter were one. Traditions the world over have idealized the hunter, making him a legendary god or hero or saint. Ancient China, Babylonia and Egypt all had their quota. Many of the tales, on becoming supernatural, have substituted monsters in place of natural quarry. Greek and Norse mythology are full of such stories. Coming closer home, we find Saint George was able to send his taxidermist a dragon head, while Saint Patrick had a peculiar penchant for snakes.

From the ending of tribal life to the inception of democracy, hunting was one of the universal and almost constant sports of the ruling classes; Egyptian pictographs reveal Pharaohs shooting lions from chariots. From time immemorial, Indian princes have hunted the tiger from the backs of elephants. Marco Polo tells of lakes and marshes reserved by His Celestial Majesty for wild fowl shooting.

As game decreased, the ruling classes began to limit the hunting of their subjects and thereby contributed no little to history. The right to hunt was one of the first "inalienable rights" recorded by historians. In other words, the peasant hunter had the initiative and self-reliance to assert himself long before the great, but timid, mass of oppressed serfdom became audible. Thus, unreasonable game laws did much to bring forth Magna Charta. Robin Hood was primarily a poacher.

Hunting restrictions furnished the rural peasant a strong incentive in the French Revolution.

It cannot be a mere coincidence that tribes and peoples with hunting proclivities have so consistently conquered other tribes and peoples with that instinct less developed,—other things being even approximately equal. Hunting as a racial occupation naturally belongs to the nomad. That cradle of civilization, the valley of the Euphrates, time and time again developed the agriculturist, the artisan and the trader, only to be subjugated by wandering races living to an extent by hunting. The Great Wall of China was erected by artisan and agriculturist against the nomad. The explorer is by instinct and of necessity a hunter; and he shares equally with sailor and trader the credit for Britain's far-flung empire. But then, in '76 the American colonist excelled his English brother in woodcraft, and the British regular was ineffective against "backwoods tactics." And while our success in the late World War is commonly attributed to our industrial development, the fact still remains that we as a nation are closer to pioneer ancestry than any other great nation involved.

It is both the technique and the spirit of the hunter that is needed in the soldier, just as we need both training and morale in the purely military sense. The spirit of the hunter is very close to the spirit of the pioneer; with all the strength and virility, self-reliance and determination implied in that term. Today, hunting and woodcraft are the most natural channels thru which the average man can express and cultivate the pioneer spirit. Without proper means of expression, these priceless instincts either die out or develop into misdirected manifestations.

The desideratum already referred to, which must belong to the ideal army sport, seems rather formidable. However, let us apply it somewhat in detail. The monetary outlay is not great. Any troop can afford sporting shotguns and rifles. Unlike most athletic equipment, they last for years. Camp equipment, animal transportation and rations can all be issued without additional expense. A small reconnaissance problem assists in training and makes it all quite legal.

The number of participants is limited by extraneous factors only. The sport appeals equally to Colonel X, with thirty years' service, and recruit Smith with thirty days' service. Health and physical development are obvious. Military technique is so interlocked with all the rest that it may be considered along with them.

There is absolutely no better training for the powers of observation than reading the signs of the woodlands. Whether you are trailing an elk through the jack pines or a rabbit in a cotton patch, your sight and hearing

(Concluded on Page 64)



# The Imponderables in an Estimate of the Situation

As Illustrated by Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign

By Colonel Weston Jenkins, 390th Infantry

THE finest mental training for civil as well as military life in the solving of problems by that systematic process of thought taught in our service as the "Estimate of the Situation." No student can repeatedly go through this methodical weighing and comparison of the pertinent factors of a situation without forming habits of mind which will be invaluable to him, regardless of the vocation he pursues. Yet, useful as these exercises are, the most important factors in an Estimate of the Situation are left out of every problem we solve. We take account of relative strengths; the amount of artillery the writer of the problem has assigned to us as against the amount he has given the enemy. We can count noses and we can count tanks. We can measure the miles we have to go and compare it with the distance the enemy has to march,

*"Then take the result, as you readily see,  
Add seven and ninety and two,  
Subtract seventeen and the answer must be  
Exactly and perfectly true."*

But it isn't always exactly and perfectly true. Inferior and poorly equipped armies have repeatedly defeated superior, well equipped forces. The favorite horse has often been the last in the field. There is evidently something else we must take into account; something beside guns and tanks and a count of noses. Obviously, we must weigh carefully the balance of material forces, but unless we use it in conformity with the higher factors, unless we understand the human equation, our superiority of force may prove an illusion.

What factors did Washington utilize at Valley Forge and Joan of Arc at Orleans? What did the Japanese overlook at Shanghai? What unseen forces did Lee and Jackson control, which McClellan and Pope could not grasp? What did Napoleon mean by "In war the moral is to the physical as three is to one"? What are these elusive things that are three times more powerful than guns and numbers and tanks and airplanes?

The Imponderables—the things of the mind and spirit and soul that cannot be weighed or measured or touched, yet have in them the power to move mountains and conquer the world. Stronger than bands of steel, more powerful than T. N. T., yet insubstantial, they exist as latent forces, waiting to be tapped by those who know their existence and understand their use.

Of themselves, the Imponderables can do nothing. What man by taking thought can add a cubit to his stature? Elan, unless properly directed, is apt to lead to foolhardy sacrifice; unreasoning faith only pro-

duces martyrs. But Cromwell took directed faith and elan and forged a thunderbolt. It is when one understands how the Imponderables impinge on the human mind, how they can breed fears, excite enthusiasm, paralyze initiative or reach into unexpected depths of endurance, that they make themselves felt and may be used to exert a physical influence on human works.

It is difficult to put these matters in a lesson to be solved. No teacher can write into a problem the breaking point of a sturdy will. Hopes, aspirations, fears and loftiness of soul have no unit of measure susceptible of exact definition or to comparison by mathematical computation. We must be in the living presence of these things to understand and evaluate them.

Yet they are susceptible to systematic examination and evaluation—not in a problem on paper, perhaps, but in the serious business of war. The great captains have all used them. Joan of Arc had a wonderful grasp of the Imponderables and their use. Here was an unlettered, poor peasant girl, sixteen years old, her life spent in the narrow routine of a medieval village; a shepherdess given to dreams and visions; yet the first army she ever saw, she commanded and led to victory. Her history is so surrounded with myth and legend that it is difficult to extract the real facts, but we know she was no figurehead. She saw clearly the combinations necessary for victory and it was her ideas, translated into action, which led to success. It is possible that the old soldiers who surrounded her were an exceedingly efficient staff but lacked imagination, and that Joan's clear mind and lofty soul understood how the patriotism and religious fervor dormant in the French could be roused into action by a proper use of the Imponderables. It would be of wonderful interest and value if we could piece together Joan of Arc's estimates of the situation and understand how she evaluated the Imponderables. However, history as a rule only tells us of the results of the combinations of the great captains and but little of the process of thought which led up to the result; how much weight they attached to this and why they rejected that.

One of the great masters of the Imponderables was Thomas Johnathon, better known as "Stonewall", Jackson. Fortunately, his campaigns have been studied by careful historians and we can come measurably near judging how he cast his Estimates of the Situation. The most reticent of generals before a battle, he made a practice of afterward enlightening his staff as to why he made the moves which puzzled them so at the time.

There seem to have been but two tangible factors he gave any weight to at all. Numbers opposed to him, he ignored—he had to. Supply and equipment, he perforce had to be content with what he had, which was little. His plans were built around the Imponderables which, with the tangible of mobility, he used to concentrate on the one sensitive spot at the critical time and won victories against overwhelming odds.

Let us turn to the battle of Kernstown.

**MAP PROBLEM No. 1**

Imponderables in

An Estimate of the Situation


Maps: General Map: Virginia and Maryland 1862.

**GENERAL SITUATION:** The Potomac River is the boundary between two hostile states. Blue, north, and

Gray, south. Gray, formerly a part of the Blue nation, seceded the previous year, since which time there has been a state of war between them. The Blue capitol is at Washington, the Gray at Richmond.

The main Blue army (180,000) has concentrated in the vicinity of Washington, another army (23,000) covers the Potomac River from Harpers Ferry to Cumberland with Headquarters at Frederick, where there is a reserve of 4500 men. This army has an additional force of 4500 men at Romney. A smaller Blue army occupies western Virginia and threatens Staunton. In addition to these forces, Washington and Fort Monroe have permanent garrisons.

The main Gray army (50,000) covers Manassas Junction. Its right rests on Fredericksburg where there



are 6000 troops, its left on Winchester where there are 4200 of all arms, known as the Army of the Valley. Connecting this latter force with the main body at Manassas Junction there are some 4000 troops at Leesburg. A separate force of 11,000 is at Yorktown facing a threatened invasion from Fort Monroe. Some 2800 men are at Staunton protecting the upper Shenandoah Valley, and Richmond has a small garrison. These are all the Gray troops in the theatre of operations. No assistance can be expected from other theatres.

Blue has been spending the winter equipping and training his armies and is expected to initiate an invasion of Gray territory in the near future. Gray has spent the winter in minor operations, in consolidating his positions and in preparations to meet the expected spring offensive.

Blue resources are ample for any emergency. It holds command of the sea and its armies are fully equipped and supplied. Gray's resources are limited. Its armies are miserably clad and supplied, and poorly equipped.

Blue is well trained and determined with good morale. Gray is well trained and has exceptionally high morale due to previous victories. Gray's cavalry is superior to Blue's but his artillery is inferior.

The climate is mild, although rather rainy in the spring. Main roads are fair except in the immediate vicinity of the armies where movement cuts them up and artillery and transport have difficulty in movement. Side roads are generally bad.

Both Blue and Gray have unflinching determination to prosecute the war to the finish.

**SPECIAL SITUATION:** The Gray Army of the Valley, three work brigades of infantry (3600 rifles) with six batteries of artillery and one small regiment of cavalry attached, from positions in and about Winchester, has spent the winter covering the Shenandoah Valley and observing the Blue forces along the upper Potomac and in western Virginia. In the latter part of February, Blue forces advanced from Harpers Ferry and threatened Winchester with 23,000 troops. During the period 7-9 March, Gray forces at Manassas Junction and Leesburg retired south of the Rappahannock River. Instructions previously issued to the Commanding General of the Army of the Valley stated this retirement was contemplated and that he was to conform to it, delaying the enemy to his front as long as he could. These instructions were construed by General "Army of the Valley" as not requiring a deeper retirement than the occasion demanded. Accordingly on 11 March he retired forty miles to Woodstock, and Winchester was occupied in force by Blue.

On 17 March the main Blue army started its movement from Washington to Fort Monroe by water, with Richmond as its ultimate objective. On 8 March General "Army of the Valley" requested reinforcements hinting that with them he could seriously disturb Blue plans but his request was refused. Shortly after he received further instructions, the gist of which was as follows:

"You are to employ the invaders of the Valley

without exposing yourself to the danger of defeat, by keeping so near the enemy as to prevent him from making any detachments to reinforce the main Blue army, but not so near that you might be compelled to fight."

After occupying Winchester, the Blue army consolidated its positions and, leaving some 10,000 troops just south of Winchester, started a withdrawal of the remainder.

By 20 March the general Blue plan was divined as a converging movement on Richmond with the main effort moving from Washington by water to some base along the lower Chesapeake Bay, while a strong force moving overland was to cooperate.

On the evening of 21 March, General "Army of the Valley" received reports from his cavalry that the Blue force to his front had been reduced by recent detachments to some 5000 or 6000 troops and was retreating. Wagon trains had been observed moving eastward from Winchester.

Required: General "Army of the Valley's" "Estimate of the Situation" as of 8:00 p. m. 21 March, 1862.

#### A Solution

General "Army of the Valley's" Estimate of the Situation as of 8:00 p. m., 21 March, 1862.

##### 1. Mission.

As stated it reads:

"To employ the invaders of the Valley without exposing yourself to defeat by keeping so near the enemy to prevent him from making any detachments to reinforce the main Blue army, but not so near you might be compelled to fight."

While these instructions embody the letter of his instructions, the Commanding General "Army of the Valley" reads more into them than appears on the surface and seeks the spirit behind them.

Carefully analyzed these instructions convey two separate and distinct thoughts:

- (1) The result to be effected: i. e. to prevent Blue from reinforcing his main effort by detaching troops now facing the Army of the Valley;
- (2) General instructions limiting the manner by which the result is to be effected; i. e. by pressing the enemy closely but not to risk an engagement.

General "Army of the Valley" decided that his real mission lay in the result he was to accomplish, and his instructions as to how he was to effect this result were only binding while effective. If at any time they were not effective and did not accomplish the end, if other means were indicated as necessary, he was willing to run counter to that part of his instructions limiting his actions. The longer he pondered over the problem before him, the broader it seemed, until he felt that any move of his which simply retained the Blue forces now in the vicinity would be inadequate, that the spirit of his mission justified, the more daring strategy of drawing upon his little army, other forces destined for the main Blue effect.

In this he was exhibiting his character as a great general. The ordinary general would have looked mainly to that part of his instructions advising him to keep



in touch with the enemy without bringing on a general engagement. A good general might have seen further and attempted by pressing close to prevent any detachments from being made, but still kept from a general engagement, thus carrying out his instructions to the letter. But, it takes a truly great general to so work himself into the spirit of his instructions that he feels the full strength of all the forces which underly the strategy of a campaign and is able to discard the unessential and concentrate on the essence of the matter. So General "Army of the Valley" construes his real mission as follows:

"To induce Blue to retain in the Valley all troops in the vicinity and draw upon himself all possible forces intended to reinforce the main Blue effort."

How? is a matter for the Estimate to determine.

## 2. *Opposing Forces.*

### (a) *Own Forces.*

**Composition and Strength:** Three brigades infantry (3600 rifles), six batteries and one regiment cavalry (600 sabres). The infantry and five batteries are concentrated at Woodstock, while the cavalry with one battery is in close touch with the Blue outposts south of Winchester. Physical condition of troops—good; Morale—high; Training—good. They are troops seasoned by several campaigns and elated by previous victories.

Supply is barely sufficient, transportation is crude, clothing, rags; the men look more like scarecrows than soldiers—nothing is bright but their rifles.

**Other Gray troops:** The nearest are about fifty miles away along the Rapahannock where Gray's main army, some 40,000 men, is poised ready either to face a Blue advance from Washington or to move southeast of Richmond, whichever will be required. No help can be expected from these troops who are facing the main Blue effort. Indeed, instead of expecting assistance, he must render it; any move made by the Army of the Valley must help the main Gray force. The total of all Gray troops in the theatre of operations is somewhat over 80,000 of all arms.

### (b) *Enemy Forces.*

**Composition and Strength:** 180,000 troops have been concentrated in and about Washington, of which an undetermined number have been put enroute for the Yorktown area. 4500 are near Fredericksburg, 23,000 along the upper Potomac of which 9000 are at Winchester and about the same number at Harpers Ferry. 4500 are at Romney and a number of smaller detachments in western Virginia. Including the garrisons of the Washington defenses, Blue has nearly 250,000 men in the theatre of operations. These forces consist of the proper complements of all arms.

Physical condition and training—fine.

Morale—good but not as high as Gray.

Supply and equipment—the best and most complete unlimited resources can furnish.

While a large number of these troops are tied to the defense of localities, such as Washington and the upper Potomac, still an overwhelming number can be concentrated for a mobile offensive operation.

### (c) *Relative Combat Strength:* General "Army of

the Valley" estimates that the enemy has 5000 to 6000 men to his immediate front, but 12,000 more are in or near the Valley which, with 4500 near Frederick and 4500 at Romney and some scattered detachments, could be called in and available in three days or so. So, while the force immediately facing him is only ten to fifteen percent stronger than he, nearly 30,000 Blue troops, or seven times his own strength, can be concentrated on him in a few days.

The main armies have not fully developed their lines of action as yet, but the whole Blue force outnumbers Gray three to one and his mobile field army, which will probably consist of from 120,000 to 175,000 troops, will outnumber Gray anywhere between the proportion of three to two up to two to one in the field.

Gray has withdrawn to the line of the Rapahannock with his main army.

Blue troops to General "Army of the Valley's" front are initiating a rearward and easterly movement. It hardly seems within the bounds of possibility that this little army of 4200 men in the Valley can influence vitally the movements of a host sixty times its size. The material factors are preponderantly against General "Army of the Valley," monstrously so. But we have not as yet considered the Imponderables in the case.

These General "Army of the Valley" evaluates as follows:

(1) By virtue of its constitution the Blue command rests eventually in the hands of the President of the country. He operates as a rule through his Secretary of War who gives directions to the high military command. At the present time the command of all Blue armies rests in one general (McClellan) who is in supreme command, but answerable to and removable by the President. General "Army of the Valley" has noted, however, that while the chain of command supposedly runs from the President through the Secretary of War and the supreme military commander to the various armies, there has at times been a tendency for the President and Secretary of War to usurp purely military functions; that sometimes one and sometimes the other would issue orders to army and detachment commanders over the head of the supreme military commander.

Here is the first Imponderable. Divided command and authority.

(2) General "Army of the Valley" has noted in the attitude of the Blue press and people, and also in the Blue administration, a certain lack of confidence in their General of the Armies, although the Blue army itself has implicit confidence in him. Then, too, certain rumors have it that there is a serious difference of opinion between the administration and the General of the Armies as to the plan of operations most desirable.

Here is the second Imponderable: Disunited councils and lack of confidence.

(3) General "Army of the Valley" knows that Blue places a very high value on the inviolability of their capitol, Washington. There are a number of excellent reasons why they should.

(a) With their capitol captured, the Blue govern-



mental machine would be dislocated and even if moved to another locality, the interference would be embarrassing.

(b) A large number of Blue citizens hold the opinion that the war should terminate even at the price of Gray becoming a separate nation permanently. At the present time inactive and silent, a hostile occupation of the capitol would encourage the open activity of this group, perhaps with disastrous results upon the prosecution of the war.

(c) Even more important is the probability that if the Blue capitol were captured, foreign powers would recognize Gray as a separate and independent country. Foreign recognition would have far-reaching results affecting the prosecution of the war. It might endanger the blockade Blue has enforced against Gray through his command of the sea; it might even lead to foreign intervention.

(b) Blue, early in the war, was defeated in close proximity to Washington and for several days the capitol was open to capture. The memory of the panic at that time is fresh in the minds of the Blue administration.

So here we have the third Imponderable: A keen, almost morbid anxiety on the part of Blue for the safety of its capitol.

Washington is particularly vulnerable. It lies on the very frontier of the two states; it has no natural defenses and it can be attacked easily, either from the direction of Manassas or from Harpers Ferry down the Valley of the Potomac. It is separated from its wholly loyal population by the border State of Maryland, which, while nominally Blue territory, is highly sympathetic with the Gray cause. One of the two lines of communications between Washington and the loyal states from which the army draws its replacements and supplies is a railroad and canal paralleling the Potomac and passing through Harpers Ferry. The Blue administration's fears are not entirely groundless.

(4) There is another Imponderable which has engaged General "Army of the Valley's" attention: the personality of the Blue commanders, their intellectual grasp of the situation and their strength of character. He knows the prestige of victory is with Gray. From the caution exhibited by the Blue commanders in previous campaigns he believes, confronted by unexpected and puzzling moves, the Blue generals will prove irresolute. Following this reasoning he feels they will place an over-emphasis on the importance of any aggressive moves Gray may make.

So the fourth Imponderable lies in the cautions, character and irresolute minds of the opposing commanders.

(5) The fifth Imponderable is the relative fighting spirit of the Gray and Blue troops. General "Army of the Valley," while not underestimating his adversaries' fighting ability, has faith in the superior morale of his own troops, for Victory so far has perched on their bayonets and they are fighting on their own territory in defense of their own homes. With good reason he believes the mobility of his own troops is superior to the enemy.

(6) He has faith in himself and in the justice of his cause. He feels that the driving power of his will to victory is stronger than his opponents', for he knows exactly what he wants to do and they are restricted by a cautious uncertainty.

(7) Together with these six Imponderables, General "Army of the Valley" has a deep religious faith which is rare in any age. He honestly and completely believes that Divine Providence will aid a just cause if reverently invoked. His whole life and character is built around the conviction that while the Divine Will operates through the works and minds of men, it is a direct influence which in the end is conclusive and final. His faith is that of Cromwell, "Trust in God and keep your powder dry."

General "Army of the Valley" then has seven Imponderables which he can use to offset the enormous inequality of material force which confronts him:

- (1) Divided authority and command in the hostile ranks;
  - (2) Divided councils and lack of confidence of Blue in their commander;
  - (3) The extreme anxiety of Blue for his Capitol, coupled with its vulnerability;
  - (4) The cautiousness and irresolution of the Blue commanders;
  - (5) His own faith in the fighting value and mobility of his troops and in his cause;
  - (6) His faith in his own will to conquer;
  - (7) His complete faith in Divine Providence.
- (We will see what use he makes of these Imponderables.)

#### *Enemy Situation:*

(a) Plans open to enemy.

General "Army of the Valley" knows enough of the enemy's general plan to realize that the main effort is directed on Richmond, the Gray capitol. He knows this effort is in the nature of a converging attack, partly overland, through Manassas Junction and Fredericksburg and partly by water to some base on Chesapeake Bay, and thence by land toward Richmond. He understands that from 125,000 to 150,000 men are available to Blue for these operations and that Gray has only 70,000 to 80,000 men to oppose them.

In his immediate front his cavalry reports evidence of the enemy withdrawing and detaching troops to the east. This may either mean that Blue is

- (1) evacuating the Valley entirely, or
- (2) detaching troops to reinforce their main effort, leaving a force to contain him.

(b) Analysis of possible enemy plans.

General "Army of the Valley" discards the first contingency as unsound from the hostile viewpoint. Why should they evacuate the Valley entirely? They have not been defeated and there is still his force there to be observed and contained.

He feels it is much closer to the truth that Blue is retiring to better consolidate his position, that he will leave a comparatively small force to observe and contain him and is detaching what troops he can spare to reinforce the main Blue effort.

This is the very thing his mission is to prevent. But he knows that all factors point to the fact that this detachment is in harmony with Blue plans and seems practicable, for why should not the "Army of the Valley," a mere 4,000 or 5,000 men, be contained by a relatively small force? Even should Blue overestimate his strength, no supposedly sane man could believe that such a small force as Gray can possibly have in the Valley could seriously interfere with the Blue plans.

#### *Own Situation:*

(a) Plans open to General "Army of the Valley."

1. He could observe the Blue force in the Valley keeping his main body intact and while constituting a threat to refrain from any close engagement involving his force seriously.

2. He could advance cautiously against Blue and while not committing himself too seriously might, by a show of aggressiveness, induce Blue to recall the detachments now moving eastwardly.

3. He could attack Blue vigorously and, by pressing the action, draw on himself not only the Blue detachments now moving from the Valley but other troops destined for the main Blue effort.

4. He might retire in conformity with the rest of the Gray army.

(b) Analysis of plans.

General "Army of the Valley" rejects plan No. 4 at once; while his orders previously received might be urged in extenuation of this course, it in no way conforms to his mission as he sees it.

Plan No. 1—keeping contact but avoiding an engagement—he rejects also. While in apparent harmony with that part of his instructions which states how his mission is to be performed, he considers it repellent to his real mission, i. e. to induce Blue to detach troops from his main effort.

Plan No. 2—a cautious aggressive—has certain advantages. It seems practicable. While he is not quite sure of the strength of the force Blue has left in the Valley to contain him, he feels he would not be running too great a risk. If he is outnumbered and repulsed he could, by a show of aggressiveness, still constitute a threat which would require watching by Blue. The cautiousness of the Blue commanders will probably cause them to recall at least some of the troops recently detached. Thus the plan would probably fulfill the mission as outlined in his instructions.

However, there are risks. However weak Blue's strength in the immediate vicinity may be he can call superior numbers to his assistance in a few days. A cautious attack which was not altogether successful might increase Blue's confidence even to the point where he would feel he could handle the situation without recalling the detachments.

But over and above all these considerations, General "Army of the Valley" knows his real mission, as he sees it, would not be fulfilled by any such program. What is needed, and needed desperately by Gray, is something which will cause a complete change in Blue's plans.

Plan No. 3—a vigorous attack.

Advantages. It is practicable; the force opposed to

him does not seem to be more than a rear guard. Also it will probably be unexpected, thus having the element of surprise. It will set in motion the Imponderables he has considered, for a strong aggressive movement is related to all the factors which make up these Imponderables.

(1) Blue will believe any offensive from the Valley, even if made by a small force, is the prelude to an advance by larger forces, striking at the rear of the advancing Blue armies. This will raise fears for the safety of Washington which can be reached via Harpers Ferry and the Valley of the Potomac or from Ashby's or Snickers Gap.

(2) It will be certain to diminish the confidence of the Blue administration and populace in their General in Chief. He will wish to continue his own plan, the move against the Gray capital, already well under way; they will wish to modify it for the greater security of Washington.

(3) These factors will inevitably operate to disintegrate the unity of Blue command. The President and Secretary of War will be unable to resist interfering directly with military operations.

(4) A bold attack will prey on the cautiousness of the Blue commanders. They will not understand it and the uncertainty will paralyze their initiative.

(5) His force is small, but it is all he has and all he can expect. While confronted with superior numbers, the enemy is scattered, he is concentrated. If he is to strike at all, now is the time. His faith in the mobility of his troops and their fighting spirit leads him to believe that he can risk an encounter and retain the initiative even if Blue concentrates on him.

(6) His faith in the morale of his troops and in his own will to conquer is based on confidence in himself and his cause, aided by Divine Providence.

There are certain disadvantages:

(1) If the Blue commanders act with resolution, he will shortly be confronted with superior numbers.

If the Blue administration penetrates his design and realizes how few the numbers are at his disposal, it may allow the plans of its general to proceed without interference. In that case, General "Army of the Valley" might win a local victory which would be too dearly purchased at the price of casualties without any corresponding benefit to the Gray cause. A mere tactical advantage, unless it affected the strategical situation, would be a barren victory.

(2) He may be defeated and open up the Valley to a Blue penetration, a contingency that might require detachments from the main Gray army, which they cannot spare, but might be obliged to dispatch to extricate him from the difficulty. He would then probably be blamed by the public for disobedience of orders.

We will not enter into the tactical Estimate of the Situation dealing with the factors which General "Army of the Valley" believe favor a tactical victory for his army. Suffice it to say that the enemy to his front was reported in but slightly superior numbers and that an envelopment of the hostile right, promised success.

General "Army of the Valley's" Decision:

"To attack the hostile force at Winchester enveloping its right flank and drive it north with the purpose of making a threat at Washington, drawing toward the Shenandoah Valley and to the defense of the Blue capitol troops destined for the main Blue effort."

\* \* \*

In conformity with this decision on 23 March 1862, Stonewall Jackson attacked the Union forces at Kernstown. He found the enemy in greater strength and better handled than he had expected and, after a bitterly contested action, Jackson was defeated. But he had pressed the attack with great resolution and handled the Union forces roughly. Under the cover of darkness he drew off his army in good order and retired unmolested by the enemy.

He had suffered a tactical defeat where he sought a victory, but his aggressive boldness and his appreciation of the Imponderables had set mighty forces in motion. That night a Confederate soldier with the easy familiarity of that army and in that atmosphere of danger which, short of death, is the greatest leveler of rank, approached "Old Jack" who was warming his hands at a camp fire.

"General," he said, "the Yankees are in Winchester tonight."

"Winchester is a very fine place to be in," returned the General.

Nothing abashed, his visitor went on, "General, it was reported that the Yankees were retreating but I reckon they were retreating after us."

With his eyes fixed on the burning logs, Jackson replied slowly and impressively, "I think I may say I am satisfied, Sir."

There has been some doubt whether Stonewall Jackson realized the extent of his success at the time, but when he expressed himself as "satisfied" in the midst of defeat, he must surely have been looking beyond the affairs of the moment. He knew what he had done. He knew his carefully laid plans would develop. He knew that the Imponderables he had set in motion would reach out and close like a vise on the will of the authorities at Washington and paralyze the initiative of the Union commanders. And he was right. His aggressive move, so well timed, upset the

whole Union plan of campaign. They could not conceive that his attack at Kernstown was simply the bold move of a small force. To them it was an advance guard action, the prelude to an invasion of northern territory with Washington as its objective.

As Jackson had anticipated, Lincoln and Stanton took over the direction of the Union armies, thus destroying unity of command. They ordered back to the Valley all troops detached to aid McClellan in the Peninsula; they diverted McDowell and his corps which was McClellan's right wing and placed him covering Washington, violating the principles of co-operation and mass.

By the battle of Kernstown and subsequent moves, known as the Valley Campaign, Jackson paralyzed the initiative of the Federal command and had Stanton ordering troops over all northern Virginia. So, McClellan's army, deprived of McDowell's corps, was defeated by Lee, reinforced by Jackson, while it was astride the Chickahominy, and enough Union troops to crush Lee were searching vainly for Jackson over a hundred miles away and protecting a capitol which was not in danger. The Imponderables were working hard.

With a hostile force three times his own strength in the theatre of operations, Lee, with Jackson's aid, concentrated a superior force on the critical wing of the enemy and defeated him. Certainly strategy could do no more. It was not the heaviest battalions but the Imponderables rightly appreciated and properly applied, which won the victory.

The field of strategy is not the sole place the Imponderables work. They exist, not only in the rarified air of the high command, but in the more restricted spheres of the regiment, battalion, company and platoon. Those who command armies are few but any officer, no matter what his grade, is an important link in the military chain, and in campaign a junior may suddenly be confronted with a tremendous responsibility which no one can handle but himself. Often important issues hang on the decision of the man on the spot. A proper appreciation of the Imponderables by a subordinate officer may well be the deciding factor in a situation momentous in its consequences.





# The Russian Plan of Campaign in the World War (1914)

By A. M. Nikolaieff\*

THE importance of the initial military operations in a war, and especially in a modern war, can hardly be over-emphasized. A well-known military aphorism says: Mistakes made in the deployment of troops at the start of operations can not be righted in the course of the whole campaign.

In the World War a mistake made by the authors of the Russian plan of campaign made it impossible to reach a strategic decision on the Eastern front in the first year of the War, despite the victory over the Austro-Hungarian army in Galicia. The struggle had to go on, and this faulty plan of campaign was one of the causes which made its continuation inevitable.

In what did the mistake in the Russian plan consist, and why was this mistake made? In all the vast literature now available in English on the history of the War, no comprehensive answer to these questions is to be found; yet the subject is one of general interest, for the reason that a different plan of campaign might not only have brought an earlier victory to the Allies, but might have changed the whole subsequent history of Europe.

The obligations of Russia as an ally of France were defined by a military convention concluded by the governments of the two countries in 1892. The convention was signed three years after the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy came into being. The signing of the convention was prompted by the desire to oppose to the powerful Triple Alliance, which had replaced the so-called "Alliance of the three emperors" (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia), a political combination which would counterbalance the powers of Central Europe and prevent them, should they act offensively, from inflicting a separate defeat either upon France or upon Russia.


Although the military convention, as an insurance against separate defeat, was of equal importance to both Russia and France, the political attitude of the two countries toward the powers of the Triple Alliance was not identical, nor could their strategic plans for joint military action in case of a war with Germany and Austria-Hungary be easily reconciled and harmonized. France, fearing Germany, was anxious that Russia should direct her plans against that country, but Russia, on the other hand, had little expectation of finding herself at war with Germany alone. Had there been no alliance between Russia and France, a

war between Germany and Russia might have come only as a result of a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia in connection with the Balkan question, in which both those powers were vitally interested. This actually happened in 1914: the decision of Russia to stand by Serbia and to protect her independence caused Germany to give unconditional support (a "blank check") to Austria-Hungary and eventually to declare war on Russia, that is, to start the World War.

But neither the political nor the economic interests of France conflicted with those of Austria-Hungary, and the importance of helping Russia in a war against Austria-Hungary, was not given much attention by France, though such a war was more likely to occur than a war between Russia and Germany. According to the first French project for a military convention, no help was to be given to Russia by France in case of an attack on Russia by Austria-Hungary, while, on the other hand, Russia was to direct almost one half of her armed forces against Germany in the case that country should attack France. It was with no little difficulty that General Obrucheff, chief of the General Staff of the Russian army under Emperor Alexander III, succeeded in amending the French project so that the draft of the military convention became acceptable to both parties. The agreement signed in 1892 provided that France would help Russia by directing all her available ("*disponibles*") forces against Germany, not only in case of an attack on Russia by Germany, but also in case of such an attack by Austria-Hungary supported by Germany. Russia, on her part, in the case of an attack on France, was to direct all her available forces against Germany as soon as possible, in order to compel Germany to fight at the same time in the West and in the East. The great advantage of the agreement, in its modified form, was that it did not restrict the freedom of Russia's choice of a plan of military operations or of a date of starting the offensive.

The military convention between Russia and France remained in force throughout the whole period from 1892, when it was signed, down to the outbreak of the World War in 1914. But, as a result of supplementary agreements, worked out at conferences which were held periodically by the Chiefs of the two General Staffs, Russian and French, and recorded in special "protocols", Russia took upon herself additional obligations which not only tended to bind her freedom of strategic action but, under the circumstances, were not even capable of being accomplished. According to those protocols "the defeat of the German troops remained under all circumstances the first and funda-

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mental goal of the Allied troops"; and accordingly it was provided that Russia, concentrating 800,000 men against Germany, was to start an offensive either in East Prussia or in the direction of Berlin on the 15th day of mobilization. Now, by the 15th day of

mobilization only one third of the Russian army in the field could be concentrated on the Western frontier of the Empire, and less than one half (350,000) of the Russian forces destined for action against Germany

† Protocol of August 31, 1911.

under the protocol could be deployed by that time, with the organization of their rear still incomplete. Yet on that day the Russian troops facing Germany were to start their march with the purpose of invading that country.

The new obligations of Russia were a concession made by her under the influence of the insistent requests of the French representatives, who feared above all that Germany, taking advantage of the slow progress of the Russian mobilization, might throw all her forces against France and defeat her army before the Russian army would move forward. The French representatives were therefore anxious that Russia, upon the declaration of war by Germany, should expedite her mobilization, and begin action at the same time as the French army. With that end in view the French even promised their support in the matter of arranging a French loan to be used by Russia in constructing strategic railways which would make possible the mobilization and concentration of the Russian army within a shorter time. In 1912 special funds for that purpose were granted Russia in the form of an annual loan of 500 million francs, and President Poincaré informed Emperor Nicholas II of the fact by a personal letter.

The Russian plan of campaign, formed under the influence of the French requests and known as the plan of 1910, was severely criticized by the commanders-in-chief and the chiefs of staff of the several military areas into which the territory of the Empire was divided. A conference of the chiefs of staff of the military areas was therefore called in 1912 in Moscow, and at that conference a project for a new plan was worked out. The project was based on fundamentals set forth by General M. V. Alexeieff, chief of staff of the Kieff military area and later, during the World War, chief of staff of the Emperor after the latter assumed the command of the Russian army in the field. These fundamentals, serving as points of departure for the new plan, may be summarized as follows: First, Germany will direct her main forces in the beginning against France, and will confine herself to defensive action against Russia; accordingly Germany will have the advantage of the topographical obstacles and the strong fortifications of East Prussia and will be able to resist even a numerous Russian army of invasion in that quarter; moreover, because of the flanking position of the fortified East Prussian territory, no advance from Western Poland (from Warsaw) in the direction of Berlin may be undertaken so long as East Prussia is held by the Germans; second, Austria-Hungary is the real enemy of Russia, and, if account be taken of the number of troops which she will bring into action against Russia in the initial period of war, then she is the most dangerous enemy as well: the defeat of Austria-Hungary is of the greatest importance, inasmuch as it may result in the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy and the solution of the Slav problem. Upon the ground of the above considerations General Alexeieff maintained that the fundamental idea of the plan of 1910 should be changed, and he proposed that in the beginning the

main attack should be made on Austria-Hungary and that there should be directed against that country as many forces as possible; as to Germany, military operations against her should be confined in the beginning to the protection of the Russian frontier and to a limited action against the German troops left in East Prussia; only six army corps were to be assigned for the latter purpose, according to Alexeieff's plan.

The project of the Moscow conference did not receive the approval of the Chief of the General Staff, but it could not possibly be disregarded. A new plan, known as plan of 1912, was therefore worked out by the General Staff. That plan, with the revisions made prior to the outbreak of war in 1914, may be regarded as a compromise between the ideas on which the plan of 1910 had been founded and those set forth at the Moscow conference.

The plan of 1912 was prepared in two versions: version "A", to be put into effect in case the greater part of the forces were to be directed against Austria-Hungary, and version "G" for use in case the major forces were to be directed against Germany. Version "A" was the one actually put into operation in 1914. According to that version, 33.52 per cent of the forces deploying in the initial period of the campaign (that is, 19 regular divisions and 11 of the second line,—30 infantry divisions altogether, out of a grand total of 89½)\* were to form the North-Western group of armies (or the North-Western front) with the object of invading East Prussia; 50.84 per cent of the forces (45½ infantry divisions, including 32½ regular divisions and 13 of the second line) were to form the South-Western group of armies (or the South-Western front) and were to advance against Austria-Hungary; the remaining 15.64 per cent (7 regular divisions and 7 of the second line) were to remain in Finland, the Baltic provinces and Bessarabia with the object of protecting the flanks of the two groups of armies destined for active military operations.

That distribution of forces clearly shows that the plan of campaign had two objects in view, both to be achieved at the same time: one, to undertake decisive action against the German troops in East Prussia; another, to inflict a crushing defeat upon the Austro-Hungarian army in Galicia. Now, the fundamental principle of strategy demands that a strategic plan shall have at a given time only one main objective, and that as many forces as possible should be concentrated for the achievement of that aim; as to all the other objectives, they should be considered of secondary importance, and only a minimum of forces should be assigned for their execution. Contrary to that fundamental demand of military art, the Russian forces, according to the plan, were to be split into two major groups. Which then of the two objectives was con-

\*At the time of the mobilization in 1914 there were in the Russian Army 70 regular infantry divisions, and 18 regular infantry brigades, forming the equivalent of 9 infantry divisions, or a grand total of 79 regular infantry divisions. Out of that total 58½ divisions in the initial period of war were to be deployed in the European theatre of war, and the remaining 11½ divisions were to protect the frontier of Asiatic Russia in Siberia, Turkestan and the Caucasus. The formation of the 31 infantry divisions of the second line to reinforce the regular troops was to be started at the beginning of mobilization.



sidered the main one? Judging from the larger per cent of troops assigned to the South-Western front (50.84), one would be led to conclude that of the two objectives set by the Russian plan, the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian army was considered of greater importance than the invasion of East Prussia. General Y. N. Danilooff, who was the Quartermaster General of the Russian General Staff throughout the five years preceding the War, and in that capacity was responsible for the working out of plans of operations, appears to support this conclusion when he says\* that the Austro-Hungarian army represented, under conditions existing during the years immediately before the War, the chief active enemy force on the Russian front, and could deprive the Russian army of liberty of action; yet on the other hand plainly states,\*\* that "the guiding idea of the strategic deployment of the Russian army was the desire to insure the most favorable conditions with respect to (numerical) strength for the combats in East Prussia". In trying to explain the splitting of the Russian forces, he further states that the Austro-Hungarian theatre of operations "from the point of view of the coalition of powers (the Entente)" was one of "secondary importance", and that "it began to assume the rôle of the main theatre on our (the Russian) front only when the failure of the North-Western group (the Russian armies in East Prussia) became clear".\*\* Thus, by showing that Germany could not be defeated at this stage of the War, in East Prussia, events had shown that the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian army, not the invasion of East Prussia, should have been the main objective, and that, to insure its attainment, the forces diverted for action against Germany in the initial period of the War should have been limited as closely as possible.

Fifty per cent of the Russian forces which would be deployed in the European theatre of war did not present a power sufficiently strong to inflict upon the Austro-Hungarian army a crushing defeat. This General Danilooff fully admits as he says† that the plan in relation to Austria-Hungary was a "daring" one—that is, a risky undertaking, and that "the task set for the (Russian) troops of the South-Western front had been formulated not in accordance with their numerical strength, but in the expectation that their spirit would be superior" to that of the Austro-Hungarian troops, made up as the latter were of elements belonging to many nationalities, among them Slavs whose sympathy might be on the side of a related nationality, the Russians. The war showed that that expectation was not well founded, the Austro-Hungarian troops having proved that, although not the equal of the German troops, they were an enemy who could not be put easily to rout.

The 33 per cent of the Russian forces assigned to the North-Western front (making up 9 army corps, instead of the 6 corps assigned to that front in General Alexeieff's plan), likewise could not be considered an adequate force for achieving decisive results in East Prussia, although their numerical strength exceeded that of the German troops which were expected

to be left in the Eastern theatre. It is known that a heavy reverse (the defeat of Samsonoff's army at Soldau-Tannenberg in August, 1914) was suffered by the Russian troops on the North-Western front in the beginning of operations. But even if this reverse could not have been foreseen, it should have been evident in advance that the occupation of such a stronghold as East Prussia by the Russian forces assigned for that purpose would hardly be possible at a time when one half of the Russian army in the field would be engaged in a decisive battle with the Austro-Hungarian army. Yet it was also true that no invasion of Germany on a grand scale could be undertaken prior to a complete and secure occupation of East Prussia.

Finally, consideration should be given to the dates on which it had been planned the Russian forces would be ready to begin active operations on the two fronts. They were as follows: the regular troops of the North-Western front were scheduled to complete their concentration on the 20th day of mobilization, those of the second line—on the 36th day; the regular troops of the South-Western front were scheduled to be in complete readiness on the 29th day of mobilization, those of the second line—on the 38th day. Now, the Russian army, as has been already said, was to start an offensive against Germany on the 15th day of mobilization, according to a promise given by the Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Zhilinsky, to the Chief of the French General Staff, General (later Marshal) Joffre.‡ It follows that the offensive was to be launched before the concentration of the Russian army had been carried out. This actually happened in 1914; the Russian forces started the offensive on August 14th, which was the 15th day of mobilization, and crossed the frontier of East Prussia: the 1st army on August 17th, the 2d army on August 21, at a time when the formation of the supply columns and the organization of the rear establishments of these armies required seven more days to be completed and no division of the second line was ready to advance. The fact that the offensive was undertaken prematurely was one of the main causes of the reverses suffered by the Russian army in East Prussia in 1914.

The question arises how did it come to pass that a plan of campaign the basic conception of which was faulty, inasmuch as it was a violation of the fundamental principles of strategy, was actually adopted. An answer may be found in the statement made by General Danilooff, himself one of the authors of the plan, in his book, "Russia in the World War." He writes as follows:§ "Russia, having become an ally of France, took upon herself a serious and heavy obligation; she had to bear in mind, as she considered measures of preparedness for war, the necessity of a swift and energetic offensive against Germany. . . . In order to accelerate our offensive against Germany,

\* Danilooff, Y. *Russia's Part in the Initial Period of the World War*. ("The Marine Corps Gazette", Washington, D. C., 1923, v. 8, no. 2, p. 56.)

\*\* Danilooff, Y. *Suzhdeniya Posle Sobytiy*. ("Vozrozhdenie," a Russian daily, Paris, 1930, no. of March 21.)

† Danilooff, Y. *Suzhdeniya Posle Sobytiy*.

‡ Danilooff, Y. *Rossiya v. Mirovoi Voine* (Russia in the World War). Berlin, 1924, p. 80.

§ Danilooff, op. cit., p. 81, 80, 78.

—our ally, France, had opened a large credit in favor of our Government for the purpose of constructing railways of strategic importance. This financial assistance.... was a heavy burden weighing upon the free creative power of the Russian strategy.... In point of fact at the conferences (which were held periodically by the Russian and French representatives) it always came to this: France would express her wishes, and Russia would consider to what degree and in what ways they could be accomplished. There is no doubt that such a state of things necessarily fettered our strategy and the free use of our forces in the initial period of war."

Thus it is clear that had not the Russian strategy been hampered by the requests of France, a different use of the Russian forces might have been made, in other words, it is probable that no splitting of them would have taken place. The only reason for dividing the Russian active forces into two large groups was the anxiety of France that Russia, from the very beginning of military operations, should keep engaged on the Eastern front as many German troops as possible (five or six army corps at least), with a view to preventing Germany from directing and using all her forces against France; and in order to achieve that purpose, an attack on Germany (in East Prussia) was decided upon as the best way of action, Austria-Hungary being looked upon by France as a secondary theatre.

Would it not have been possible to devise a plan which would serve the needs of France and yet avoid the splitting of the Russian forces? It seems that the working out of such a plan would have been possible, if instead of regarding the actions against Germany and Austria-Hungary as two different, semi-independent campaigns, France and Russia had looked upon their two enemies as one armed force (which they really were) fighting in the beginning of the war on two fronts, directly opposite to one another—in the West against France, and in the East against Russia. Now, an attack with the great majority of her forces on one of the fronts (the Western as it was in 1914) could be undertaken by Germany only on condition that her rear (the Eastern front) be protected not only by the few army corps left in East Prussia but by the entire Austro-Hungarian army as well. It is obvious that Germany could not possibly take the risk of leaving her Eastern frontier open to invasion, if the whole Russian army were free to act against her alone. Germany could take this risk only because the Austro-Hungarian army, by attacking and engaging the greater part of the Russian army, would serve as a protection of Germany's rear. Consequently, the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian army in the beginning of the war would have constituted destruction of those very forces which, making the rear of Germany secure, enabled her to use nearly all her own regular forces against France. As a result a considerable fraction, if not the greater part of the German troops in the West would have of necessity been shifted immediately to the East in order to bar the advance of the Russian army on Berlin. Having disposed of

the Austro-Hungarian army, it would have been possible for the Russian forces to undertake such an advance, using the shortest routes (by way of Silesia).

How sensitive Germany was to the security of her rear (in the East) the following fact may show: The initial success of one of the Russian armies (the 1st) in East Prussia (the battle at Gumbinnen on August 20th), at the very time when the greater part of the Russian force was to engage in a decisive battle with the Austro-Hungarian army, caused the German General Headquarters to withdraw two army corps (the Guard Reserve and the XI corps) from the Western front and rush them to the East.

It would naturally be asked whether a concentrated attack by Russia on Austria-Hungary would have brought pressure to bear on Germany quickly enough to enable France (with no assistance from a Russian invasion of East Prussia) to withstand the German onslaught? The answer is, yes—if in the beginning of the war France had acted only defensively.

In 1914 the Austro-Hungarian army was defeated by the Russians by September 12th. On that day, which was also the date of the telegram from the French General Headquarters informing the Russian Commander-in-Chief of the victory on the Marne, the Austro-Hungarian army was in full and disorderly retreat toward Cracow, its base. It may therefore be assumed that had the Russian force which fought against the Austrians been materially stronger (and the force assigned to face Germany therefore considerably weaker) the Russian armies on the South-Western front might not only have defeated the Austro-Hungarian army by September 12th, but might have prevented it from retreating toward Cracow; that is, the Russians might have cut off the Austro-Hungarian army from its base. And this would have put an end to the fighting of Germany's ally.

If the plan here suggested had been followed, the French army would have of necessity been limited to defensive action during the period of the decisive battle between Russia and Austria-Hungary. The object of this action by the French would have been to hold out against the invading army until a decision had been reached in the East. The well-known slowness of the Russian mobilization made it essential that during the initial period of war France should be on the defensive. Had the French remained on the defensive, they would have had on their side the two following advantages: first, the possibility of making full use of the barrier of fortresses between the Swiss frontier and Luxemburg (Belfort, Epinal, Toul, Verdun), and, second, the possibility of assigning a large part of their forces to the strategic reserve to be moved against the invading enemy according to circumstances.

Now, the French plan in 1914 was just the opposite to what it should have been. In complete disregard of the slowness of the Russian mobilization, the French scheme was based on the idea of an immediate and decisive offensive. Its central idea was that all the concentrated forces of France should be moved forward for an attack upon the advancing Germans who, it was expected, would concentrate along the Franco-German

frontier and attack from the East; the French forces therefore were to meet the enemy attack by an advance between the Vosges and the Moselle river on the French right flank and to the north of the line Verdun-Metz on their left. The concentration of the French army was actually planned and carried out with this purpose in view. The attack of the Germans through Belgium, aimed at Paris from the North, came to the French as a complete surprise.\* If despite its extremely unfavorable position, the French army was able to win the victory of the Marne—it stopped the German attack on September 6th and forced the enemy to retreat on September 8th—it may be safely assumed that, if they had avoided the great disadvantage of concentrating their forces in a wrong zone and had kept at their disposal a strong strategic reserve, the French would have been able to hold their own until September 12th, or even longer—that is, until the Russians had put an end to the Austro-Hungarian army.

Under the plan proposed the German forces facing the French would not have been reduced by the two army corps (the XIth and Guard Reserve) which as a result of the Russian invasion of East Prussia were rushed by the German General Headquarters on August 25th to the Eastern front, but this would not have changed the situation materially if France had acted on the defensive, inasmuch as the French General Headquarters might have opposed to the 78 German divisions\*\* which had invaded France a force of an almost equal strength. In point of fact in 1914, at the time of the German invasion, the French had 84

divisions,† not counting the 6 Belgian and 4 British divisions; that is, the French had a superiority over the Germans in the number of divisions, but because the German artillery was the more powerful,§ the opposing forces might have been considered as almost equal in strength.


In the opinion of the German General who was in 1914 the Chief of the Military Operations Section of the German General Staff‡ the cause of the German reverse on the Marne was the absence of the two army corps which had been withdrawn to face the Russian front on August 25th. Yet this officer also maintains that "had the battle on the Marne ended without any favorable (*positifs*) results for the French and the British," even then "the war itself would have continued." With this opinion of the German General, no military expert of the opposite side is likely to disagree. On the other hand, it seems equally certain that had the Austro-Hungarian army met its "Sedan" in Galicia, Germany, left alone, would hardly have gone on fighting, and the War might thus have ended in the year in which it began.

\* A study in peacetime of the net of German railways leading to the Belgian frontier and of the fortifications of Thionville and Strasbourg might have shown that it was the German plan to invade France from the North.

\*\* 45 regular divisions, 27 reserve divisions and 6 ersatz-reserve divisions.

† 47 regular divisions, 25 reserve divisions and 12 territorial divisions.  
§ 14 batteries to a German division including 3 batteries of light howitzers and 2 batteries of heavy guns against 12 light batteries to a French division.

‡ General Tappen. *Jusqua a la Marne en 1914*. In: *Documents allemands sur la bataille de la Marne*. Paris, 1930, p. 119-121, 124-126. General Tappen was the Chief of the Military Operations Section from the beginning of the War to the autumn of 1916.





# A Decade of Army Schools

By Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Lentz, Infantry

**A**BOUT ten years ago our army schools began to flourish in a manner undreamed of before the World War. This war having brought out the necessity for a broader program of training and education, especially for officers, we went at it with a will and soon the officer who wasn't either preparing to go to a school or coming from one became quite the exception.

At that time, having the firm conviction that our schooling was being overdone, I wrote an article entitled "Who is going to soldier when everybody is going to School?" This article brought forth "brickbats," particularly from those who had been through our pre-war schools, and "bouquets" especially from



Army War College

those who sensed the necessity for becoming educated but who lacked, perhaps, the enthusiasm for doing so.

I have since gone through the schools and now, after more than ten years have passed during which our schools have undergone changes and have been placed on a more permanent basis, I feel that an article on the present subject will not be out of place.

Jonathan Swift, the English satirist has told us: "If a man would register all his opinions upon love, politics, religion, learning etc. beginning from his youth and so go on to old age, what a bunch of inconsistencies and contradictions would appear at last." It is with Swift's idea in mind that I undertake my present task.

I sometimes wonder if we fully appreciate the extent to which our schools have contributed to the up-building of our national defense. We are wont to speak of national defense in terms of man power, trained and untrained and supplies either on hand or planned for and often fail, because we lack a definite yardstick, to

measure adequately the great national defense asset we possess in our corps of schooled officers.

No study of our state of preparedness can be complete without entering on the credit side of the ledger this large item of military education which, when taken at its full value, goes far to make a good showing when the ledger is balanced.

Our schools have been worth all the money and all the efforts we have expended. This was forcefully brought to my attention sometime ago when I participated in a tactical inspection of an infantry regiment. After the inspection the general—one of the best known tacticians in the army—pronounced the organization fit, in every way, to take the field, and yet the organization had had practically no field training for many months prior to the inspection. The regiment, snow bound for months in winter and conducting camps of every description during the summer, simply hadn't found the time for tactical training.

The commanding officer, all the battalion commanders and a large majority of company commanders and staff officers had recently joined the organization. The inspection being imminent, some tactical exercises had been planned but had to be mostly omitted because of inclement weather. And when, in spite of an almost total absence of field training coupled with the fact that a majority of the officers were new to the organization, the regiment was pronounced fit for the field there could be but one conclusion. It was this: While the officers had not played their respective parts in the team prior to the inspection, they did show up well during the inspection because at school they had learned among other things, two very important ones viz. a uniform technique and a knowledge of their respective roles in relation to the regiment as a team.

Not only in the Regular Army but also in the National Guard and Organized Reserves, the influence of our schools has spread; directly, through the hundreds of National Guard and Reserve officers who have passed through the schools and indirectly, through the teachings of our regulars who serve with these components.

The objections to our greatly enlarged school program, which were quite violent ten years ago, have gradually disappeared, "and fools who came to scoff remained to pray," now aptly describes the change of sentiment that has taken place.

It is interesting to note the changes that have taken place in the conduct of our schools since the close of the world war. Foremost among these changes is a broader definition of education on which, more and more, our school methods of instruction are being based. I feel that those in charge of our schools are recognizing, while military training and military education must go hand in hand, that there is a dis-

inct difference between training and education; that there is a proper place for both and that both must be fostered if our schools are to achieve the best possible results.

In this connection, let me quote from an article by Dr. A. Flexner, Director of the Institute for Advanced Study, published in May 1932 number of the *North American Review* and entitled, "The University in American Life:" "Training is, let me repeat, concerned with skills, technique and devices. One trains cooks, one trains plumbers, one trains bookkeepers, one trains business men; but one educates scholars, one educates philosophers, one educates economists, one educates physicians." Applying this line of reasoning to the military we might say that one trains army officers for general utility and one educates army officers for leadership and responsibility.

Without in any way belittling its importance, training as Dr. Flexner observes "is on a distinctly lower intellectual level and aims at a distinctly lower, because an immediate, goal than does education."

The end to be gained through military education (bearing in mind the distinction that has been made above between training and education) is, a liberal outlook on the part of those who are to hold important positions in our military set-up.

An English writer—Wickam Steed—has given us a good definition of a liberal outlook. He says "A liberal outlook is a matter of mental and moral poise. It is compounded of tolerance; of a belief in individual freedom; of a conviction that all things human are relative and that the tyranny of fixed absolutes cramps men's minds. It recognizes that within given limits of space and time, certain principles may be accepted as rules of unquestioned expediency, subject always to deterioration when circumstances change."

Unless we study this definition of a liberal outlook rather carefully and at the same time bear in mind

the pages of history, we find that all real leaders, military or otherwise, have been made of the same stuff. They were men of character; they were trained, yes, but last and not least they were educated.

In this connection let me give two quotations. The first is from General Von Seeckt who in his book, "Thoughts of a Soldier"—a book well worth reading—tells us: "The value of the knowledge acquired by study must not be over-estimated. The soldier faced



Photo by Signal Corps, U. S. Army  
The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.

with the necessity for independent decision must not mentally search the pages of his professional encyclopaedia nor seek to remember how the great generals of history, from Alexander to Zieten, would have acted in a similar case. Such knowledge as that derived from the study of the history of war is only of living practical value when the wealth of detail has been incorporated with a man's own mental resources."

The second quotation is taken from York von Wartemberg's "Napoleon as a General": "The rational employment of general principles marks the difference between the genius of the true artist and the lack of freedom of the mechanic who is dominated by rigid rules, and the bungler who despises all the rules and denies their justification."

Undeniably, the authors of both the aforesaid quotations had in mind the educated man and not simply the trained man. The conception of education brought out by these military writers is the same as that enunciated by Dr. Flexner. In other words to develop leaders military or otherwise, we must have more than training, we must insist on education.

We should recognize that among our army officers we shall always have first, those who can be trained and no more, second those who can be trained and educated and third, those who can neither be trained nor educated. For the first class there will always be sufficient jobs in our army because as everywhere else much important work must always be done by the dependable trained man. The officer who shows by his work, not only in school but year in and year out, that he belongs in the second class should be encouraged to go to our higher schools to become educated. The third class which I am happy to feel is quite small, should be eliminated.



Photo by Air Corps, U. S. Army  
Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

the conception of education, as distinct from training, we are likely to come to the snap conclusion that here we have ideas that may be appropriate for use at Harvard or Oxford but have absolutely no application in the military service. Search as we will through

Our system of schools is intended to do just these things. We shall succeed, more and more, in accomplishing the desired results as we understand, better and better, the relationship between training and education.

If we linger too long in the field of training for those who are capable of being educated we shall find that the student, when he reaches the higher schools will have difficulty in learning to think for himself, to acquire the liberal outlook, to become educated. The idea of education should go hand in hand with training in our lower schools so that the young student will learn to appreciate early in his career that if and when he goes on to the higher schools he will more and more be expected to stand on his own intellectual feet.

I have always thought that hitching our general staff eligibility to our schools was a mistake for the simple reason that the student is likely to feel that he had better accept what is given out as doctrine or he may find himself not on the eligible list when the course is over. The measure of a school is not in what the student does in school so much as what he does after he leaves the school—the result of the stimulation of his thinking machinery received while a student. To my way of thinking the general staff eligibility law should be repealed if for no other reason than it will encourage true education in our higher schools.

We know that in Europe, for years prior to the World War, general staff eligibility depended largely on school achievement and we may have gotten the idea from Europe. But Europe may have been wrong. I inject a remark by General von Seeckt in speaking of the German army: "Perhaps in an age when so much was done to develop the general staff, too little was done to extend the training of commanding officers". Our schools train for both but do we not give the general staff a special halo through the eligibility law?

Our general staff officers should be trained but what is more important they must be educated—they must possess the liberal outlook—if our present logical general staff system is to function in time of great stress.

To sum up: Our schools have made wonderful progress during the past decade. They leave little to be desired by way of training which is important, but what is really significant, our schools have grasped the idea that education is not so much the acquisition of knowledge but deals largely with the process of stimulating the student to think for himself. This is indeed an auspicious trend for if we continue to follow it, our officers' schools will turn out to an increasing extent—not an over-trained and under-educated product—but a corps of officers who fully understand the proper balance that should always be maintained between training and education.




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## NOTES FROM THE CHIEF OF CAVALRY

### What Would You Do in a Situation Like This?



2d Lieutenant Horatio Bottomley, halting his command at point "A," wiped the sweat and grime from a brow which six months before was first introduced to an army campaign hat. The O. D. handkerchief with which he performed this office removed much of the grime but failed to remove the worried look from Mr. Bottomley's youthful forehead. Once more he was faced with problems, the answers to which he could not recall having been taught in his three months' course of instruction prior to being commissioned for this war.

Briefly, his situation was this. . . . His platoon of Cavalry, now reduced to two squads through march casualties and unreplaced messengers, was on a two days' reconnaissance mission in hostile territory. It was sunset of the first day, with a clear moonlight night in prospect. Due to the dryness of the country, no water suitable for either man or horse had been encountered since 10:00 AM. It was about ten miles to the nearest friendly troops and probably about the same distance to the nearest Red forces, although the inhabitants were actively hostile.

As shown on the sketch, immediately ahead was the village "B", where water might reasonably be expected. To the southeast of village "B" was a woods. Farther on down the road was the sizeable town "X". There should be plenty of water there. Town "X",

by the way, was one of the points the platoon had been directed to reconnoiter.

Acting on an impulse which had proved profitable in solving previous problems, Lieutenant Bottomley called Sergeant McMiffin, his platoon sergeant, and asked this worthy for his recommendations.

Sergeant McMiffin rolled his quid into a more convenient recess of his mouth and spoke:

"Lieutenant, these horses need water. Probably the best place to water around here is in the town "X". I know there may likely be water at "B", too, but it will only be wells. We've got to reconnoiter town "X" anyway before we get back, so we could go on to town "X" for water, and then we can take a look around and see what to do next. Of course, we may hit trouble in "X", and in that case it might be better to water at "B", halt around here somewhere for the night and look over "X" in the morning. On the other hand we may strike trouble at "B" and then we might never get to "X". Lieutenant, I don't know what is best to do."

The furrows of care on Mr. Bottomley's brow were seen to grow deeper as he tried to decide what to do.

What would you do?

*For Solution Turn to Next Page.*

## Lieutenant Bottomley's Solution

Lieutenant Bottomley marched the platoon, with two men acting as a point, to the village "B", where the horses were watered and canteens filled at the well. Pails and tubs were commandeered in the village to facilitate watering. A small march outpost covered the platoon during watering.

By this time it was growing dark, with a clear moonlight night coming on. The platoon then resumed the road toward the town "X" until nightfall and, when about opposite the woods south of the road, it left the road and moved into the woods to bivouac for the night.

### Discussion

To maintain the condition of the personnel and mounts of his platoon, Lieutenant Bottomley must get them watered. The village "B" is nearby and should prove adequate as a watering point.

While watering, cavalry is very vulnerable to surprise attacks. The village "B" being small offers less probability of such an attack by hostile civilians than does town "X". To attempt to water after dark increases this danger at either town.

It would be a mistake to go into "X" at this time, particularly as it will be but a short time until dark.

After watering, to remain in the village "B" or the town "X" for the night might be disastrous; to bivouac in the open within sight of the village "B" or the town "X" might be equally dangerous. Many small commands have been surprised and destroyed under such circumstances.

A covey of quail will water in the evening and at dusk will fly to a field for the night. Upon alighting they will run for some distance to a spot where night will be passed. Bobwhite knows that owls, cats and foxes may have marked his return flight from water, and he does not stay for the night in the spot where his enemies may have located him at dusk; neither should Lieutenant Bottomley's patrol.

The best place for a small cavalry command in hostile territory at night is in a location not definitely known to the enemy, in woods with some adjacent high ground on which to place some observation. Its security comes from its concealment, not from a large outpost. The command needs all the rest it can get consistent with its safety and mission. (Department of Tactics, The Cavalry School)

## An Appreciation

September 16, 1932.

Colonel Pierre Lorillard, Jr., Q. M. C. Remount,  
Tuxedo Park, New York.

My dear Colonel Lorillard:

In the name of the United States Cavalry Association, as well as personally, I wish to thank you for your assistance to that Association in its responsibility for conducting the Equestrian Events and the Riding Phase of the Modern Pentathlon Event in the Games of the Xth Olympiad recently held in Los Angeles, California.

Singlehanded and in a time of financial depression you collected the sum of \$5,000.00, thus materially aiding that Association in caring for its large responsibilities in the Games. Without this aid on your part it is very doubtful if there would have been any Equestrian Events in the Olympic Games.

In addition to the above your personal advice and assistance prior to and during the Games were most valuable.

The United States Cavalry Association and the horse world in general owe you a debt of gratitude.

Most sincerely yours,

Guy V. Henry,

Major General, U. S. A.,

Chief of Cavalry,

President, U. S. Cavalry Association.

## Cavalry Leadership Tests for Small Units, 1932

AT a review given by the 11th Cavalry, Presidio of Monterey, California, August 29, 1932, the Chief of Cavalry presented the members of the Composite Platoon, Troop A, 11th Cavalry, their prizes earned as members of a winning platoon in the 1932 Cavalry Leadership Test for Small Units. These prizes consisted of a piece of silver to the platoon leader,



Major General Guy V. Henry, Chief of Cavalry, Presenting to 1st Lieutenant Harry C. Mewshaw, 11th Cavalry, a Silver Trophy won as Platoon Leader of the Composite Platoon, Troop A, 11th Cavalry a winner in the 1932 Cavalry Leadership test for small units.

1st Lieutenant Harry C. Mewshaw, 11th Cavalry, and \$425.00 in cash to the enlisted members of the platoon. The prizes are donated annually by "A friend of the Cavalry."

## Tables of Organization

THE Cavalry School has recently published "Tables of Organization. Reference Data. 1931-32—Peace Strength."

The "Introduction" states:


"This pamphlet, compiled by the Department of Tactics, assembles in convenient form certain reference data relative to organization, movement, supply, and designation of units for authorized peace strength."

"The figures shown in the tables contained herein are based upon tables of basic allowances, peace

strength, and authorized tables of organization, peace strength, except as indicated in the individual table, and are authoritative in the preparation and solution of all problems and exercises at The Cavalry School. Under actual conditions in the field these figures will vary depending upon the existing strength, number of absentees, terrain, weather, hostile fire, and other conditions, since the organic transportation and the tables of basic allowances as shown in tables herein, are constant for authorized peace strength, reduced peace or recruiting strength. For organizations taking the field on mobilization, the supplies, road distances, etc., required by an organization, are in the nature of the actual strength to authorized strength as shown herein, and may prove of value throughout the cavalry service in the several components of the United States Army."

The table of contents is most complete and covers Organization, Troop Movements, Trains, Class I Supply, Ammunitions, and Miscellaneous.

The pamphlet would be most useful in all squadron and higher headquarters.



**COVERED PICKET LINE, TROOP F, 3rd CAVALRY FORT MYER, VIRGINIA. (Winner—1926 GOODRICH TROPHY)**

This cover was made from salvaged material. It has been in use for two seasons. Its construction was largely due to the perseverance and initiative of 1st Sergeant Thomas Moffett.



**A TRIBUTE TO A GALLANT CAVALRYMAN**

Signal Corps Photo.

Colonel William K. Naylor, Chief of Staff of the 2d Corps Area, makes the principal address at the dedication of Morris Memorial Field, the polo field at Governors Island, New York, Sept. 15, 1932. This field is dedicated to Colonel Willis V. Morris, Cavalry, who did much to promote the game of polo in the United States Army. Colonel Morris died, while serving as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Headquarters, 2d Corps Area, as a result of injuries received while playing polo on Long Island, N. Y., in 1931. In polo costume is Major Paul R. Davison, G. S. C. (Cav.), A. C. of S., G-1, and Polo Representative, Hdqrs 2d Corps Area. (Troops and colors of the 16th Infantry in background).





## BOOK REVIEWS



THE NATION AT WAR, by General Peyton C. March. Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York. 376 pages—Illustrated; Indexed. Price \$3.00.

This book is so well known and has been so much discussed throughout the military service, it scarcely needs a review in these columns. Extracts from the book have already appeared in the press and have undoubtedly been read avidly by all students of military lore. However, these extracts are those which would be most likely to catch the public eye and, it should be stated, fail to do justice to the book as a source of military study.

General March has not trusted his memory completely in the writing of his book, but has made extensive use of the files of the War Department. As these files were compiled while he was at the head of the great war machine of 1918, they are really his own, but are the official records nevertheless.

The book is not a chronological account of the activities of the War Department but treats each of its activities under a separate head.

After a brief discussion of the Army as it was when the United States entered the World War and of the grand strategy of the Central Powers, and the military situation at that time, General March tells of the War Department as he found it when he returned from France in March, 1918, and of how it was reorganized after that time. In three chapters entitled The Great Shipping Saga he tells of how ships were obtained and men shipped to France, of how ships were obtained and cargo was shipped to France and finally of how the A. E. F. was returned to home shores for demobilization. He tells how the Siberian and the Archangel Expeditions came about. The chapters on Industrial Mobilization and Demobilization should be studied assiduously by all who entertain hopes of being "the man of the hour" should his nation ever become engaged in a struggle calling for maximum effort. The chapters on the organization and activities of the Supply Service, the Air Service, Welfare Organizations, Censorship, and the Draft Law are valuable sources for War College studies on these subjects.

These are the chapters which the military student, striving to equip himself to take his place in a great war machine, will find the value. There are other chapters dealing more with personalities which, while not detracting from the military value of the book, give it a human interest touch which makes it absorbing to all—the military historian, the patriot, and the idle reader. These are the chapters on why General Wood was not sent to France; President Wilson as a war Commander-in-Chief; Mr. Lloyd George; General Bliss; Congress and the War Department; and the A. E. F. from the War Department records.

*The Nation at War* is a book which should be found in every thinking man's library. It will be quoted in World War controversies for years to come. It will be referred to in many studies on the planning and conduct of war. It will be the basis for much of the history of the American participation in the World War.

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WORLD STATES OF THE MACHINE AGE, Capt. Woodbern E. Remington, Infantry. Gilbert Printing Company, Columbus, Georgia, 1932.

"World States of the Machine Age," a brilliant discussion of conditions of the present day, by Captain Woodbern E. Remington, and released by a local printing company a few days ago, has a triple claim to interest of Columbus people. As the most ambitious undertaking of the Columbus printing company, it would alone attract favorable attention; as the work of a Fort Benning officer who this winter made his home in Columbus, it will create further interest; for its clear cut analysis of world conditions of today, it will challenge the thought of thinking people.

"World States of the Machine Age" carries a foreword by Major General Campbell King, commandant of Fort Benning, in which he says, "The subject matter is one which vitally concerns the future economic and political status of mankind. The discussion is predicated upon a broad background and shows an extraordinary degree of scholarly research. It is a book which should be carefully read and seriously pondered by all those who are concerned with the amelioration of the present conditions which confront the civilized world. I congratulate the writer heartily on the brilliant analysis he has made of these conditions and the remedies, both political and economic, which he discusses as necessary to cope with the complications incident to the development of the Machine Age."

In his preface Captain Remington lifts the guilt for the present international chaos from the Great War, which he says was but "a phase of a tremendous world-wide social upheaval—the attempt of humanity to adjust itself to the Machine. Those extensive organizations of humanity, necessitated by the Machine Age, will be shaped on racial lines. It is with these new social organizations which we have termed 'World States,' that we are now concerned. Until they are finally consummated, we must continue to undergo such periods of industrial depression and political unrest as we are now experiencing."

In a scholarly review of Captain Remington's book, which for lack of space we cannot publish in full, Major Truman Smith says:

"Captain Woodbern E. Remington, Infantry, U. S. A., a Harvard man and a soldier by choice, has

recently published a book of unusual significance for our changing World, and which will be of equal interest to soldiers, scientists and scholars.

"Captain Remington urges, as a preliminary step toward World unity, the coalescence of those nations, akin by custom, ideals and blood relationship, into super states; for instance a Latin America, a Slavia, a Mediterranean empire, a Far Eastern Mongol state. Such coalescences in addition to serving a distinct purpose in this machine age would constitute definite progress towards world unity.

"Remington is conservative in his program for the future. Rejecting visions of leagues and world super states all at once as the dreams of impractical idealists, he urges the creation of tariff unions by blood related states. For America and England, he demands an economic alliance into which will also be admitted the Scandinavian and Teutonic countries. Such an economic alliance, Remington suggests, should be based on a system of tariff preferences and trade agreements, much along the lines which the British empire proposes to discuss at the coming Ottawa conference. If Dutch South Africa, French Canada and Anglo-Scotch New Zealand can come to an economic agreement, Remington sees no insuperable obstacles to a similar agreement among racially allied English, Swedes, Teutons and Americans.

"It has already been suggested that racial blood kinship is to be the cementing tie in these race-nations of the future. However, the life flood of these states is to be its internal trade.

"There is no one who has tasted the economic absurdities of the Danubian states as created by the peace treaty, who does not realize how obsolescent the nationalism of small states has become in this machine age. What reason is there, in the efforts of nations such as Denmark and Austria to become economically self-sufficient in an age when the two hemispheres are scarcely a day apart by aeroplanes? Remington believes, and this reviewer shares his belief, that if nationalism is to survive, the small nations must be amalgamated into economically self-sustaining blocks. That feeling which we now understand as patriotism must in the future strictly limit itself to a love of one's locality. Our present feeling of patriotism must be transferred from the 'nation' to the 'racial group.'

"The formation of such superstates, if it can be accomplished, will inevitably lead on to world unity."

"World States of the Machine Age" is written in a clear, readable style. It is to be placed on the shelves of the larger libraries of the country.—*The Ledger-Enquirer*, Columbus, Georgia.

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BETWEEN THE BIG PARADES, by Franklin W. Ward. New York: Frederick M. Waterbury, 1932. 284 pages. \$2.50.

One of the most widely known National Guardsmen in the country is the author of this work. He has added a real contribution to the history of the American Expeditionary Forces in France. It is essentially the story of an infantry division's human

elements in war, with refreshing individual bisections predominating.

The word pictures are unusually well done many of the events related standing out like snapshots. At times the reader becomes, as the author indicates, an imaginary wayfarer on the road to Ronssoy in France, who will watch that which as a fanciful observer he is to witness.

Replete with exploits, adventures and misadventures in which wit and humor dominate, there is closely woven into the fabric many incidents that pierce the depths of pathos and tragedy. The descriptions of the minutia of long fatiguing marches of infantry through rain and mud; building up a combat line, long battle action, and in the end practical exhaustion; are comparable with the very best that military literature has produced.

The author deals with the abstract and withal philosophic atmosphere of fighting men, and sounds notes that come only from the hands of men of observation who have served and marched and lived amongst them.

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THE COMING OF SOUTH AMERICA, by Henry Kittredge Norton. Published by the John Day Company, New York, 1932. 300 pages. Price \$3.50.

It would probably be safe to make the statement that the average citizen of the United States says, "Latin America"—and immediately visualizes revolutions, bananas, Sandino and our own U. S. Marines, the entire conglomeration being somewhere south of the Rio Grande River and Tia Juana! In this volume Mr. Norton dissipates the fog. As a representative of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the distinguished author has recently spent many months in South America studying political and economic developments in the leading South American countries, and here records his "reflections and analyses."

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Peru are all great countries, each one with an individuality of its own, and all resentful at being classed simply as "Latin America." Each one has a different internal problem and maintains different relations with each other and with the United States. The author notes that at present there is considerable ill-will shown towards the United States, due to the more or less crude manner in which our financiers handled the numerous postwar loans made with them. Mr. Norton records briefly the revolutions of the past two years and discusses the internal political, social and economic problems. He makes an estimate of the trends of development in each country, and forecasts their political, cultural and economic relations with the United States.

It is plainly apparent to all students of international affairs that eventually there will be much closer union between the countries of the Americas, North and South, than exists today, and for the reason Mr. Norton's book is most appropriate at this time. It is recommended to all officers.

# The Foreign Military Press

Reviewed by Major Alexander L. P. Johnson, Infantry

COLOMBIA—*Revista Militar del Ejército*—January-February, 1932.

In honor of the Bicentennial of the birth of George Washington the *Revista Militar del Ejército* of Colombia dedicates the opening pages of this issue to the Father of Our Country whose likeness adorns this ably edited military periodical as a frontispiece. The editors reproduce on this occasion the correspondence that passed between the great Liberator, Simón Bolívar, George Washington, P. Custis, Lafayette and others regarding the George Washington portrait and relief presented by the Washington family, in 1825, to General Bolívar through Lafayette. A thumbnail sketch of the life of Washington appropriately completes the tribute of our comrades in arms of the Colombian Republic. May the ideals and precepts of Bolívar and Washington ever cement the friendship that happily prevails between the nations which owe their existence to the genius of these great Liberators of the North and South.

CANADA—*Canadian Defense Quarterly*—April, 1932. "An Unsubstantial Frontier of Europe," by An Observer.

"One of the many territorial problems," writes the author, "which had to be dealt with by the Allied Powers at the close of the Great War was that of the frontier between the resurrected countries of Poland and Lithuania." That frontier, fourteen years after, is still one of the unsettled and constantly irritating problems of Europe. For several centuries the two countries were more or less united. Although the golden age of Poland coincides with the reign of the Jagellones, her Lithuanian dynasty, it was Polish culture that bid fair to cement the two nations firmly together. The partition of Poland interrupted this peaceful evolution. With the collapse of Russia and Germany, Poland and Lithuania came back into existence as independent but separate states. There was keen controversy as to the national frontier. In the disputed areas the populations were thoroughly mixed. The main area in dispute was the district of Vilna including the city of Vilna claimed by the Lithuanians as their national capital. The League of Nations awarded the district to Lithuania. A Polish general—ostensibly disowned by the Polish government—seized Vilna by force and defied Lithuania and the League of Nations to dislodge him. The League of Nations, following the advice of the Council of Ambassadors, reversed its decision and awarded the district to Poland. Lithuania broke off relations with her neighbor and refused to recognize the League's decision. Along the frontier which now separates these nations, Poland maintains a chain of guardhouses placed at intervals from 6 to 10 km and Polish frontier guards keep a vigilant watch over Lithuanian

approaches. The Lithuanians, on the other hand, with significant consistency refuse to establish any sort of guardhouses or watch towers along a frontier which they decline to recognize. As might be expected, frontier clashes between sentries of the two states are rather of common occurrence. On dark, stormy nights Lithuanian patrols have a trick of moving frontier markers farther back into Polish territory. The Poles of course move them back as soon as they detect the trick, perhaps adding here and there a few yards to their territory. There are neither roads nor railroads across this troubled frontier.

Although Lithuania alone cannot hope to do anything to change the situation, serious danger lurks in the circumstance that behind Lithuania are Germany and Russia, neither of whom is likely to remain satisfied with the present territorial arrangements. Whenever either of them regards the time ripe for action, the Lithuanian frontier with its constantly recurring incidents and atmosphere of permanent friction may offer a convenient place for the striking of the spark which will set the powder magazine ablaze.

AUSTRIA—*Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen*—January-February, 1932.

"Did Armaments Cause the World War?," by Major General Franz Schubert.

"The members of the League of Nations subscribe to the principle that the preservation of the peace demands the reduction of armaments," thus quotes the author from an official pronouncement of the League. The author goes on to show that in 1912, France appropriated for her military and naval establishments about 30, Germany 23 and Austria-Hungary 10½ gold crowns per capita of population. The gold crown was worth about 23 cents, U. S. currency. In 1913, the author states, there were with the colors in France one soldier for every 65 inhabitants. The ratio in Germany was one for every 98 and in Austria-Hungary one for every 128. At the outbreak of the war France mobilized 8 per cent of her population, Germany 5½ per cent and Austria-Hungary only 2¾ per cent. Thus, the author observes, "if armaments were actually responsible for bringing on the World War, the blame certainly cannot rest with the Central Powers. Notwithstanding these facts, the author continues, the Central Powers were charged with war guilt and were as a punishment disarmed, while France and her allies continued to arm to a point where their present armament far exceeds that of the pre-war period.

The author does not answer the query he chose as a title for his thesis, except by implication, that the armaments of the Entente, notably of France rather than those of the Central Powers brought on the war. The arguments advanced are not convincing



for, unfortunately, statistical figures can be used to prove anything.

FRANCE—*Revue d'Artillerie*—February, 1932.  
"The 155 mm Schneider Gun."

The new platform mounted 155 mm Schneider gun with an all-around field of fire is characterized by its ease of manoeuvre, rapidity of fire and great mobility. These qualities are essential considering that this gun



The 155 mm Schneider Gun in Firing Position.

is intended for use against aerial as well as ground targets. The gun, set at an angle of 45 degrees, will fire a 50 kilogram projectile a distance of 26 kilometers with an initial velocity of 900 meters. Mounted upon a platform with a semi-circular track, the gun is capable of firing in any direction at elevations from  $-8$  to  $+45$  degrees. The breechblock is easily operated at any angle of elevation. The rate of fire is four to five rounds per minute at angles of elevation between zero and 25 degrees, and three to four rounds per minute at elevations above 25 degrees.

The gun is normally transported in three loads, the gun, the carriage and the platform. It can be transported in a single load. The gun can be put into action in a very short space of time without the necessity of excavation. The projectile, weighing 50 kilograms, contains 5.580 kg of explosives. The powder charge weighs 19.500 kg. The maximum range is 26 kilometers. The field of fire is 160 degrees which by a simple shifting of the semi-circular track is increased to 360 degrees.

The gun in battery, including platform and track, weighs 16,400 kg.

—*Revue Militaire Francaise*—February, 1932.  
"Yorktown (1781)," by General de Cugnac.

The Sesqui-Centennial of Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown, at the commemoration of which, in October, 1931, Marshall Pétain participated as the official representative of France, furnished the motive for General de Cugnac's very interesting and able monograph of that memorable campaign. "This short and brilliant campaign," writes the distinguished author, "is largely ignored by the French public. It well deserves to be known. Remarkable for its strategic conception and for the perfect cooperation between the land and


sea forces, it was a small affair from the point of view of actual numbers involved, but most important from the point of view of actual results. The Franco-American victory at Yorktown assured the independence of the United States, changed the map of the world, and for these reasons is the greatest event in modern history."

Tracing in detail the events of that truly remarkable campaign on land and sea, which, after three months, culminated in the capitulation of the British at Yorktown, the author concludes that it is difficult to find in history another campaign as perfectly conducted. "Everything merits admiration; the perfect collaboration of France and America, as well as the excellent relations which existed between the allied general staffs; the correct strategic plans; perfect tactical disposition of troops and naval forces; the skill of the artillery on land and sea; the valor and endurance of French sailors, and both French and American troops." The most important factor, however, which made that victory possible was, the author points out, the mastery of the sea which de Grasse was able to secure. "The arrival of the allied siege artillery, the transport of infantry, the naval blockade and the inability of the British to bring up reinforcements, were all corollaries of French naval superiority."

GREAT BRITAIN—*The Army Quarterly*—January, 1932.

"Yorktown, 1781," by Captain M. E. S. Laws, M.C., R.A.

"At the present time, when popular clamor for disarmament may be expected to sway the judgment of



The 155 mm Schneider Gun, Traveling Position.

those who are responsible for the efficient maintenance of the country's fighting services," writes the author, "the unveiling of a tablet at Yorktown, Virginia, to commemorate the surrender of Lord Cornwallis' army to George Washington....teaches a lesson which we cannot afford to forget, namely our dependence on sea-power in war." The author believes, that the capitulation which lost the American colonies to England was the direct result of the temporary failure to retain command of the sea. He points out, that

after five years of war the situation was by no means unsatisfactory for England. The colonists, in spite of French aid, were disorganized and their enthusiasm for the war was on the wane. The British troops were, however, numerically weak and their operations were, in the author's opinion, hampered by friction between their commanders. Giving a brief outline of the progress of the campaign which ended with the surrender of the British at Yorktown, the author concludes that "the campaign had been badly mismanaged partly owing to personal jealousies between Clinton, Cornwallis and Germaine, the Secretary of State in London, and partly owing to ineffective cooperation between the naval and military commanders, but the immediate cause of the disaster was the unexpected arrival of de Grasse in overwhelming strength which gave to the enemy command of the sea." He believes, that without the assistance of the French fleet, Yorktown could not have been completely invested, and the British army could have been transferred either to Charleston or to New York.

The loss of the command of the sea by the British for a period of six weeks was, in the author's opinion, sufficient to finish at a blow the war, which had dragged on for six years. "The vital necessity for England to retain command of the sea in war," writes the author, "is so obvious, that the lesson of the Yorktown campaign must not be overlooked when the time comes to discuss further reductions in naval armaments." One cannot help to agree with the author when he concludes that "the cost of a powerful navy may be heavy to a nation already embarrassed by financial difficulties, but the inevitable penalty of weakness at sea will certainly be no less disastrous in the future than it was...at Yorktown."

GERMANY—*Militär-Wochenblatt*—January 11, 1932.  
"The Last 200 Meters," by Lieut. Col. Dr. Lothar Rendulic.

The difficulties involved in delivering a daylight attack under modern conditions of warfare will necessarily compel the attacker to launch his offensive as far as practicable under cover of darkness or to take advantage of poor visibility, natural or artificial. Even under the most favorable conditions the attacker will have to be content if he can come within 200 meters of the hostile main line of resistance. Whatever the time or conditions of the attack, the moment the infantry assault waves arrive within 200 meters of the enemy's line, supporting artillery fires must necessarily cease. During the most critical stage of the attack, the final assault, the attacking infantry is thrown completely upon its own resources.

In the light of war experiences, infantry on the defensive can recover its striking power quickly after the hostile artillery lifts its fire. The last 200 meters present a formidable problem to the attacker. The author seeks the solution in a proper employment of infantry weapons. Among these, he believes, the heavy machine gun is the most important. It should give uninterrupted support to the advancing skirmish line under all circumstances but more particularly so during the last 200 meters. This will frequently necessi-

tate the emplacement of heavy machine guns far to the front. The light machine gun plays an equally important part in the tactics of the final assault. The infantry mortar as the battalion commander's weapon should be used in advanced positions only under favorable conditions. The author observes that there is a growing demand for a light type mortar in the rifle company. These mortars would go into action within the combat zone of the rifle company. In the case of light mortars single bursts are more important than effective range, hence reduction of weight must not be sought by means of reducing the calibre. Moreover, a single calibre for both types of weapons would considerably simplify the ammunition supply. The author believes that the mortar is an indispensable weapon in that stage of the attack when the infantry no longer can receive the support of artillery.

Another very effective but somewhat neglected weapon is, in the author's opinion, the rifle grenade. It has, however, the serious drawback that only a small proportion of riflemen can be equipped with the rifle grenade, hence it is always a question whether or not the men so equipped will actually reach the point whence they may fire with the maximum effect. It would be difficult indeed to hold out initially rifle grenadiers with a view of bringing them forward at the critical time and place.

Different armies conceive differently the tactics of the final phase of the attack which begins approximately 200 meters from the enemy's line. The French favor a coordinated attack behind a rolling barrage. The line of departure may thus be several hundreds of meters from the enemy. The infantry advances to its objective without halt. Platoons and squads drive home the assault independently. The charging distance is about 10 meters. This plan of action, in the author's opinion, represents a purely infantry point of view. It fails to utilize fully the fire power of the artillery and of the heavy infantry weapons. In marked contrast to the French plan of action, Austrian combat regulations provide for heavy artillery concentrations either upon request of the infantry commander or upon the initiative of the artillery commander. The infantry must be in position to deliver the assault the moment the artillery lifts its fire. During the charge infantry weapons, notably hand-grenades supply the necessary support to pin down the enemy. The Austrian plan of action does not admit a rigidly meticulous organization of the attack except in zone warfare. The impulse to the charge germinates in the most advanced line. The artillery must keep itself thoroughly informed as to the progress of the attack and render the necessary support. Coordination is largely left to the respective commanders of the infantry-artillery team.

Tanks and attack aviation, in the author's opinion, will necessarily support the main effort. Their employment requires elaborate preparation, hence their usefulness, the author thinks, is largely restricted to position warfare.

Within the enemy's lines the action becomes a series of isolated combats of small groups. Control by the

higher echelons of necessity must give way to the initiative of subordinate leaders. A prearranged plan of coordination of supporting weapons is practically out of the question. In this situation infantry must be wholly independent of the artillery, hence heavy machine guns in close support assume particular importance.

The advance over the last 200 meters and the ensuing combat within the hostile position represent the decisive phase of the attack. They present such a variety of situations that, in the author's opinion, it is quite futile to lay down rules to cover all possible contingencies. It is, therefore, important that the peace-time training of leaders and troops take full cognizance of this fact, and provide the practical means of inculcating initiative and resourcefulness in subordinate leaders in order to enable them to meet situations effectively and efficiently as they arise.

—*Wissen und Wehr*—April, 1923.

"The Concentration of the Cavalry," by Konrad Leppa.

An interesting study and discussion of the strategic concentration and employment of cavalry by the various belligerents during the early stages of the World War. The author, a general staff officer with the Austro-Hungarian First Army during the war and a noted writer on military subjects, reaches the conclusion, that nowhere was the employment of the cavalry correctly conceived either strategically or tactically. In the West as well as in the East, cavalry divisions rode practically side by side, but there was never an attempt to assemble under a single leader a cavalry force of several divisions for the purpose of seeking a decision. The great lessons of the campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great seem to have been forgotten. Both of these great generals consistently used the cavalry in large bodies. The high commands and general staffs of the World War apparently did not think in terms larger than the division. Russia, France and Austria-Hungary, according to the author, even neglected to create the necessary cadres for the command and general staff of cavalry corps. No thought was apparently given to the possibility that such large bodies of cavalry might be en-

trusted with important missions during the period of concentration. The consequence of the erroneous views which prevailed regarding the employment of cavalry, the author believes, was its faulty concentration, and this inevitably led to a gradual dissipation of that arm during the progress of the war. "It is not easy to lead cavalry," writes the author. "The best cavalry can prove its worth and mettle only when led by a great cavalry leader. Great generals are born and not appointed. This applies with equal if not greater force to cavalry generals."

HUNGARY—*Magyar Katonai Szemle*—June, 1932.

"French or Italian Orientation," by Ladislav Nyíri.

The author discusses Hungary's foreign policy as to whether it ought to follow a French or Italian orientation. Although, in the author's opinion, the peace treaties which terminated the Great War bear the stamp of French imperialism, the treaty of Trianon would not have been as severe had it not been for France's bitter hostility towards Germany. The German people, he states, were misled at the peace conference by assurances to the effect that Germany's disarmament was not a punishment but merely a prelude to universal disarmament. He presents graphically the European armament situation as shown below.

A glance at the map of post-war Europe shows that Germany is encircled by the armies of France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland aggregating nine million men. France, reenforced by the states of the Little Entente and Poland succeeded in securing the balance of power against the Anglo-Italian-German group. The author raises the serious question, whether or not France might in time be tempted to pursue a policy which is bound to lead to war.

The author believes that Germany will not consent to perpetual isolation. It is natural that she should turn towards Russia for assistance. Although much is said about the Red Army one way and the other, it is certain that Soviet Russia possesses an excellently equipped military establishment which as far back as 1920 was able to overpower the Poles. In order to counter the Russo-German menace, France sponsored the Polish-Rumanian military accord which places the combined forces of those nations under Marshal Pil-

|   |                |           |
|---|----------------|-----------|
| ■ | U.S.S.R.       | 6,500,000 |
| ■ | FRANCE         | 4,500,000 |
| ■ | POLAND         | 3,200,000 |
| ■ | RUMANIA        | 2,000,000 |
| ■ | CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 1,300,000 |
| ■ | YUGOSLAVIA     | 1,150,000 |
| ■ | BELGIUM        | 600,000   |
| ■ | GERMANY        | 100,000   |

European Armament Situation



Post-War Europe



sudski's command in the case of a war. If however, the Polish-Rumanian army of five million men facing Russia's six and a half million were attacked in the rear, conceivably their front might collapse. Thus, the creation of a second strategic grouping becomes a necessity. In this connection Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia might come into consideration. So far, Hungary has been left out of all reckoning partly because of the disinclination of France and her allies to grant Hungary any concessions, and partly, because Hungary in her present mutilated condition would be of little value to France. Hence, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia may be regarded as France's strategic reserves. Czechoslovakia is in a particularly favorable position to menace Berlin. The author concludes, that Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are important bulwarks of French capitalism against any possible soviet assault and at the same time are valuable supports in any anti-German action. Thus, France's vital interests demand the preservation of these states, and it follows, that any revision of the treaty of Trianon in favor of Hungary is contrary to the interests of France.

On the other hand, Italy's renunciation of the eastern shore of the Adriatic in favor of Yugoslavia was a genuine sacrifice, the author believes, for as long as another flag flies on that sea, Italy's eastern coast must be provided with adequate defenses. It is one of the motives behind the Italian policy of expansion eastwards, which quite conceivably may lead to a conflict with Yugoslavia. Although Italy's army is numerically superior to that of Yugoslavia, the narrow frontier, which separates the two kingdoms, is ill-adapted to elaborate military operations. It is for this reason that Italy has a peculiar interest in Albania. An invasion of Yugoslavian territory across the Albanian frontier would, however, likewise prove difficult, the author believes, unless Italy is able to secure certain strategic points in Albania before the outbreak of hostilities. Necessarily Italy must pursue a foreign policy which will be helpful to her in her quest for the mastery over the Adriatic. Hungary, by her geographic position, might seriously menace Yugoslavia, but only if Hungary could recover her former strength. It follows, the author concludes, that it is in the interest of Italy that Hungary should recover her former frontiers. On the other hand, the author adds, the best interests of Yugoslavia dictate that she secure Hungary's benevolent neutrality by offering some territorial concessions.

**POLAND—Bellona—February, 1932.**

"Operations of Major Units," by Colonel I. Rowecki.

This valuable study of the fundamental principles of military operations of major units and their practical application in manoeuvres for the training of troops in time of peace, furnishes some very interesting information regarding Soviet Russia's preparations for winter warfare. As is well known, no special provisions had been made for winter operations by any of the powers before the Great War. When the problem became acute, as in the campaign in the Carpathian Mountains, situations were met as they arose.

Since the war only France, Italy, Germany and Soviet Russia have undertaken specific measures to solve the problems presented by winter warfare.

The Soviet Army, as a result of its experiences in the Polish-Soviet war, in Karelia and the Marmansk Coast, attributes such importance to adequate preparation against the contingency of a winter campaign, that it adopted as its slogan the doctrine: "The colder the weather, the deeper the snow, the greater will be the activity of the Red Army." Elaborate preparations have been undertaken since 1925 in that direction, and the last three years show some very concrete results. The time of planning and experimentation is over. They have succeeded in solving the problem of transportation of personnel and materiel. Infantry and artillery as well as the other arms and services, the author states, have been trained in the operation of "aero-sleighs." Winter manoeuvres have taken the place of the traditional summer exercises.

It is noteworthy, the author observes, that military and technical writings on this subject are very popular in Russia, and they are being published on an unprecedented scale. Whole editions are sold out as soon as they get off the press.

**SWITZERLAND—Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitung—October 15, 1931.**

"Camouflage as a Full-Fledged Arm." by Major Kaiser.

"Camouflage" or "tarning," as the author calls it, is the means of making invisible persons and objects. Although it is not a new discovery, it really gained full military recognition only in course of the World War. Conditions of modern warfare make effective camouflage an indispensable adjunct to military operations. To render our own troops invisible—of course assuming their correct tactical employment—is absolutely necessary to secure victory at a minimum of cost. It follows, that means of tarning must be provided for each man, beast and weapon. Effective tarning or camouflage must render the individual and his equipment invisible at a distance of 100 meters even in an open field. A machine gun crew must be invisible to an observer with binoculars at a distance of several hundred meters. In any event, camouflage must provide invisibility against aerial observation.

The author discusses a system of tarning invented by the Bavarian painter Linnekugel. It provides equally effective camouflage in bright and dull weather as well as under the varying conditions incidental to seasonal changes. In actual field tests skirmishers and machine guns were deployed in an open field. Although the occupied area was definitely marked, observers using field glasses could see nothing at distances from 400 to 500 meters. Advancing slowly while making a careful search of the terrain, the observers were unable to discover anything even at 50 meters. Numerous suspicious spots were pointed out by them, but none of them harbored tarning troops. In course of the test observers were asked to face about. While doing so the tarning was removed and "objects" became visible. Another "about face" while

tarning was restored, and objects became as invisible as before defying discovery once more. The tests demonstrated the mobility and ease of manipulation of the camouflage. In a further test with troops advancing as in an attack, the camouflaged troops actually fired a number of rounds at 400-500 meters. Neither observers nor the advancing troops were able to locate the point of origin of the shots. Advancing under cover under simulated battle conditions the "attackers" soon began to disclose a degree of nervous tension which became quite acute when, at 100 meters, the camouflaged "enemy" opened a brisk rapid fire. In battle the situation would no doubt have developed into a serious panic.

It was noted, writes the author, that where the terrain offered natural concealment, such as bushes, grass, humps of soil, etc., the "attacker" invariably directed his fire against such natural objects. He concludes, that well camouflaged troops possess a tremendous advantage, both moral and tactical. They will suffer fewer casualties and may calmly permit a numerically superior enemy to approach to closest proximity and annihilate him within a few minutes with a well-directed fire. Tarning permits a considerable thinning out of lines and a considerable reduction in the size of the garrison required for a given area. The author is of the opinion, that the war of the future will be fought under the sign of the new system of camouflage called "tarning."

#### General Military Information

AUSTRIA. The peace army and reserves of European powers are as follows:

|                      | Active Army | Reserves  |
|----------------------|-------------|-----------|
| France .....         | 612,000     | 4,100,000 |
| Italy .....          | 250,000     | 3,500,000 |
| Yugoslavia .....     | 110,000     | 1,500,000 |
| Rumania .....        | 186,000     | 2,000,000 |
| Poland .....         | 266,000     | 3,200,000 |
| Czechoslovakia ..... | 130,000     | 1,000,000 |
| Belgium .....        | 67,000      | 530,000   |
| Russia .....         | 1,200,000   | 6,500,000 |

Based upon peace strength, France ranks first with 12 soldiers per 1000 population. At war strength, Poland mobilizes most heavily with 117 soldiers per 1000 population. Compared with these figures, the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with 31,000 officers and 364,000 men, inclusive of the Austrian Landwehr and the Hungarian Honvéd, actually mobilized in 1914 a total of 1,396,000 men, one-third of the present available man-power of France. (*Oesterreichische Wehrezzeitung*, January 22, 1932).

ITALY. According to the "Giornale d'Italia," the Italian division at war strength consists of 534 officers and non-commissioned officers, 9808 men, 681 horses, 150 guns, 54 tanks and 364 motor vehicles. The newspaper observes that the present division bears the stamp of the fascist regime and that, in the matter of equipment, it is fully apace with other modern armies. The principal characteristics of the Italian army are: extensive use of massed offensive weapons, strong artillery and the motorization of all essential

elements of a mobile force. The smallest unit is supported by machine guns and artillery to the extent that it can execute far more difficult missions than was the case in the past. (*Deutsche Wehr*, December 18, 1931).

POLAND. The artillery of the Polish army consists of 30 divisional field artillery regiments, one mountain artillery regiment, 13 horse artillery battalions, 10 heavy artillery regiments and six independent anti-aircraft artillery battalions. During the range practice period artillery units are placed under the control of artillery group commanders, but at all other times they are subordinated to the commanders of the higher echelons of which they are an organic part. The artillery group comprises all artillery within a corps area with the exception of the anti-aircraft artillery.

The President of the Polish Republic exercises supreme command over all armed forces through the Minister of War and the Inspector General. The War Ministry has charge of all military and naval affairs. The Inspector General is the commander-in-chief designate of all forces in case of war.

Security on the eastern frontiers of Poland is provided by the "Border Guard Corps," a well organized corps d'élite of 1078 officers, 7,183 non-commissioned officers and 19,752 men. Its commander is a general officer. The command is in matters of discipline subject to the Ministry of War, but with reference to its special mission, pay and maintenance it is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior.

The German, Czechoslovak and Rumanian borders are guarded by the "Frontier Watch" which, like the preceding, is organized along military lines with a brigadier general in command. The organization comprises five districts (regimental sectors) each of which is under the command of a colonel or lieutenant colonel. Each district consists of 3 to 5 circuits (battalion sectors) commanded by majors. In addition there are a number of separate mounted detachments. The Frontier Watch consists of 275 officers, 1,806 non-commissioned officers and 3,576 men. In matters of discipline this force is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War, but as to its special functions, pay and maintenance it pertains to the Ministry of Finance. (*Deutsche Wehr*, December 18, 1931).

SOVIET RUSSIA. *Tchassavoy*, a Russian periodical published in Paris contains an interesting article on the Red Army by the pen of A. Saizov, Russian emigré. Although bitterly hostile to the bolshevik regime, the author notes considerable progress made by the Soviet army during the past few years. In his opinion, the Soviet army no longer lags behind the armies of neighboring countries in matters of organization and training. In some respects, notably in the matter of aviation, the Red Army actually surpasses them. The militarization of Russia is complete. There are no difficulties in the matter of replacements. Regulations are up to date. War industries have been placed upon an effective basis. The "Achilles heel" appears to be in the command. The author does not believe that commanders are qualified to meet the exigencies of

modern warfare. The antipathy which exists between soldiers and politicians is likewise a fruitful source of possible difficulties. The army is apparently striving for its emancipation from political tutelage. (*Militär Wochenblatt*, October 18, 1931).

In a copyrighted article published serially in the Budapest daily, "*Pesti Napló*" Elias Tobenkin, a Russian, gives a graphic account of his observations during a recent sojourn of several months in Soviet Russia. He writes that Soviet propaganda is seeking to convince the masses that the success of the five-year plan is upsetting the equilibrium of the capitalist world. As a consequence class struggle is becoming more and more acute in the bourgeois states where the upper classes are seeking protection under the banner of fascism while the working classes gravitate towards bolshevism. In order to avoid the proletarian revolution, the capitalistic states, according to the leading minds of Moscow, will unite against the Soviet Union. War, they say, is inevitable because the capitalistic governments are determined to wipe out the Soviet state. In Russia, the author states, preparations against such a contingency accord to women a part fully as important as that assigned to men. Not only are the women trained and prepared to replace men in all civilian occupations, but large numbers of them actually receive military training. There are at present 250,000 women in active service with the colors. Of these, 60,000 are in the regular infantry, 55,000 serve in machine gun units, 40,000 are in the supply services, 10,000 in the Chemical Warfare Service, while the remainder belong to the artillery, air force and other arms.

In 1930, fifty women completed the general staff course. Many of the feminine veterans of the wars against White Russians hold important posts of command in the Red Army. In addition to the regular formations there are a number of territorial military organizations of women. The female battalions of Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk enjoy quite a reputation for military prowess. Mohammedan women are said to be splendid soldiers. They receive their military training together with Siberian troops of the line. Women reservists are called to the colors for annual maneuvers and serve side by side with regular troops. These maneuvers extend over a period of two months. After a refresher training course of two weeks women are assigned to male companies so that the proportion of females to males in each unit is about 30 per cent.

Voroshilov, Red generalissimo, in a recent address remarked that "women must serve in the army just as men. They must share with men in the duty of defending the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics." (*Pesti Napló*, July 3, 1932).

"War is inevitable. We must strive to carry the war into the territory of our enemies who plan to assail us. We must achieve victory at a minimum of sacrifices." Thus spoke Voroshilov, according to Tobenkin, at the opening of the IX Congress of the Komsomol (League of Communist Youth) which claims a membership of three million and which is organized and trained along military lines. On that occasion, To-

benkin writes, Voroshilov advocated an intensive campaign of education to familiarize the population with aviation and the nature of aerial warfare.

The rapid growth of aviation in Soviet Russia is significant, Tobenkin states. In 1928, Soviet Russian airways covered 11,971 km. Two years later they had expanded to 26,500 km. In 1931 they increased to 46,412 km., while it is expected that the current year will see the Soviet airways grow to 71,122 km. The five-year plan envisions a total of 110,832 kilometers by the end of 1933. These airlines provide direct connections between Moscow, Turkestan, the Caucasus and Siberia. Russian schools of aviation show this year an enrollment of 15,000 pupils. The number of military airplanes in commission is a secret but according to Kibishev, head of the Soviet Planning Commission, there are enough of them for the defense of the country. There are seven rigid type dirigibles under construction. They will be named: Lenin, Stalin, Old Bolshevik, Pravda, Klim Voroshilov, Ossoviachim and Kolkosnik. They will compose the Lenin squadron.

"Every factory is fortress," has become Soviet Russia's latest slogan. It is to signify that each factory is a bulwark in the Soviet line of defense which will crush the enemies of the Soviet Union. Particular significance is attached to chemical plants. In 1929, there were in Soviet Russia only 4,200 graduate chemists. The Soviet leaders expect to increase their number to 30,000 by October, 1933.

Russia wants war, Tobenkin writes, not to conquer new territories, but to gain new adherents to the Bolshevik creed. In the minds of Soviet leaders, war is the best means for propaganda, and they fully expect that the next clash of arms will bolshevize a string of countries in Europe and elsewhere. With the spirit of the Covenanters of old, Red soldiers enter the trenches carrying the rifle in one hand and the doctrines of Marx in the other. (*Pesti Napló*, July 10, 1932.)

YUGOSLAVIA. The air force of Yugoslavia consists at present of 7 air regiments stationed at Novi Sad, Serajevo, Skoplje, Zagabria, Nish, Zemun and Mostar. Six plants engage in the production of aircraft within the Yugoslav kingdom. The largest of these, "Ikarus Zmaj," with shops at Zemun and Novi Sad, has a capacity of 200 planes per year. The concern operates with French capital. The "Blajkovik" plant at Belgrade is operated by a Czech corporation. Other aircraft plants are the "Rogozharsky" at Belgrade, "Petrovich" at Zemun, the motor works at Racovitz and finally the state-owned aircraft factory at Kraljevo with an annual capacity of 250 planes.

The construction of strategical highways aggregating about 2,800 kilometers is under consideration by the Yugoslav government which is likewise making plans for a general improvement of the rail and river transportation systems of the realm. (*Deutsche Wehr*, January 15, 1932.)



# Organization Activities

## Fifth Cavalry

Fort Clark, Texas

BASEBALL has been very popular here during the past summer. A Post Baseball team was organized, as well as an intertroop league.

The Post Team has been very successful. Results of games played with Randolph, Kelly and Brooks Fields, and Fort Sam Houston, indicate that we have one of the finest in the Corps Area. The schedule and results indicated show the calibre of baseball played:

May 13—Ft. Clark 6, Pearsall, Texas 2

May 14—Ft. Clark 4, Charlotte 3

May 22—Ft. Clark 2, 8th Engineers 5

June 19—Ft. Clark 6, Eagle Pass 2

July 16—Ft. Clark 2, Randolph Field 4

July 17—Ft. Clark 9, Randolph Field 7

July 23—Ft. Clark 17, D. A. Russell 2

July 24—Ft. Clark 4, D. A. Russell 3

July 30—Ft. Clark 15, Ft. Crockett 0

July 31—Ft. Clark 9, Ft. Crockett 2

Summary: Fort Clark—Won 10—Lost 2.

The Inter-Troop League was won by Headquarters Troop, Fifth Cavalry. Although the schedule is not completed, Headquarters Troop is assured of winning the Post Exchange Cup, because of their unblemished record of 7 victories out of 7 games, which completes their schedule.

Although Polo has been an important activity at this Post during the past year, it was given a decided impetus this summer with the arrival of Capt. C. Lloyd Stafford, Capt. C. Burgess, and Lt. Thos. T. Thornburgh, all expert polo players. With this talent added to that already present, the coming fall and winter are looked forward to with great interest and anticipation. One game has been played this summer; the Fort Sam Houston Second Division Team visited us, and were turned back 6 to 5 in a very fast and interesting game. The line-ups were as follows:

| Second Division—5    | Fifth Cavalry—6   |
|----------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Lt. Hill          | 1. Lt. Ruffner    |
| 2. Lt. Cusark        | 2. Capt. Burgess  |
| 3. Lt. Hensey        | 3. Lt. Hammond    |
| Lt. Walker           | 4. Capt. Stafford |
| 4. Capt. J. A. Smith |                   |

However, at present, our energy is concentrated upon developing good Senior and Junior Teams, and our polo is composed mostly of practice games between various pick-up teams of Fort Clark officers. At the present time, Fort Clark can place a 9 goal team on the field, and with the very helpful coaching of experienced players, the younger officers are developing into competent players. Capt. Stafford and Lieut. Thornburgh carry 3 goal handicaps; Capt.

Burgess, 2 goal handicap and Lieut. Hammond, 1 goal. Plans are being made for trips to Marfa and San Antonio, Texas, where we hope to make very creditable showings.

The following officers are active polo players: Col. T. L. Sherburne, Fifth Cavalry; Capt. C. L. Stafford, Fifth Cavalry; Capt. C. Burgess, Fifth Cavalry; 1st Lt. T. T. Thornburgh, 1st Cavalry Brigade; 1st Lt. A. K. Hammond, Fifth Cavalry; 1st Lt. C. L. Ruffner, Fifth Cavalry; 2d Lt. C. C. W. Allan, Fifth Cavalry; 2d Lt. Edwin H. J. Carns, Fifth Cavalry; 2d Lt. C. B. McClelland, Jr., Fifth Cavalry; 2d Lt. C. A. Liehirie, Fifth Cavalry and 2d Lt. J. C. Blanning, Fifth Cavalry.

## Seventeenth Cavalry at Fort Lewis

ON SUNDAY, July 24th, 15 officers of the 17th Cavalry reported for fourteen days' active duty at Fort Lewis, Washington. Major Paul McCormick, Jr., 17th Cavalry, was in charge. Lieutenant Colonel Hartwell Palmer, Cavalry Reserve, assisted in the instruction.

Major McCormick was unable to finish his tour of duty; therefore Lieutenant Colonel Palmer assumed command and took charge of all instructional work. Major A. C. Searle, F. A., Instructor at 96th Division Headquarters, was liaison officer between the post and reserve officers. The training of the officers of the 17th Cavalry was really practical. Each morning we had a tactical ride which included map reading of the terrain actually covered. The afternoons were devoted to machine gun instruction or lectures on some other arm of the service as applied to cavalry. In the evenings we usually wrote estimates of the situation and the field orders which would be applicable to our day's tactical ride.

The camp was so conducted that each reserve officer felt as if he were receiving the training applicable to his grade.

## 103d Cavalry

Philadelphia, Penna.

THE results of the Inter-troop .30 cal. Rifle Match, firing the National Match Course (less 1000 yds.), held at the Essington Range, Sunday September 25, 1932, for the Major Edwards Hoopes Trophy, was won by Troop C with the following scores:

|                       |     |
|-----------------------|-----|
| Sgt. J. M. Williams   | 175 |
| Corp. S. W. Rawlins   | 174 |
| Pvt. J. G. Grigolanus | 166 |
| Sgt. H. N. Sailer     | 164 |
| Corp. W. A. Taylor    | 164 |
| Pvt. W. L. Stephens   | 141 |

Total ..... 984

Troop B was second with a total score of 891, Team members: Corp. H. A. Rule, Sgt. Elwell, Corp. Sangro, Sgt. J. Rule, Pvt. Slipp, Sgt. Weeks.

Troop A was third with a total of 809. Team members: Sgt. O'Brien, Corp. Ruffee, Corp. Jenks, Pvt. Purring, Corp. Ross, Pvt. Linde.

(Extract from Orders No. 10, 1st Squadron, 103rd Cavalry, signed by 1st Lient. Ralph V. H. Wood, Adjutant.)

### 104th Cavalry Members of U. S. Cavalry Association

THE following officers of the 104th Cavalry are members of the U. S. Cavalry Association:

Colonel Edward J. Stackpole, Jr.

Lieutenant Colonel George J. Shoemaker.

Majors: Benjamin C. Jones, A. H. Stackpole, Samuel E. Fitting.

Captains: Robert S. Cowan, John E. Shade, Hubert E. Thornber, Robert J. Krepps, Wm. A. E. Leitzinger, Jesse L. Waite, Benjamin I. Levine, Edwin D. Strite, Harris N. Summer, Allen J. Stevens, Clyde E. Fisher, Robert C. Lutz, John T. Bell.

First Lieutenants: James E. Snyder, John H. F. Bittner, Milton E. Koehler, Gay E. Duncan, Paul M. Kienzle, John K. Dufton, Thos. J. Barnhart, Ralph B. Brown, Walter C. Plasterer, Ira D. Cope, Wilbar Halbert, Charles M. Pollock, James C. Williams.

Second Lieutenants: Wayne W. Brame, Harry H. Billett, Lester A. Shull, Walter J. Gipprieh, John E. Gray, Harry C. McNew, Chas. G. Sheaffer, Edgar L. Dapp, Rollin M. Brightbill, John E. McCreight.

Warrant Officer Percy A. Swab.

### 114th Cavalry, Kansas National Guard

Topeka, Kansas

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL acknowledges with gratitude the support of this regiment, every officer of which is a member of the U. S. Cavalry Association. Their names follow:

Colonel: William K. Herndon.

Lieutenant Colonel: Paul A. Cannady.

Majors: Harold J. Bagby, Exie J. Monroe, Charles W. Gordon, Ralph A. Poe.

Captains: Roy N. Hillyer, Monte V. Kistler, Charles H. Kitselman, Harry H. Lowry, Roy L. McConnell, Joseph K. McVicar, Samuel P. Moyer, Clarence A. Nudson, Pete A. Pellegrino, William W. Ringer, Leo A. Swoboda, Chester L. Thomas, Robert L. Thompson, Jr., Francis W. Walden, Jewell K. Watt, Herbert M. Webb.

Lieutenants: Harlan I. Abbey, Braum L. Bentley, William R. Carpenter, Byron S. Cohn, Ward W. Conquest, Herbert L. Crapson, James H. Hetherington, Phillip H. Huffman, Elvin L. Keith, Emerson E. Lynn, Harry L. Lyon, Richard J. Marshall, Leo W. Mills, Francis E. Morawetz, Wendell W. Perham, George O. Reed, Claude N. Shaver, Frank W. Sutton, Albert P. Tustison, Charles O. Wiand, Harry O. Willhite.

Warrant Officer: Harry M. Swartz.

Grouped with the above are the following subscribers:

Unit Instructors: Major Welton M. Modisette, Cavalry; Major Thomas F. Limbocker, Cavalry; Staff Sergeant Claude M. Nash, Staff Sergeant Louis Rosenberg.

57th Cavalry Brigade: Major John B. Smith.

Cavalry Reserve Officers: Captain Harry W. Frazee; Lieutenants: Victor H. Anderson, Wendell M. Broadus, Richard M. Wilson.

### 305th Cavalry

Philadelphia, Penna.

UNDER the command of Colonel Wm. Innes Forbes, Cav.-Res., the 305th Cavalry reported at Fort Myer, Virginia for their 14-day active duty training period on August 7th.

Together with other Reserve Regiments, a number of Cavalry Brigade problems were worked out in the vicinity of Fort Humphreys. From the Reserve point of view these problems were well presented, were the very best instruction and were carried out to a satisfactory conclusion.

A number of new lieutenants received their first training with the Regiment, were favorably impressed with the Regulars at Fort Myer and have only high praise for the hospitality and consideration accorded them.

### 306th Cavalry

Baltimore, Md.

THE officers of the 306th Cavalry acted as Instructors during the last half of the Citizens' Military Training Camp at Fort Myer, Virginia, during July. Practically all instruction was turned over entirely to the Reserve officers, and they handled it in a highly satisfactory manner.

The work on the target range was particularly gratifying, as only a very few students failed to qualify.

Arrangements for inactive training are now being made, and it is planned to begin instruction in equitation at Fort Hoyle, Maryland, early in October.

### Second Squadron and M. G. Troop, 306th Cavalry

Washington, D. C.

TWELVE officers from these units attended active duty training during the summer.

Inactive training begins on Thursday evening, October 6, 1932.

It is hoped that last year's accomplishments will be exceeded, if possible, during the coming year.

The new Extension School Courses have proven to be most attractive and very beneficial, and our last year's enrollment of one hundred and three students may even be increased this year.

## 307th Cavalry

Richmond, Virginia

EIGHTEEN officers under Lieutenant Colonel William Henry Clifford received active duty training in connection with the C. M. T. C. during the period July 3rd—July 16th, at Fort Myer, Va. Three officers were on duty at Fort Myer, Va., during the period August 7th—August 20th.

Extension School enrollments have increased appreciably during the past month as the result of a drive to enroll 100%.

The following have recently been assigned to the regiment: 2nd Lieut. James G. Earnest, Jr., 2412A Stuart Ave., Richmond, Va., and Private Richard F. Beirne, Jr., Covington, Virginia.

## Third Squadron and M. G. Troop, 307th Cavalry

Norfolk, Virginia

THE 307th Cavalry completed an excellent tour of active duty training at Fort Myer, Va., on July 16, 1932. The period of training coincided with the first ten days of the Citizens Military Training Camp, and the regiment received, processed, organized and gave initial instruction to the 250 candidates who attended the camp. The result of this period of training was demonstrated on July 16th, when a mounted review was held for Colonel George T. Bowman, Cavalry, (D.O.L.), Chief of Staff of the 62nd Cavalry Division. The officers of the regiment commanded the CMTC squadron which passed in review at the walk and trot. The showing made would have done credit to any organization of much longer training and, considering the fact that this was only the sixth day that the CMTC squadron had been mounted, was a most remarkable exhibition of training.

Major David H. Blakelock, Cavalry, (D.O.L.), was the Unit Instructor of the regiment during the training period, and the following named officers of the 3d Squadron were among the eighteen officers of the regiment who conducted the training: 1st Lieut. Robert B. Batte, 307th Cav.; 1st Lieut. Henry H. Page, 307th Cav.; 1st Lieut. Southgate W. Taylor, 307th Cav.

Two officers from Norfolk attended the tactical training period of the 154th Cavalry Brigade at Fort Myer, Va., during the period August 7 to 20, 1932. Several other officers of the Squadron applied for this training, but shortage of funds prevented their attendance. The officers who attended were: 2nd Lieut. Kenneth W. Chapman, 307th Cav.; 2nd Lieut. William A. Trolan, 322nd Cav.

Colonel George T. Bowman, Cavalry, (D.O.L.), Chief of Staff of the 62nd Cavalry Division and Liaison Officer for Organized Reserves for the Third Corps Area is expected to visit Norfolk, Va., during the week of September 12th, and inspect the Newport News and Norfolk Group Schools, which will hold their first conferences of the winter season during that week. Colonel Bowman has many excellent

friends in Tidewater, Virginia who always look forward with much pleasure to his visits.

## 308th Cavalry

Pittsburgh, Pa.

THE officers of the regiment who attended Active Duty Training this summer were enthusiastic over the Camp. The training consisted to a great extent of a series of problems based on a continuing situation. These problems dealt with reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, cavalry in the attack and on the defensive and a withdrawal. The presence of an armored car gave a realistic atmosphere to the tactical rides, while on the return trip from Pohick a squadron of planes gave us a demonstration of an air attack against troops on the march.

Two promotions in the regiment have recently taken place. Captain Morehouse took his oath of office as a Captain while at Fort Myer, while Captain Ayres was sworn in shortly after our return to Pittsburgh.

## 462d Armored Car Squadron

Washington, D. C.

THE following officers of the Squadron under the command of Major William L. Covington, were ordered to active duty August 7th to 20th, at Fort Myer, Va.—First Lieutenants Ralph M. Lockhart, James T. Parkinson, Walter B. Gleason and Second Lieutenants Douglas W. Eiseman and William L. Morris.

The Squadron participated in the Tactical Exercises of the 154th Cavalry Brigade. During the Tactical Exercises, one of the latest type Armored Cars, a T-4 Six Wheeler, was furnished the Squadron from Aberdeen Proving Ground.

The training provided in the operation and employment of Armored Cars by both Cavalry and Ordnance Department Instructors was very interesting and instructive.

Washington, D. C., is the Headquarters of the 462nd Armored Car Squadron. One troop of the Squadron is stationed in each of the following cities: Richmond, Va., Philadelphia, Pa. and Pittsburgh, Pa.

## 862d Field Artillery (Horse)

Baltimore, Md.

THE regiment has returned from its active duty training at Fort Hoyle, Maryland, where it received its instruction under the guidance of the 2nd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery, and Battery C, 6th Field Artillery. About fifty percent of the officers of the regiment attended camp, and it was necessary to disappoint a number who sought to go. While the training demanded more time than in any previous camp, nevertheless it was well balanced with athletics and recreation.

Under the leadership of its commander, Lt. Colonel Roger S. B. Hartz, the regiment has made substantial and consistent improvement since its organization, and this improvement is especially evident at the end of each active training period.



(Continued from Page 32)

are sharpened. You learn to interpret instantly and accurately the evidence of your senses, you learn to look through the brush rather than at it, you acquire the ability to move swiftly but quietly, you study concealment both of your quarry and yourself, you appreciate the invisibility of a broken outline and immobility. In other words, you are developing a high order of skilled mental alertness, you are qualifying as a truly ideal scout, patrol leader, or reconnaissance car observer.

Then there is that tense moment when game breaks cover. It may be the whirl of quail in a wheat field or the crash of horns through the aspens. Line sights, lead and squeeze, all in split seconds! Here we develop true coordination. And incidentally, when it is up to me to face an armed enemy, I'd much prefer to do it boot to boot with men who have conquered their "buck fever" in the hunting field.

Stamina and determination! Have you ever followed a blood trail from dawn to dusk; stayed with it the next day with your feet blistering and your knees wobbly from fatigue, and finally taken that long-range shot despite your pumping heart—and brought in your trophy? Have you ever sat in a duck blind with the sting of sleet in your face, waiting for that "half hour before sunrise" and listening for the whistle of wings on the north wind? It is only common sense that men who do these things for the sport of it will "see it through" in campaign and combat.

Even a very little field shooting will multiply interest many times on the target range. Powder charges, shot patterns, weight of bullets, trajectories, all will be discussed in your day room. A twenty-two and a few squirrels compete favorably with your gallery practice. And the man after mountain goat must learn more about his piece than is required of an Expert Rifleman. Then, too, Rifle Marksmanship doesn't even mention the "lead" on a moving target;—but a coyote streaking through the mesquite or a pheasant winging across corn rows are wonderful instructors. It is a vital thing in open cavalry warfare or antiaircraft.

The best morale is built upon justifiable self-confidence well founded on past achievements, combined with the desire to achieve further. The second is largely the product of the first. These statements are true of the individual or the group. Woodcraft is a proverbial breeder of self-reliance,—the hunting field and camp of mutual confidence. Be he artist or laborer, the worker must know his tools. The tools with which most of us work are men. You will know a man better in five days' hunting than in three years of peacetime military service. And he will know you.

Of all this self-confidence, mutual reliance and knowledge of one another comes the highest type of team work. It is not the mechanical movement of the Manual of Arms,—it is not the machine precision of regiments at review,—it is something far more subtle, far more valuable. It is the interdependence of self-reliant men, knowing what they may expect of one another. It is the ideal team work on the field of battle today and tomorrow. Once your orders are issued and your command committed to action, it is the only team work that will overcome the unexpected and carry on. There may have been a time when the soldier was more a machine than a thinking apparatus;—but not now. If the soldier didn't have to think, we could build robots to replace him. Strange as it may seem, the more we mechanize warfare, the more we are forced to depend on the intelligence, judgment and initiative of the individual. Also, the more mobile the force, the truer this becomes.

Along these lines, consider the supervision of your men on hunting pass. Of necessity, little of it can be personal, but must operate through the channels of command. Your N. C. O.'s and more reliable men must handle hunting parties, whether for an afternoon or several weeks. This is the only control you will have in campaign over a mounted patrol, a reconnaissance car or many another function. So why not apply it here? It breeds confidence and cultivates a sense of responsibility all along the line. The officer whose supervision is limited to his range of vision doesn't belong in the Cavalry.

Sportsmanship, sometimes sadly lacking in army athletics, would justify the writing of volumes. Fundamentally it is the same in hunting as in any other sport, but its application is broader. It is based on a regard for law and property rights, consideration for others and a sympathetic respect for the game you hunt. Regard for law and property may be enforced through the supervision already mentioned. The rest will come through proper example and association. The fine points in the code of honor between hunters vary somewhat in different localities, but the principles are the same. These principles reveal themselves almost intuitively, once the over-anxiousness of the novice has subsided.

Needless to say, sportsmanship is necessary to desirable civilian contacts, for it is a thing recognized and respected even by those who do not possess it. Contacts so formed are wholly spontaneous and therefore more positive. Also, they are truly cosmopolitan, for in that glorious freemasonry of hunters, your friend, the cow hand, and your friend, the senator, meet, compete and live on terms of an equality that breeds true leadership.